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SUMMARY 
A contract strategy is, in broad terms, the legal-managerial framework adopted by the 
client of a construction project for carrying out that project. There is a view that projects 
are often procured using inappropriate contract strategies and that the associated 
financial consequences are significant. 
Following a review of previous research, it was concluded that there was scope to 
develop a decision methodology that utilised quantitative techniques. A prototype 
model was developed to facilitate the application of the quantitative approach. The 
model computes probabilistic cost and time measures of a project's performance for 
each contract strategy that is evaluated. 
Several industrialists were invited to evaluate the principles of the quantitative 
approach. From the fourteen industrialists interviewed, six simulated an application of 
the quantitative approach. Despite initial scepticism, the potential value of the 
quantitative approach was recognised. The six industrialists who performed example 
applications of the quantitative approach indicated that, in their view, the approach was 
workable. 
In response to the findings of the empirical study, an upgraded version of the model was 
designed. This version also addressed several intellectual compromises which had been 
made in the development of the prototype model. The refined model is applied to two 
example projects in order to demonstrate the potential utility of the quantitative 
approach and also to provide guidance on how to apply the model. 
It is acknowledged that the quantitative approach does not single out the most 
appropriate contract strategy for any given project. However, it is believed that the 
quantitative approach is most suited to deal with the decision problem's inherent 
complexities and is most likely to minimise the risk of irrational contract strategy 
decisions. It is therefore concluded that an improved understanding of contract strategy 
selection may result, especially on a personal level, from continued application of the 
quantitative approach. 
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1. Introduction 
The thesis opens with a brief description of the research subject and outlines the 
particular direction of investigation that was followed. The aims of the research and the 
structure of the thesis are outlined in sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively. 
1.1 Background to the research 
A contract strategy is, in broad terms, the legal-managerial framework adopted by the 
client of a construction project for carrying out that project. There is no precise 
definition of the term 'contract strategy', nor of other synonymous terms such as 
'procurement method' or 'procurement system'. Although the complete set of decisions 
that make up a contract strategy is unique to each project, there are certain broad 
strategic decisions that are common to all contract strategies. For example, ICE (1996) 
reported that decisions ensuing from the following questions establish the structure of a 
project contract strategy: 
1. Should the client employ consultants and contractors, or use its own employees? 
2. How many consultants and contractors are to be employed? If more than one 
organisation, are they to be employed sequentially or simultaneously? 
3. Who is to be responsible for what? 
4. Who is to bear which risks? 
5. What terms of payment will motivate all parties to achieve the client's objectives? 
The above questions indicate that contract strategy selection effectively encompasses all 
of a client organisation's decisions about how to realise its project. These decisions are 
made throughout the execution of a project, although some decisions have to be made 
immediately after a client has decided to go ahead with a project. Many decisions are 
interrelated and thus each decision may have an effect upon subsequent decisions. For 
example, the delegation of responsibility implemented at a project's outset is likely to 
effect the allocation of risks, which may not become an issue until a construction 
contractor is to be appointed. It follows, therefore, that contract strategies, in as 
complete a form as possible, ought to be evaluated at a project's outset (Thompson, 
1983; Perry, 1985; RICS, 1995). 
There is a widespread view that construction is inefficient on a number of levels, one of 
which is the use of inappropriate contract strategies (Latham, 1994). Since construction 
accounts for a significant percentage of the world's Gross Domestic Product, any 
efficiency gain amounts to a considerable sum. Therefore, research into the contract 
strategy decision problem is of great international commercial importance. 
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Contract strategy selection is clearly a major project decision. It is also a particularly 
complex decision problem because: 
1. there is an unlimited number of contract strategy alternatives and, owing to the 
intricate nature of contract strategies, there is no standard contract strategy 
classification system; 
2. it is widely accepted that the appropriateness of a contract strategy is dependent 
upon the particular circumstances of a project; and 
3. the uncertainties inherent both in the project and the decision-maker's knowledge 
about contract strategy selection mean that the decision process is reliant upon 
subjective, predictive judgement. 
The ultimate aim of any research in this field is to attain a set of rules that prescribe the 
most appropriate contract strategy for any project. However, such a set of rules appears 
to have remained elusive despite extensive research. Most existing contract strategy 
decision-aids are based on generalities derived from experiential, qualitative knowledge. 
The most detailed contract strategy decision-aids are expert systems (Sodipo, 1987; 
Moshini, 1993; Wang et al., 1996; amongst others) and models that use multi-attribute 
analysis (Skitmore and Marsden, 1988; Bennett and Grice, 1990; Griffith and Headley, 
1997; amongst others). All of these models contain pre-formatted knowledge of some 
type. In expert systems the pre-formatted knowledge dictates the decision options and 
the mechanism used to ascertain the appropriateness of each available option from a 
user's responses to decision criteria. The decision criteria within all the models, 
including multi-attribute types, can also be considered to be pre-formatted knowledge. 
However, it appears that the reliance on pre-formatted knowledge inhibits the decision- 
maker's flexibility and consequently undermines the models' validity and utility. 
It is appreciated that the decision problem has changed significantly in recent decades 
with the formalisation of a range of contract strategy types. Nonetheless, it is arguable 
that the decision problem is inherently as uncertain as when the first UK government- 
commissioned study into contractual arrangements was undertaken over fifty years ago 
(Simon, 1944). 
Given that every contract strategy and every project circumstances are unique and that 
the range of potential contract strategies is effectively infinite, it is argued that a 
contract strategy decision-aid must be flexible in order to permit the specifics of each 
decision problem to be addressed. The user should have the freedom to evaluate any 
potentially viable contract strategy and the decision-aid should ensure that the user is 
fully aware of the particular details of each contract strategy under evaluation. It is 
believed that a case-specific approach would enable the particular project details, 
together with the uncertainty presented by individual contract strategy decision 
problems, to be accounted for. Furthermore, the decision mechanisms in existing 
contract strategy decision-aids appear to be directed by the client's preferences. For 
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example, many decision-aids determine the appropriateness of a contract strategy 
according to, amongst other criteria, the client's requirements with regards to design 
completeness before letting the work. It appears more logical to rationalise contract 
strategy selection in terms of the price, duration and quality targets for a project (i. e. the 
client's primary objectives). 
The new perspective taken in this thesis has led to the development of a novel approach 
to contract strategy selection. The new approach effectively requires a decision-maker 
to reflect his/her perceptions about a contract strategy's potential impact upon a project 
in probabilistic estimates of the project's constituent cost and time elements. The 
estimates are combined to give probabilistic cost and time measures of project 
performance. 
To distinguish the proposed decision-aid from existing, largely qualitative techniques, it 
is referred to as the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. The 
quantitative approach is considered to have several advantages, including: 
" it ensures that contract strategies are evaluated on a case-specific basis; 
" the decision criteria are attuned to the client's primary objectives (i. e. price and time 
targets) and not to the client's preferences (e. g. risk allocation preferences, price 
certainty, etc. ); 
" once a decision-maker has translated his/her assumptions about the relative 
appropriateness of contract strategies into estimates of a project's constituent cost 
and time elements, it is possible to accumulate these estimates into a prediction of 
the respective project's overall price and duration for each evaluated contract 
strategy; 
" it requires the decision-maker's estimates to be explicit and hence open to debate 
and challenge; and 
" it may enable the decision-maker to more readily identify the impact that a selected 
contract strategy has upon a project's performance and thereby improve the 
decision-maker"s knowledge about contract strategy selection. 
Application of the quantitative approach is described throughout the thesis from the 
perspective of a construction client. However, the thesis typically refers to the person 
responsible for contract strategy selection as the "decision-makee' rather than the 
"client". This is because the decision-maker may be an external party appointed to 
advise the client on contract strategy selection. It is also important to note that the 
quantitative approach could be used by a contracting organisation to manage its 
contractual arrangements (i. e. sub-contracts), although the thesis does not address this 
option. 
The quantitative approach was developed specifically to aid contract strategy selection. 
The process of identifying and quantifying the likely impact of a contract strategy on a 
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specific project in terms of cost and time was expected to be a demanding and novel 
task for experienced contract strategists. Therefore it was appreciated that the approach 
may be unfeasible, impractical and possibly a hindrance rather than an aid to contract 
strategy selection. The following section reports that the potential limitations of the 
quantitative approach were identified and addressed from the outset of the research. 
1.2 Research aims 
The research set out to identify an approach to contract strategy selection that may 
reduce the likelihood of procuring projects with inappropriate contract strategies. It was 
also intended to develop a decision-aid that may be applied in practice. 
The specific objectives of the research can be surnmarised as follows: 
1. identify and critically evaluate the methodology commonly adopted by industrialists 
when selecting contract strategies; 
2. develop a new means of evaluating contract strategies that: 
" is attuned to the nature of the decision problem (i. e. unlimited and inconsistent 
decision options, reliant upon subjective knowledge, case-specific, directed by the 
client's objectives, etc. ); 
" can be used by practising industrialists responsible for contract strategy decisions; 
40 aids the decision-maker to make rational contract strategy decisions for each 
individual project; and 
has the potential to improve the industry's knowledge about contract strategy 
selection and thus may ultimately lead to the derivation of valid and useful decision 
rules. 
3. design and construct a decision-aid model that facilitates the application of the new 
approach to contract strategy evaluation; 
4. obtain an empirical measure of the feasibility and utility of the new approach and 
the decision-aid model. 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
A review of the most relevant literature is presented in Chapter 2. The nature of the 
contract strategy decision problem is described before the industry's typical approach to 
the decision problem is critically reviewed. It is inferred that the industry's approach 
typically lacks rigour, structure or explicitness. Similar deficiencies appear to have been 
integrated into existing contract strategy decision-aids. 
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Chapter 2 concludes that deficiencies perceived to be inherent in the industry's 
approach to contract strategy selection might be addressed if quantitative techniques 
were introduced into the industry's conventional approach. The feasibility of this 
suggestion is supported by reported cases of comparable methods applied to contract 
strategy evaluation. The final section of Chapter 2 outlines the novel approach to 
contract strategy selection which is developed in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 describes the development of a numerical model that embodies the principles 
of the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. Chapter 3 also describes the 
model that was implemented in Microsoft Excel. 
The feasibility and utility of the fundamental principles of the quantitative approach 
were tested by collecting the views of industrialists. Chapter 4 addresses important 
methodological issues before presenting the methods, results and conclusions of the 
empirical study. In addition to industrialists' opinions about the quantitative approach, 
the empirical study results include industrialists' example applications of the approach 
to hypothetical and previously-undertaken projects. These example applications were 
followed up by obtaining the industrialists' responses to the results generated by the 
preliminary version of the model. 
Chapter 5 reports refinements made to the prototype model presented in Chapter 3. The 
refinements were designed to amend several intellectual compromises made during the 
development of the prototype model whilst also taking into account insights gained 
from the empirical study. Risk analysis techniques and net present value calculations are 
amongst the refinements. 
The potential utility of the refined model is demonstrated by two example applications 
presented in Chapter 6. Finally, Chapter 7 reviews the research and outlines suggestions 
for further work. 
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2. Literature Review 
The chapter examines the nature of contract strategies and the process involved in their 
selection for construction projects. The significance of contract strategy selection is 
reported and a review of existing decision-aids is provided. 
The available literature on contract strategy selection suggests that the contract strategy 
decision problem is not addressed with the rigour and discipline that appears warranted 
given its reported complexity and importance. Section 2.2.4.2 introduces a range of 
quantitative approaches to contract strategy selection which demonstrate the potential 
for the development of an effective decision-aid. 
2.1 The nature of a project contract strategy 
A contract strategy is, in broad terms, the legal-managerial framework adopted by the 
client of a project for carrying out that project. The expression 'procurement' overlaps 
considerably with 'contract strategy', and neither of these terms are used consistently in 
the literature. 
In order to establish the fundamental nature of contract strategies, it is useful to break 
them down into their key components. Perry (19 85), Thompson and Perry (1992), Wang 
et aL (1996) and Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka (1996) identified similar broad 
decision areas which are considered to be prevalent in all contract strategies. According 
to Thompson and Perry (1992) and Wang et al. (1996), contract strategy selection 
involves decisions about the following: 
" number of work packages; 
" organisation of the roles of the parties and their boundaries; 
" terms of payment; and 
" basis for selecting contracting parties. 
Perry (1985) regarded these key decision areas as the "primary sub-systems of the 
contract strategy process". Perry (1985) listed the primary contract strategy sub-systems 
as: 
organisational structure; 
type of contract; and 
e tender process. 
Although these labels are not universal terms they are perceived, by the author, as useful 
and relevant terms of reference in the subject of contract strategy selection owing to the 
indeterminate nature of contract strategies. As a result, Perry's (1985) contract strategy 
sub-system labels are used throughout the thesis. This is with the exception that the 
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label 'pricing mechanism' is used rather than 'type of contract' because Perry's choice 
of reference to a contract's method of payment is considered ambiguous. 
A construction project is organised around a series of discrete contracts between various 
parties (Green and McDermott, 1996). The direct contracts between the client and other 
parties, particularly those related to construction work, are typically standard contract 
forms (Murdoch and Hughes, 1992). 
The remainder of this section describes each of the contract strategy primary sub- 
systems. It concludes with a critical summary of typical approaches to overall contract 
strategy classification. 
2.1.1 Organisational structure 
Gilbreath (1983) reported that the decisions which dictate a project's organisational 
structure are those which determine the number of contracting parties to be employed, 
the scope of work assigned to each party, including the client, and the division of 
responsibility within both the internal and external organisations. It is widely accepted 
that the complete set of decisions which represents the design of a project's 
organisational structure is unique for every project (Nahapiet and Nahapiet, 1985). 
The considerable amount of literature on the subject of organisational structure, not just 
within the context of construction, is reflected in the fact organisational theory dates 
back to the early 1940s (Shirazi et A, 1996). A common conclusion resulting from 
research in this area is that there is not one single best structure. Rather, different 
organisational structures are appropriate for different circumstances (Mintzberg 1981; 
Walker, 1989). 
Shirazi et aL (1996) provided an overview of the theories developed over the past thirty 
years which are relevant to organisational structures within the construction industry. 
Shrazi et aL (1996) described endeavours by Morris (1972), Thomas et aL (1983) and 
Bresnen (1990), amongst others, to identify issues which influence the effectiveness of a 
project's organisational structure and the means by which some authors have attempted 
to reduce the complex design process to a series of key decisions. 
In contrast to the literature reviewed by Shirazi et aL (1996), most of the literature that 
has specifically focused upon selection of the overall contract strategy for construction 
projects has significantly reduced the potential intricacy of the decision process relating 
to organisational structure. This is because it has categorised organisational structures 
with respect to broad generic characteristics (Perry, 1985; Hendrickson and Au, 1989; 
Walker, 1989; O'Reilly, 1996 and others). The common labels used to describe a 
contract strategy's type of organisational structure include those listed in Table 2.1. The 
description provided for each category in Table 2.1 has been adapted from those of HM 
Treasury (1993a). Meanwhile the diagrams entitled 'contractual networks' in Table 2.1 
are taken from Murdoch and Hughes (1992). 
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The labels listed in Table 2.1 are referred to throughout the thesis. However, it is 
important to remain aware that each of the labels encompasses a wide variety of 
organisational structures, some of which also have common reference labels (e. g. 
Accelerated Traditional, Develop and Build, Turnkey, Design and Manage, etc. ). It may 
also be argued that some organisational structures cannot be classed within the broad 
categories in Table 2.1. 
Organisational structure label Description Contractual network 
Traditional Design is completed by 
Cli 
I 
ent 
consultants before I ---I 
construction is awarded to a 
Contract Main Design 
Administrator contractor Team 
contractor III 
Domestic Nominated 
Sub- Sub- 
contractor contractor 
Design-Build Both detailed design and Client 
construction performed by 
Client's Main 
contractor Representative contractor 
I17 
Domestic Nominated 
Sub- Sub- 
contractor contractor 
Management Contract Design by consultants; Client 
management contractor I --I 
appointed early and work Contract Management Design Administrator contractor Team 
package contracts let I1 -1 
progressively by the Works Works 
management contractor contractor contractor 
Construction Management Design by consultants, Client 
construction manager -I 
appointed early to produce 
Construction Design 
Manager Team 
and manage work package F______1 contracts which are made Trade Trade Trade 
directly with the client contractor contractor contractor 
Table 2.1 Common categories of organisational structure 
2.1.2 Pricing mechanism 
Gilbreath (1983) described a contract strategy's type of pricing mechanism as the 
method by which a price for contracted goods and services is both established and paid. 
Gilbreath (1983) also recognised that there is an infinite number of pricing mechanism 
types. Nonetheless, there are common categories into which different types can be 
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classed. The two broadest categories are typically labelled and defined as follows (Aqua 
Group, 1990): 
1. Rxedjzrice: 
The estimated price (determined before the respective work is undertaken) is paid by 
the client, irrespective of the actual costs incurred by the contractor. 
2. Cost reimbursable: 
The contractor is paid for the work on the basis of its actual cost. 
Table 2.2 lists and describes the more specific pricing mechanism types within each of 
the two categories according to Ashley et aL (1995). 
Fixed Price Cost Reimbursable 
LumpSum Percent Fee 
Singlefixedpricefor entire contract Contractor reimbursedfor costs and a percentage 
of costs 
Unit Price Fixed Fee 
Payment on basis ofunits ofwork actually done. Contractor reimbursedfor costs plus stipulated sum 
Unit costs and estimated quantities stated covering general administrative costs andprofit 
Fixed Price with escalation Incentive Fee 
Price adjustments on cost of certain materials, Contractor reimbursedfor costs whilefee is 
labour or otherfactors beyond contractor's dependent upon achieving certain cost or schedule 
control targets 
Fixed Price with Bonus/Penalty for completion Performance Fee 
schedule 
Bonuslpenalty amount per dayfor earlyllate Fee varies according to a certain agreed criteria on 
completion which the contractor is ratedforperformance 
Guaranteed Maximum Price Conversion 
Price ceiling; bonuslpenaltyfor cost Any type ofreimbursement contract converted to a 
under-runslover-runs fixedprice or guaranteed maximum contract 
Table 2.2 Types of pricing mechanisms (Ashley et aL, 1995) 
Ashley et aL (1995) acknowledged that the fundamental difference between pricing 
mechanism types is the division of cost responsibility between the client and contractor. 
As a result, the type of pricing mechanism is considered to significantly influence both 
risk allocation and contractor motivation (Perry, 1986; Ward and Chapman, 1994). 
It should also be noted that a contract strategy can comprise different types of pricing 
mechanisms because: 
a contract strategy can comprise several prime contracts (i. e. contracts between the 
client and contracting party), each of which may employ a different pricing 
mechanism type (Gilbreath, 1983); and 
9 
2. different aspects of work executed under the same prime contract can be paid for 
using different pricing mechanism types (Murdoch and Hughes, 1992). 
2.1.3 Tender process 
Murdoch and Hughes (1992) described the purposes of any tendering procedure as to: 
select a suitable contractor, at a time which is suited to the circumstances of the 
project; and 
2. obtain from the relevant contractor, at the appropriate time, an acceptable tender or 
offer upon which a contract can be let. 
A variety of tendering procedures have evolved within the construction industry in 
recent decades (Aqua Group, 1992). As with a contract strategy's organisational 
structure and pricing mechanism, the tender process may not be considered to exist as a 
formal system because it can constitute a complex decision process (Aqua Group, 
1990). 
Tendering procedures are often described in terms of their level of competition 
(Cook, 1991). In addition, there are widely recognised categories used to classify tender 
process types. According to Holt et al. (1995) these categories include: 
" negotiation - the contract is awarded to a contractor after negotiation between the 
client and contractor 
" open - any contractor is able to submit a bid 
" selective -a number of selected contractors are invited to submit bids 
" two-stage - in the first stage a contractor is selected on a competitive basis and the 
contract is awarded after negotiation in the second stage 
" serial - the successful tenderer may be awarded similar contracts in the future 
2.1.4 Classification of complete contract strategies 
It has been suggested that contract strategies are indeterminate entities and therefore 
may not be considered to exist as discrete systems (Ireland, 1985). Nonetheless, the 
preceding sub-sections have illustrated that variants within each of the three primary 
contract strategy sub-systems are classified using fairly standard and widely understood 
terminology. 
Perry (1985) highlighted the fact that some types of organisational structure are often 
associated with a type of pricing mechanism because they are compatible (e. g. a 
Traditional type organisational structure and a unit price type pricing mechanism). As a 
consequence, Perry (1985) claimed that contract strategies are often referred to solely in 
terms of their broad type of organisational structure (e. g. Traditional, Design-Build, 
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etc. ). Similarly, Hibberd and Basden (1996) asserted that decisions about contract 
strategies, contract forms and pricing mechanisms are commonly regarded as the same 
decisions. 
Moshini (1993) and Haviland (1981) also perceived that contract strategy classification 
systems are typically over-simplified. They considered that the definition of a contract 
strategy is normally restricted to certain contract strategy features, whilst additional 
important details are overlooked. In addition, Moshini (1993) and Haviland (1981) 
claimed that contract strategy classification systems typically suffer from aggregation. 
Moshini (1993) demonstrated these perceived problems using the example 
organisational structure label, Turnkey. Moshini (1993) explained that although this 
label establishes the fact that the client holds a single contract with the developer- 
builder-purchaser (the turnkey organisation) there is no confirmation as to whether the 
turnkey organisation uses an independent design architect or undertakes construction 
using approaches such as construction management, single prime contracting or 
multiple prime contracting. 
More detailed contract strategy classification processes have been proposed by, for 
example, Haviland (1981), Ireland (1985) and Walker (1989). Walker (1989) presented 
the following 2x3x7 matrix that gives forty-two alternative organisational structures: 
(a) Client 
(i) No construction expertise, a senior manager liases between client and 
project team. 
(ii) In-house expertise available, project manager appointed within client 
organisation. 
(b) Design team 
Conventional organisation 
Non-executive project manager 
Executive project manager 
Contractor's appointment 
selective competitive tender 
two-stage competitive tender 
competitive serial tender 
(iv) negotiated tender 
(V) management contract 
(vi) separate trade contracts 
(vii) design-and-Build (overlaps with (b) above) 
Baker (1994a) suggested that the classification system proposed by Walker (1989) 
would not be accepted by the construction industry. Baker (1994a) perceived that 
industrialists related more to contract strategy labels which made reference to broad 
types of organisational structures, pricing mechanisms and tender processes. Section 
II 
2.3.2.1 acknowledges the view that poor contract strategy decisions can arise from 
contract strategy classification. 
2.2 Contract Strategy Selection 
Despite the existence of many standard contract forms there are no standard solutions to 
construction procurement and each project's individual set of circumstances need to be 
evaluated separately (Willis et A, 1994). Different contract strategies have their own 
advantages and disadvantages that are relative to a client's objectives and the project 
circumstances (Turner, 1994; Turner, 1997). The client's objectives for a particular 
project are the primary factors underlying contract strategy selection (Ramus and 
Birchall, 1996; Latham, 1993). Hence the contract strategy selected for any project has 
to be that which is perceived most likely, at the time of contract strategy selection, to 
enable the client's objectives to be achieved (RICS, 1996). The following sub-sections 
describe the principles of contract strategy selection in more detail. 
2.2.1 The importance of contract strategy selection 
During the first half of this century construction was typically procured using 
Traditional type organisational structures with the works let using open tendering (Holt 
et aL, 1995). After the Second World War, construction clients came to attribute poor 
project performance to the project's contractual approach (Perry, 1985). This perception 
has remained and it is supported by numerous government-commissioned studies into 
the relationship between project performance and contractual arrangements. These 
studies include Simon (1944), Emmerson (1962), Banwell (1964), NEDO (1975), 
NEDO (1983), NEDO (1985), NEDO (1988) and Latham (1994). 
In recent decades there has been a proliferation of contract strategy types (Comick, 
199 1). McGowan et al. (199 1) and Walker (1995) suggested that this was a reflection of 
the industry's, particularly the client's, dissatisfaction with existing arrangements. 
Yates (1991) claimed that the cost and time impacts that may be induced by a project's 
contract strategy can be comparable to the impact that design and engineering advice 
could have upon a project's function and quality. Potts (1995) tempered this claim by 
acknowledging that project success is dependent upon a whole array of factors, not just 
contract strategy selection. 
Section 2.2.4 acknowledges that any evaluation of the extent to which a contract 
strategy impacts upon a project is dependent upon an individual's subjective judgement. 
Hence there is no indisputable evidence that demonstrates that contract strategy 
selection is an important decision. However, there are reported cases where it has been 
perceived that major project problems occurred because of the selection of inappropriate 
contract strategies (Yates, 1991; Potts, 1995). 
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The New York Business Roundtable (1982) proposed that five percent of project costs 
could be saved by selecting the most appropriate form of contract. Trench (1991) 
claimed that five percent was an underestimate of the potential savings margin in the 
United Kingdom. In a survey conducted by RICS (1995) clients and representatives 
from the U. K. industry estimated that a ten to twenty percent cost saving potential was 
attainable by improving strategic decisions, made at the project outset, which were 
intended to ensure: 
1. rigorous briefing; 
2. value-management implementation; and 
3. effective procurement method selection. 
Although the third item in this list can be interpreted as equivalent to contract strategy 
selection, it is considered that the other two items are also integral to contract strategy 
selection. 
2.2.2 Timing of contract strategy selection 
It was reported in section 2.1.4 that Perry (1985) recognised that some contract strategy 
decisions are governed by other contract strategy decisions. He illustrated this point 
with reference to the fact that particular types of organisational. structures are 
compatible with particular types of pricing mechanisms. 
A project's contract strategy decisions are not made simultaneously. It is expected that 
the initial decisions relate to a project's organisational structure (Perry, 1985; Potts, 
1995). Therefore, owing to the interrelationship between contract strategy decisions, 
early decisions ought to be based upon a holistic contract strategy evaluation. Perry 
(1985) asserted that if contract strategy evaluation is left too late, options are heavily 
constrained by irrevocable decisions and commitments. This view is supported by 
numerous sources that have highlighted the importance of early contract strategy 
selection (New York Business Roundtable, 1982; Thompson, 1983; Latham, 1994; 
Millar, 1995; Potter, 1995b; RICS, 1995). 
2.2.3 A client organisation's objectives for its project 
It is widely accepted that the client organisation's primary objectives relate to the final 
price, duration and quality of a project (Dobson, 1995; Turner, 1997). The three 
ultimate objectives are often defined as: 
" Minimise project price 
" Minimise project duration 
4, Maximise project quality 
13 
It is also commonly acknowledged that a project's price, duration and quality outcome 
are interrelated and may conflict with each other (Hughes and Williams, 1991; RICS, 
1996). The interrelationship is demonstrated in Table 2.3. The table presents a sample of 
the variables that Ireland (1985) presumed have some impact on a project's cost, time 
and quality performance. The table indicates each variable's type of impact on each 
objective (increase (1) or reduction (R)) and annotates Ireland's reasons behind his 
assumptions. 
I= Increase; R= Reduce 
Effects on 
Variable COST TIME Quality Explanation 
Time overlap of design I R R Although the overall project duration could reduce, the actual 
and construction construction cost and time is expected to increase and quality reduce 
Complexity of form of Construction complexity (e. g. unusual materials or processes) is 
construction expected to increase cost, time and architectural quality 
Use of nominated Sub-contractors selected by the client or architect, rather than the 
subcontractors contractor can lead to increased cost, time and quality. 
Use of time control R R Designs will have to be changed if they cannot be constructed within the required time. Therefore while time is reduced, so is quality 
Use of cost monitoring R R Designs will have to be changed if they cannot be constructed within during design the required cost. nercfore while cost is reduced, so is quality 
Quality control on site 
Greater degrees of quality control will increase quality, time and 
cost, but the cost and time effects are negligible 
Competition at tender R I R Using cost as the basis for competitive tendering is expected to improve value for money, but quality and time are comDromiscd. 
Table 2.3 A demonstration of the interrelationship between a client's price, time and 
quality objectives (Ireland, 1985) 
The interrelationship between price, duration and quality means the client cannot expect 
to optimise all three primary objectives. Instead, the client must establish an appropriate 
balance of price, duration and quality targets for the specific project. Therefore, in each 
project, these targets constitute the client's primary objectives. 
The 'price' and 'duration' primary objectives relate to the project stage at which the 
works are complete. In contrast, the 'quality' primary objective concerns the project 
quality when the works are complete and also subsequent to that stage; when the project 
is in operation. For instance, Garvin (1988) listed the following eight dimensions of 
quality: 
" performance; 
" features; 
" reliability; 
" conformance; 
" durability; 
" serviceability; 
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" aesthetics; and 
" perceived quality. 
Cost and time objectives relating to project stages, other than at works completion, are 
often cited as client objectives. According to Perry et aL (1982) these include: 
certainty of final project price before construction commences; 
certainty of project completion date before construction commences; 
minimise pre-construction period; 
minimise construction cost and duration; and 
minimise life-cycle costs. 
The last of these objectives, minimise life-cycle costs, could be interpreted as a 
derivative of the 'quality' primary objective. Garvin (1988) included durability, 
serviceability, reliability and performance within the list of eight quality dimensions. 
The motivation behind the first four cost and time objectives, in the list taken from 
Perry et aL (1982), is considered to be correlated with the motivation to attain the 
client's primary objectives (i. e. completion within cost, time and quality targets). 
However, it is questionable as to whether the other four objectives are unconditionally 
conducive to the client's primary objectives. For example, consider the first two 
objectives in the list: price and time certainty. It is widely acknowledged that a 
predetermined price and duration are rarely guaranteed in construction projects 
(Flanagan and Norman, 1993). Hence it may be inferred that price and time certainty 
ought to be treated as secondary objectives which need to be rationalised in terms of the 
client's primary objectives. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.1.1. 
There are other cited client objectives which do not make express reference to cost, time 
or quality. Kumaraswamy and Dissanayaka (1996) included the following typical 
examples amongst an extensive list of client objectives: 
" construction, design and financial risk allocation; 
" need for mid-project design changes (i. e. flexibility); 
" need to be involved; 
40 preference to assign single-point responsibility; 
40 preference to delegate decision-making; 
health and safety concerns; 
good communications; and 
level of price competition. 
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Despite the fact that many potential client objectives do not make express reference to 
cost, time or quality, it is evident that the issues central to these objectives have some 
bearing upon at least one of the primary objectives. In other words, they are sub- 
ordinate to the client's primary objectives. Furthermore, like price and time certainty, 
they are not necessarily conducive to the client's primary objectives. Again, this issue is 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.5.1.1. 
2.2.4 Differentiation between contract strategies 
Numerous studies have been undertaken to identify which variables affect the 
performance of projects. Some of these studies have concluded that a project's contract 
strategy does not affect the project's performance. Ireland (1983), Rowlinson, 1988; 
Rwelarnila (1994) and Walker (1994) suggested that project performance is affected by 
managerial actions and human factors such as attitudes and the quality of the 
relationships between the project participants. There are, however, opinions that these 
factors are not independent of the contract strategy type. For example, Perry (1995) 
reported the existence of views which claim that contractual arrangements can influence 
both contractual culture and management effectiveness. Meanwhile, HM Treasury 
(1993b) claimed that a project's contract strategy can influence the way in which the 
client organisation, the designers, consultants, contractors and suppliers work together. 
Some studies which set out to ascertain the variables that affect a project's performance 
have cited the project's contract strategy as a contributing factor (Sidwell, 1982; NEDO, 
1983; Sanvido et aL, 1992; Naourri and Mustapha, 1995; Hashim, 1996). It has also 
been acknowledged, however, that it is not practically possible to determine the precise 
impact that a project's contract strategy has had on the project's performance. Curtis et 
al. (199 1) and Ward et aL (199 1 b) reported, firstly, that there are an interTelated mass of 
factors which influence project performance, and secondly, that the precise impact that a 
contract strategy had on a project's performance would be a one-off because every 
project's contract strategy and circumstances are unique. Nonetheless, the perception 
that a project's contract strategy has some effect on the project's performance appears to 
be widely held. 
Despite the fact that every project's contract strategy and circumstances are unique, 
generalised characteristics of both have been used to define the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of certain contract strategy types (Franks, 1984; Nahapiet and Nahapiet, 
1985; Perry, 1985; Ashworth, 1991; Akintoye, 1994; Naoum, 1994; RICS, 1996, 
amongst many others). This literature can be divided into three types: 
" articles that suggest the applicability of a particular contract strategy in qualitative 
terms; 
" articles that suggest the relative advantages and disadvantages of different contract 
strategies in qualitative terms; and 
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articles that suggest the relative advantages and disadvantages of different contract 
strategies in quantitative tenns. 
It is also important to note that each of the above type of contract strategy review may 
be: 
" purely theoretical; or 
" the result of a survey of industrialists' perceptions. 
It is not possible to review contract strategies using direct data. This is because it is not 
possible to conduct a experiment where identical projects, in identical circumstances, 
are procured using different contract strategies. 
The following sub-sections feature examples of research in which selected contract 
strategies, or contract strategy sub-systems, have been differentiated subjectively. The 
first of these sub-sections (section 2.2.4.1) addresses qualitative contract strategy 
reviews whilst the second sub-section (section 2.2.4.2) presents details from three 
quantitative reviews of contract strategies. The latter are far less commonly discussed in 
the literature. 
2.2.4.1 Qualitative reviews of contract strategies 
The reviews presented by Potts (1995) and Ndekugri and Turner (1994), featured below, 
are both examples of articles which endeavour to suggest the applicability of a 
particular contract strategy in qualitative terms. Whilst the review by Potts is purely 
theoretical, the review by Ndekugri and Turner is the result of a survey of industrialists' 
perceptions. The research presented by Naourn and Langford (1987) on the other hand, 
is one example of the many papers which described the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of different contract strategies in qualitative terms. 
Potts (1995) proposed that cost-reimbursable type pricing mechanisms can be more 
appropriate than fixed price alternatives where: 
" risk analysis has shown the risks are unconventional in nature or magnitude; 
" the engineer is unable to define the works clearly at tender stage, substantial 
variations are anticipated, or early completion takes priority; 
" an increased involvement of the client and/or contractor is required or desirable; 
" exceptional complexity exists (e. g. a high degree technical innovation is required); 
and 
" an excellent, trusting relationship between the client and contractor already exists. 
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Ndekugri and Turner (1994) conducted a survey of contractors, designers and clients to 
obtain their views about Design-Build type contract strategies. The results gained from 
the seventy-four respondents can be summarised as follows: 
"A Design-Build type contract strategy is most suited to an experienced client, 
particularly when the project is large and complex. 
" The contribution from a Design-Build contractor during the design stage is 
commonly expected to induce cost savings through improved constructability of the 
design. 
" Essentially all of the respondents suggested that projects are completed faster if a 
Design-Build, rather than a Traditional, type contract strategy is used. The two main 
time saving facets claimed for Design-Build were reported as: 
buying, subcontractors appointment and construction can overlap design; 
and 
* more efficient Procurement of materials and other components. 
The majority of respondents claimed that Design-Build involves less risk of 
litigation and arbitration compared with other contract strategy types because the 
Design-Build contractor accepts more responsibility. 
*A clear and comprehensive brief is an important prerequisite. 
Naoum and Langford (1987) reported the responses from ten construction clients who 
were asked to compare Management Contracting (MC) with the Traditional method of 
project procurement. Table 2.4 summarises the clients' responses to twelve questions. 
The first two examples suggest that the appropriateness of a contract strategy is 
commonly regarded as being dependent upon a project's circumstances. Therefore, 
given the typical complexity of construction projects, each project could present a 
multitude of factors that warrant consideration before a contract strategy is selected. The 
example taken from Naoum and Langford (1987) is a very generalised review of 
broadly-categorised contract strategy types. The questions and responses in Table 2.4 do 
not make any reference to project circumstances. 
The examples demonstrate that the literature, in which contract strategies are reviewed, 
often cites advantages and disadvantages which make express reference to the potential 
of contract strategy types to induce cost and time savings or losses relative to other 
types. Therefore the 'price' and 'duration' primary objectives of clients are often the 
subject of these reviews. The 'quality' objective also features in this type of literature, 
but the cost and time objectives are often considered more important (Rwelamila and 
Hall, 1995). 
18 
Response 
Question/statement Yes Same No 
1. MC is riskier to clients? 6 2 2 
2. Is MC more profitabIe to the contractors? 10 - - 
3. Does MC involve fewer claims? 3 4 3 
4. Is MC more flexible? 10 - - 
5. Does MC allow an earlier start on site? 10 
6. Is MC quicker? 10 - 
7. Is MC more reliable in predicting the construction time? 9 1 
8. Is MC cheaper? 2 4 4 
9. Is MC more reliable in estimating construction cost? 6 3 1 
10. Does MC provide more control for subcontractors? 9 1 - 
11. Does MC exercise more control over operations? 9 1 - 
12. Does MC provide a better building design? 1 1 8 
Table 2.4 Responses from ten construction clients to questions about the attributes of 
Management Contracting (MC) relative Traditional procurement methods (Naoum and 
Langford, 1987) 
Several of the advantages and disadvantages claimed for contract strategy types do not 
make express reference to potential cost and time effects. For example, Hayes et aL 
(1983) claimed that an advantage of Management Contracting was gained from 
improved work packaging which results from the contract strategy's facility to involve 
the management contractor during a project's planning stage. However, this effect is 
likely to have some indirect impact upon the client's primary objectives (i. e. cost, time 
and quality targets). This view was supported by Ward et al. (1991a) who integrated a 
list of advantages, claimed for Management Contracting from various sources, into a 
hierarchical framework (Figure 2.1). The framework illustrated how the attributes of 
Management Contracting can contribute both directly and indirectly to the client's 
primary objectives. Ward et aL (1991a) similarly illustrated how the contract strategy 
advantages and disadvantages, pertaining to project circumstances, impact upon the 
client's primary objectives (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2 Influences of a project's nature upon a client's objectives (Ward et A, 
1991a) 
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224.2 Quantitative reviews of contract strategies 
Despite the fact that contract strategies are often differentiated from each other in terms 
of their expected cost and time impacts, contract strategies are commonly reviewed on a 
qualitative, rather than quantitative, basis. Qualitative reviews of contract strategies may 
be considered to be the only feasible option since it has already been acknowledged 
that: 
" reviews of contract strategies have to remain general because every project's 
contract strategy and circumstances are unique (Ireland, 1985); and 
" assessment of the impacts that contract strategies have had on the performance of 
previously completed projects is based upon subjective judgement (Pain and 
Bennett, 1988). 
The former handicap is essentially made redundant in a specific project situation whilst 
the latter appears to be an unavoidable obstacle. However, it may be considered possible 
for experienced construction professionals to quantitatively estimate the different 
potential cost and time impacts that different contract strategies may have upon a 
specific project. Three quantitative approaches to contract strategy evaluation are 
described below. 
Pain and Bennett (1988) reported the results of a survey in which the quantity surveyor 
and contractor from a specific project were asked to subjectively assess and estimate the 
difference in project cost and contract period between two standard forms of contract. 
The survey prompted the respondents to enumerate the actual total cost and contract 
period of a project which they had previously completed using the JCT With 
Contractor's Design form of contract (JCT CD 81, which could be described as a 
Design-Build type contract strategy). The respondents were then asked to estimate the 
total project cost and contract period if the same project had been procured using the 
JCT 80 standard form of building contract (which could be described as a Traditional 
type contract strategy). Fourteen different projects featured in the overall survey. 
It should be noted that the time estimates related to the contract period rather than the 
overall project duration. Therefore under the JCT CD 81 arrangement the contract 
period includes the construction process and an element of the design, whilst the JCT 80 
arrangement covers just construction. 
A fair and complete comparison between the two contract strategies' cost impacts was 
attained for only four projects. The estimates made by the contractors and quantity 
surveyors are shown in Table 2.5. With regards to the two contract strategies' time 
impacts, estimates were provided for twelve of the fourteen projects. Table 2.6 displays 
these estimates. 
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Project type Case 
number 
Total actual cost 
(Design-Build) 
Total estimated 
cost (Traditional) 
% difference 
(Design-Build 
relative to 
Traditional) 
Housing 2 E581,982 E609,500 -4.51% 
Education 3 E408,760 E434,260 -5.87% 
Warehouse 12 ; E7,131,927 0,150,000 -0.25% 
Warehouse 13 E455,275 E490,000 -7.08% 
Table 2.5 Comparison of total project costs under JCT 80 (Traditional) 
and JCT CD 81 (Design-Build) (Pain and Bennett, 1988) 
Project type Case 
number 
Quantity surveyor's estimate of 
% difference in contract period 
(Design-Build relative to 
Traditional) 
Contractor's estimate of % 
difference in contract period 
(Design-Build relative to 
Traditional) 
Housing 2 0% 0% 
Education 3 -11% -10% 
Education 4 0% -10% 
Education 5 -8% -25% 
Education 6 0% -10% 
Office 7 -3% -25% 
Office 9 -28% +25% 
Refurbishing 10 -17% -10% 
Refurbishing I1 +7.5% -10% 
Warehouse 12 -29% -10% 
Warehouse 13 -21% -25% 
Warehouse 14 0% 0% 
Table 2.6 Comparison of the contract period under JCT 80 (Traditional) 
and JCT CD 81 (Design-Build) (Pain and Bennett, 1988) 
The survey results suggest that a Design-Build arrangement can lead to a faster and less 
costly building project than a Traditional arrangement. Table 2.6 particularly 
emphasises the speed advantage of Design-Build given that the contract period 
estimates for the JCT CD 81 option includes an element of design work as well as 
construction. 
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Chisnall (1991) reported an instance where the Property Services Agency (PSA) had to 
select a contract strategy for a project whose client, the Ministry of Defence, desired 
completion in as short a time as possible whilst within acceptable constraints of cost, 
space and quality. The PSA team's evaluation of contract strategies involved estimates 
of the potential project cost and duration for each of the different prospective contract 
strategies. Table 2.7 shows the estimates made for four contract strategies. 
Contract Strategy Project duration Relative project cost 
Traditional fully pre-planned 3 years 3 months 100% 
Accelerated traditional 2 years 10 months 101% 
Two-stage develop and 2 years 9 months 104% construct 
Single-stage, single tender I year 9 months 108% design and build 
Table 2.7 Estimated project cost and duration assuming the same project was procured 
using each of four contract strategies (Chisnall, 1991) 
The estimates in Table 2.7 display an interrelationship between project price and 
duration; the shorter the duration the higher the price (referred to also in section 2.2.3). 
This interrelationship did not exist in the data presented by Pain and Bennett (1988). 
This inconsistency may be interpreted either as a demonstration that the impact of 
contract strategies is dependent upon a project's circumstances and/or that the decision 
process is subjective. 
Pedwell et aL (1996) conducted a survey in which thirty industrialists estimated the 
potential cost and time effects which may be induced by a contract strategy's type of 
organisational structure, type of pricing mechanism and facility to fast-track. All thirty 
respondents were presented with details of the same project ($20M complex 
construction project within the oil and gas industry). 
The survey data were analysed using a linear multiple regression analysis. Two sets of 
analyses are presented in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
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Figure 2.3 shows the cost overruns expected at various levels of design incompleteness 
for three different categories of contract strategy. The three contract strategies used the 
same organisational structure, but each employed a different type of pricing mechanism. 
The contract strategies' type of organisational structure is defined as 'simple', but it was 
explained that this term was used to make reference to a Design-Build type 
arrangement. It was also indicated that a 'complex' type organisational structure 
assimilates to Traditional and Management type contract strategies in which there are 
many contract interfaces. Figure 2.4 compares the expectant effects of the two 
categories of organisational structure on the project's time performance at various levels 
of design incompleteness. 
Amongst other things, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate that the impact of a contract 
strategy involves the consideration of interrelated factors. The figures show that a 
contract strategy's cost and time impacts are expected to vary according to the degree of 
design and construction overlap. 
Pain and Bennett (1988) referred to a scenario where actual projects had been 
completed using a particular contract strategy and thus real quantitative data about 
project cost and time performance existed. Therefore the professionals' estimates of the 
projects' cost and time performance, if an alternative contract strategy had been 
implemented, were likely to be affected by their perception of actual project events. 
This was not the case, however, in the following two examples (Chisnall, 1991 Pedwell 
el al., 1996). The estimates resulted from purely speculative assessments of the options' 
impacts upon projects that were 'to-be-completed' and hypothetical. Therefore there is 
some evidence to suggest that a quantitative evaluation of contract strategy options at 
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the outset of a particular project is feasible. All three cases indicate that different 
contract strategies are expected to induce different cost and time performances for 
particular projects. Furthermore, the estimated values indicate that the difference 
between the impacts of alternative contract strategies can be very significant. Therefore 
all three examples emphasised the importance of contract strategy selection. 
The quantitative comparisons of contact strategies, especially when presented using the 
format proposed by Chisnall (199 1) are clearly valuable decision-aids because: 
" the values are particular to the given project; 
" the options are evaluated directly in terms of the client's primary objectives; and 
" the comparisons are explicit. 
2.3 Decision-making 
Section 2.2 reported the principles and complexities of contract strategy selection. It is 
evident that it is a particularly difficult decision problem. This section addresses the 
biases inherent in decision-making and registers the decision-making conditions which 
are particularly conducive to biases. Subsequently, deficiencies in the industry's typical 
approach to the contract strategy decision problem are identified and described. 
2.3.1 Human judgement 
Decision-making is reliant upon human judgement. However, human judgements are 
subject to biases (Wright and Ayton, 1987). Skitmore et aL (1989) provided a summary 
of psychological literature which have addressed how these biases distort our 
interpretation of the past, prediction of the future and thereby our decisions in the 
present. Table 2.8 (Flanagan and Norman, 1993) summarises common judgmental 
biases and their effects. 
Z3.1.1 Enabling conditionsfor biases 
Hogarth (1980) asserted that judgmental biases can be attributed, primarily, to the 
characteristics of both the decision task and the decision-maker's schema (i. e. strategies, 
heuristics, assumptions, attitudes, etc. ). 
Hogarth (1980) highlighted the following four task-related factors as influential to 
judgmental bias: 
" complexity of task; 
" procedural uncertainty; 
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psychological regret (i. e. personal negative consequences hanging upon the decision 
outcome); and 
0 stress. 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 indicated that the first two characteristics in the above list typify 
contract strategy selection. It has been established that there an infinite number of 
possible decision options. The decision process may warrant consideration of many 
interrelated factors and these factors vary on every project. Furthermore, the decision- 
maker is faced with considerable uncertainty. Owing to the fact that contract strategy 
selection takes place at an early project stage (section 2.2.2), there is uncertainty in the 
decision-maker's perception about what may eventuate during the execution of the 
project. Uncertainty is also inherent in the decision-maker's subjective knowledge about 
contract strategies and in the application of this knowledge to individual decision 
problems. 
The final two characteristics in the above list could also be considered applicable to 
contract strategy selection because of the reported importance of contract strategy 
selection (section 2.2.1). Hence with respect to Hogarth's (1980) theory, contract 
strategy selection is clearly subject to biases. 
Bias Effects 
Availability Judgements of probability of easily recalled events 
are distorted 
Selective perception Expectations may bias observations of variables 
relevant to a strategy 
Illusory correlation Encourages the belief that unrelated variables are 
correlated 
Conservatism Failure to sufficiently revise forecasts based on new 
information 
Law of small numbers An over estimation of the degree to which small 
samples are representative of population 
Wishful thinking The probability of desired outcomes judged to be 
inappropriately high 
Illusion of control Overestimation of the personal control over 
outcomes 
Logical construction 'Logical' construction of events which cannot be 
accurately recalled 
Hindsight bias Over estimation of the predictability of past events 
Table 2.8 Common judgmental biases and their effects (Flanagan and Norman, 1993) 
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Hogarth (1980) condensed the schema-related conditions perceived to influence 
judgmental bias into: 
" verdicality (i. e. the extent to which a person's understanding of the task is accurate 
and his/her approach is realistic); 
" stability (i. e. the extent to which related decisions are approached in a consistent 
way); and 
" generality (i. e. its applicability to a particular decision problem and thereby the 
capacity to account for a wide range of relevant factors). 
Hogarth's (1980) theory basically appears to suggest that a rigorous and formal 
approach to a decision problem, particularly one which is difficult (i. e. complex, 
uncertain and important), is likely to lead to better decisions. According to a historical 
review of literature on psychology-of-judgement research by Goldstein and Hogarth 
(1997), there is a well established theory that intuitive judgements are generally less 
accurate than an analytical combination of the same information available to the 
decision-maker. 
However, Hammond et aL (1997) arrived at the theory that the more difficult a decision 
is, the more likely the decision-maker will choose to rely solely upon intuitive 
judgement without the use of analytical methods. It is suspected that this theory holds 
true with respect to the contract strategy decision problem. The following section 
reports that the industry's typical approach to contract strategy selection is far from 
analytical. As a result, the common traits of the industry's approach as well as unsound 
decision policies are described as deficiencies. 
2.3.2 Deficiencies in the construction industry's contract strategy selection 
practice 
Section 2.2.4.1 described, with examples, literature that present qualitative reviews of 
contract strategies. Broadly-defined contract strategy types (e. g. Traditional and Design- 
Build) are the subject of these reviews. In addition, reference to the conditions in which 
these contract strategy types are appropriate and inappropriate tends to be restricted to 
generalised project details (e. g. high project complexity, industrial buildings, etc. ). 
However, it is inferred that these reviews are archetypal of the industry's typical 
approach to the contract strategy decision problem presented by each individual project. 
The reviews demonstrate that practising professionals are prepared to generalise the 
decision problem even though the decision problems presented by different projects can 
be very dissimilar. According to Evans (1982), failure to refer to specific and detailed 
reasoning is common when faced with complex decision problems. Furthermore, the 
contract strategy decision-aid models described later in section 2.4 are clearly developed 
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around the general qualitative criteria that feature in the literature where contract 
strategies are reviewed qualitatively (section 2.2.4.1). 
Numerous sources have reported deficiencies and weaknesses common to the industry's 
approach to the decision problem (NEDO, 1983; Perry, 1985; Yates, 1991; Hughes, 
1994; Latham, 1994; Anderson, 1995; RICS, 1995). Although the industry has not been 
expressly criticised for selecting project contract strategies on a general and qualitative 
basis, it is adjudged that this approach is unlikely to optimise: 
1. the likelihood that the most appropriate contract strategy will be selected for a 
project; and 
2. the capacity to appreciate the actual impact that a selected contract strategy has upon 
a project. 
Although the first of these points represents the ultimate aim of contract strategy 
selection at a project level, it is largely dependent upon the second point. This is 
because contract strategy selection is reliant upon the decision-maker's subjective 
assumptions which derive from his/her accumulated experience (Pain and Bennett, 
1988). 
The subsequent sub-sections describe the following six deficiencies perceived to be 
common within contract strategy selection practice: 
" limited appreciation of the decision options; 
" failure to set clear, realistic and balanced price, duration and quality targets; 
" failure to, wholly rationalise decisions in terms of the client's primary objectives; 
" unstructured and imprecise decision mechanisms; 
" lack of explicitness and transparency in the decision mechanism; and 
" failure to account for the uncertainty inherent in contract strategy selection. 
23.21 Limited appreciation of the decision options 
Section 2.1.4 described common deficiencies in contract strategy classification. Both 
Masterman (1992) and Moshini (1993) indicated that poor contract strategy 
classification can have a detrimental effect on the decision process. For example, 
Moshini (1993) perceived that common contract strategy classification systems "allow 
only a partial evaluation of the strategy and offer very little scope for identifying, and 
then changing, those determinants that may be dysfunctional to the project goals". 
Section 2.1.4 also acknowledged that contract strategy options are often reduced to their 
standard form counterparts (Hughes, 1994; Hibberd and Basden (1996)). 
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Z3. Z2 Failure to set clear, realistic and balancedprice, duration and quality targets 
Section 2.2.3 established that a client's primary objectives for a given project constitute 
a balanced set of price, duration and quality targets. However, section 2.2.3 also 
reported that many cited client objectives do not make express reference to the client's 
primary objectives (e. g. a client's need to have the option to make mid-project design 
changes). This is regardless of the fact that these additional, secondary objectives are 
likely to have some impact on a project's price, duration and quality outcome and which 
may not necessarily be attuned to the client's primary objectives. This argument is 
explained further in Section 2.5.1.1. 
Owing to this apparent failure to establish clear and congruent objectives and 
preferences, it can be deduced that the interdependencies between the client's primary 
objectives (see section 2.2.3) are also not taken into account. This deduction is 
supported by Curtis et aL (199 1). 
It is widely believed that if the client's objectives are clear and realistic there is a greater 
likelihood that they will be achieved (Walker, 1995; Simon et aL, 1997). In accordance 
with Hogarth (1989) (section 2.3.1.1), failure to establish clear, realistic and balanced 
objectives epitomise schema with low verdicality and which are therefore subject to 
biases. 
Z3. Z3 Failure to wholly rationalise decisions in terins of the client's primary 
objectives 
The preceding section referred to the industry's apparent failure to co-ordinate the 
client's preferences with the client's primary objectives. Therefore it follows that the 
resultant decisions are not entirely rationalised in terms of the client's primary 
objectives. As noted in the preceding section, this argument is explained further in 
section 2.5.1.1. Meanwhile this section highlights ulterior motives that occasionally 
govern contract strategy selection. 
Perry (1985) surmised that the concept of contract strategy had not yet been widely 
acknowledged by the industry. Perry (1985) made reference to a report (NEDO, 1983) 
which asserted that Traditional type contract strategies were selected by default rather 
than as the result of a conscious and reasoned decision process. Similarly, Latham 
(1994) and Rwelamila and Hall (1995) claimed that contract strategy decision options 
are often constrained to those which had been implemented on past projects. 
It has been acknowledged that using procedures which are familiar to the project 
participants can be a contributing factor to project success (Rowlinson, 1988). However, 
it is questionable as to whether this factor has been considered amongst the many other 
factors to ensure that contract strategy selection is disciplined and rational. 
Yates (1991) perceived that procurement advice is often held with little regard. He 
claimed, with reference to two examples, that poor contract strategy selection 
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occasionally results when the decision-making responsibility is expropriated by clients 
with insufficient experience and technical knowledge. However, there is a view that 
procurement advice, from sources external to the client organisation, could be biased by 
the adviser's interests (Ashworth, 1991; Pain and Bennett, 1988). Furthermore, there is 
a view that irrational decisions can result when the decision-maker perceives a contract 
strategy is 'fashionable' (HM Treasury, 1993a). 
23.24 Unstructured and imprecise decision mechanisms 
Again assuming that the widely-published reviews of contract strategies (discussed in 
section 2.2.4.1) typify the industry's approach to contract strategy selection, it may be 
inferred that contract strategies are normally differentiated on a qualitative basis in 
practice. One may even infer that the subjective assumptions used to differentiate 
between contract strategies, in a given project, often remain in their fairly general 
context (i. e. the decision-maker does not make a detailed account of case specifies). 
This latter trait corresponds to schema with low generality (Hogarth, 1980) (section 
2.3.1.1). 
The cited literature on contract strategy reviews also indicated that contract strategies 
are typically evaluated and compared using an unstructured decision process. Hence it 
would appear that a prospective set of alternative contract strategies for each project 
(i. e. for each decision problem) are not evaluated consistently against the same set of 
criteria. Again in accordance with Hogarth (1980), this reflects schema with low 
stability. 
Following a review of British and Swedish contract strategy selection practice, 
Anderson (1995) reported that contract strategies are selected using non-structured, 
qualitative and imprecise decision mechanisms. His survey of clients and industry 
representatives revealed that none of the respondents employed a systematic selection 
process. Instead, the respondents, reportedly, based their decisions simply upon their 
awareness that different contract strategy types were required for different types of 
project circumstances. Anderson noted that the categories of contract strategies and 
project types are typically broad and imprecise. 
23. Z5 Lack of explicitness and transparency in the decision mechanism 
Fischhoff (1982) reported that some judgmental biases can be eliminated by making 
knowledge explicit. Ahmad and Morad (1993) suggested that an explicit thought 
process can be documented to promote communication and facilitate peer review. 
However, it is widely acknowledged that contract strategy selection is typically 
exercised as an implicit decision process (Skitmore and Marsden, 1988; Ahmad and 
Morad, 1993; Wong and So, 1995). In other words, the assumptions used to 
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differentiate between contract strategies as well as the reasoning behind the assumptions 
are not transparent, possibly even to the decision-maker. 
Curtis et A (1991) conceded that it is impossible to ascertain the precise impact that a 
contract strategy has upon a project's performance (section 2.2.4). Nonetheless, Curtis 
et aL (1991) claimed that, relative to the industry's typical approach to project 
performance evaluation, there was scope to attain a better understanding of a contract 
strategy's impact on a project. It was proposed that in addition to establishing the tasks 
and objectives that a client wishes to achieve, the processes required to achieve them 
should be made explicit (Curtis et A, 199 1; Rwelarnila and Hall, 1995). 
2.3.2 6 Failure to accountfor the uncertainty inherent in contract strategy selection 
Section 2.3.1.1 made reference to the considerable uncertainty presented by each 
contract strategy decision problem. There is uncertainty in a decision-maker's 
perception about what may eventuate during the execution of a project. Uncertainty is 
also inherent in the decision-maker's subjective knowledge about contract strategies and 
in the application of this knowledge to individual decision problems. 
Assuming that contract strategies are typically evaluated on a qualitative basis, it is 
unlikely that contract strategists deal expressly with the considerable uncertainty that 
surrounds each decision problem. Risk analysis and management is well established as a 
methodology that has the potential to effectively manage the uncertainty presented by 
construction projects (Simon et al., 1997). However, a survey by Akintoye and 
MacLeod (1997) reported that risk analysis and management, including risk pertaining 
to contractual arrangements, were implemented within only a very small proportion of 
the thirteen project management practices and thirty contractors who participated in the 
survey. The survey indicated that industrialists typically rely upon intuition, judgement 
and experience to deal with project uncertainty. 
2.4 Contract strategy decision support 
Analytical decision support refers to the techniques which are commonly classified as 
decision analysis and/or risk analysis. There is a wide variety of decision support 
techniques, but all are basically formal methodologies that embody the following 
analytical principles (Bernie and Yates, 1991; Goodwin and Wright, 1998): 
1. break the problem down into more manageable sub-problems; 
2. evaluate decision options with respect to certain criteria relevant to each sub- 
problem; and 
3. combine the elemental evaluations to aid the decision-maker resolve the complete 
problem. 
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The ensuing sub-sections describe models that have been specifically designed to aid 
contract strategy selection. The models employ different decision support techniques. 
The models are grouped under the following headings: 
" graphical aids; 
" multi-attribute analyses; 
" expert systems. 
2.4.1 Graphical aids 
Literature on the subject of contract strategy selection often includes diagrams which 
use a set of criteria, or even a single criterion, to differentiate between contract 
strategies or contract strategy sub-systems (e. g. pricing mechanisms). Figures 2.5a, 2.5b 
and 2.5c are common examples of graphical aids. 
Figure 2.5a is a flow chart (Chappell, 1991) which presents a sequence of criteria 
designed to single out the most appropriate standard form of building contract. Clamp 
and Cox (1989) and Griffith and Headley (1997) have also presented flow charts to 
assist contract strategy selection. 
Only one criterion is used to distinguish between the contract strategy types in Figure 
2.5b (HM Treasury, 1993b). The criterion is the division of project risk between the 
client and contractor. Similar guides can be found in Clamp and Cox (1989) and 
Flanagan and Norman (1993). 
Figure 2.5c is a triangular chart (Corrie, 1991) in which seven types of pricing 
mechanisms are arranged into a particular order to illustrate their relative attributes with 
respect to five different criteria. Similar charts are provided by Burgess (1980), Ridout 
(1982) and Bennett and Grice (1990). 
These types of graphical aids are very basic and are not essentially decision support 
systems. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the general principles of contract strategy 
selection models (i. e. a set of alternative contract strategy types are evaluated against a 
set of decision criteria). The following section describes more elaborate graphical aids 
that subsequently inspired more sophisticated models. 
2.4.1.1 Matrix charts 
Figures 2.6a and 2.6b are common examples of matrix charts which intend to illustrate 
the relative attributes of a set of alternative contract strategy types. The column 
headings of the matrix correspond to contract strategy types while the decision criteria 
(i. e. attributes) operate as the row headings. 
Matrix charts differ from each other in the method used to measure the perceived 
performance of contract strategies with respect to the decision criteria. For example, 
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Figure 2.5b Division of project risk between client and contractor by a set of alternative contract 
strategies (HM Treasury, 1993b) 
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Gordon (1994) and HM Treasury (1992) simply used tick marks and dots, respectively, 
to signify which criteria reflected a contract strategy's attributes and characteristics. 
Similarly, NEDO (1985) used dots, but divided each criterion into levels to enable a 
contract strategy's capacity with respect to each criterion to be rated, albeit on a very 
simple two or three step scale (Figure 2.6a). Franks (1984) adopted a five step scale 
(Figure 2.6b). The steps in Franks' chart were numerical (integers from one to five) 
whereas the steps in NEDO (1985) were discursive. 
Management system 
Client's performance 
Requirements/expectations 
r- 
0 
9 
0=0 
0 t; to 
r gv 
00 :EU"E 
4 
0) 
A4 :2 
O. -U. 0 I 
-0- r V 
0 1: 4 
a. E E! 
(a) Technical complexity; 
The project has a high level of structural mechanical 4 5 4 5 
services or other complexity 
(b) High aesthetic or prestige requirements 5 3 3 4 
(c) Economy; 
A commercial or industrial project or project where 3 4 4 4 
minimum cost is required 
(d) Time is of essence; 2 4 5 4 Early completion of the project is required 
(e) Exceptional size and/or administrative complexity; 
Involving varying client's/user requirements, 2 4 4 5 
political sensitivity etc. 
(f) Price certainty; 
Is required at an early stage in the project's design 4 2 4 4 
development 
(9) Facility for change/variation control by client, users 5 5 1 4 
or others during the progress of the works. 
Figure2.6b Matrix chart developed by Franks (1984) 
It was acknowledged in the reporting of each matrix chart that the decision criteria were 
to be used to establish the priorities within the client's profile of objectives and 
requirements. However, the models described in the following sections incorporated this 
process into analyses that calculate a numerical measure of the relative appropriateness 
of different contract strategies. 
2.4.2 Multi-attribute analysis 
Multi-attribute type analysis has been designed to facilitate comparison of alternative 
decision options with many attributes or characteristics (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). 
Models which have applied this analysis type to the contract strategy decision problem 
have been reported by Skitmore and Marsden (1988), Bennett and Grice (1990), Singh 
(1990), Chan (1995) and Griffith and Headley (1997). Skitmore and Marsden's (1988) 
model derived from NEDO's (1985) matrix chart and this template of decision criteria 
and analysis has remained virtually unchanged in the subsequent models. 
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These models adopt the same format as Matrix charts; decision criteria (i. e. attributes) 
are listed as row headings while the column headings are the contract strategy types. 
Application of the models generally involve the following procedures: 
1. The perceived performance or suitability of each contract strategy type with respect 
to each criterion is scored on a quantitative scale. 
2. The client assigns a weight (i. e. a quantitative score) to reflect the relative 
importance of each criterion. 
3. Each criterion's weight is proportioned relative to the sum of all the criteria's 
weights to give each criterion a normalised weight. 
4. Each contract strategy type's criterion score is multiplied by the corresponding 
normalised weight. 
5. The subsequent products are summed for each contract strategy type and the 
subsequent value reflects each contract strategy type's relative appropriateness. 
Figure 2.7 shows an example application of Skitmore and Marsden's (1988) model. In 
the example the contract strategy which is classified as 'Design-Build Competitive' is 
ranked as the most appropriate option. From Figure 2.7 it is apparent that this result 
eventuated because the client particularly desired to: 
" complete the project within a short and definite period of time; 
" be guaranteed a price before the project work is executed; and 
" accept very little risk. 
All of the models cited above use a basic form of multi-attribute value analysis. In 
multi-attribute utility analysis, utility values are used in order to take account of the 
decision-maker's risk attitude towards the anticipated performance of the decision 
options with respect to each criterion (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). A very basic version 
of multi-attribute utility analysis has been applied to contract strategy selection, or 
rather specifically to pricing mechanism type selection (Ahmad and Morad, 1993). 
Figure 2.8 depicts the model analysis developed by Ahmad and Morad (1993). The 
analysis can be summarised as follows: 
" The client assigns weights (that reflect the client's perception of importance) to each 
of the model's three decision criteria; project price, duration and quality outcome. 
" The performance of each decision option with respect to each criterion is 
represented as a forecast of two discrete potential outcomes. 
" The probability that a decision option will enable the achievement of each 
criterion's two discrete outcomes is estimated. 
" Each criterion's two discrete outcomes are converted into utility values once the 
client's utility function for each criterion is elicited. 
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Each criterion's Expected Utility Value (EUV) is calculated from the summed 
products of the utility values and their corresponding probabilities. 
The decision option's EUV is calculated from the summed products of each 
criterion's EUV and their corresponding weights assigned at the outset. 
OPTION 
Pricing 
mechanism 
tvpe 
I 
CRITERIA PROBABI- POSSIBLE CRITERIA CRITERIA DECISIOf 
LITIES OUTCOMES EUV WEIGHT OPTION 
EUV 
Mini 
Px project cost ax 
--"<I 
-p project cost bx 
> 
EUVX-wx 
Minimise p project 
duration ay 
duration -0ý EUVy - wy (Y) I-p project duration by> 
Maximise p proj 
. ect quality az 
quality --a EUVZ -wz (Z) I- p- project quality bz 
> 
EUV 
Figure 2.8 Structure of the basic multi-attribute utility analysis model developed by 
Ahmad and Morad (1993) 
2.4.3 Expert systems 
Wager (1984) provided the following definition: 
"An expert system is a computer system containing knowledge in a specific area and 
has the ability to manipulate that knowledge in an intelligent manner such that it can be 
used and understood by those of more limited experience. Such systems are able to 
communicate decisions and advice effectively and justify their reasoning to the user" 
Expert systems can be considered to comprise three main components (Pigford and 
Baur, 1990): 
User interface - this is the means of communication with which the user supplies 
evidence about the decision circumstances and subsequently receives the model 
output. 
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Knowledge base - this is the store of experts' knowledge about contract strategies 
and the conditions which govern their suitability. 
Inference engine - this is the dynamic decision-making mechanism that is directed 
by the knowledge base. 
The inference engine can model interdependencies between decision criteria. It appears 
that all of the expert systems described in this section model the dependencies that a 
contract strategy's attributes have upon a project's circumstances. In addition all the 
expert systems have an explanation facility to make the models' knowledge base 
transparent to the user. 
Brandon (1990) reported a client advisory expert system (ELSIE) which was designed 
to provide a basic aid to contract strategy selection. The model's decision criteria and 
contract strategy options are listed in Table 2.9. 
Decision criteria Contract strategy options 
" Quality of the client's brief 0 Conventional 
" Timing of the project 0 Two-stage conventional 
" Level of quality required 0 Design-Build 
" Complexity of the building services installation 0 Management contracting 
" Nature of the design 0 Construction management 
" Need for specialist construction methods or 
materials 
" Acceptable level of uncertainty on price 
" Need for changes during the construction period 
Table 2.9 Decision criteria and options within ELSIE (Masterman, 1992) 
Moshini (1993) developed an expert system to aid selection of specific components of a 
contract strategy, rather than broad contract strategy types. The contract strategy 
sub-systems, and the options within each, are listed in Table 2.10. Figure 2.9 illustrates 
the structure of Moshini's model which can be summarised as follows: 
The client responds to decision criteria relating to project constraints, construction 
documents, risk allocation and cost and time objectives in modules one and two (the 
specific decision criteria are displayed in Figure 2.9). 
2. Using the decision criteria responses, the model determines a shortlist of plausible 
options within the contract strategy sub-systems that relate to product type, type of 
documentation and the responsibility and administration in the project's design and 
construction (see the list of contract strategy sub-systems in Table 2.10). 
39 
A* 92 
W 0 c4 
1 M r u, r. 5 z 
5 2u0 Z . 14 
tt 
- * : L- ;, u c3 
0 r. ýg 0 r 
"0 15 
r- *Z -CJ .- 
r_ 
I 0 -0 a - E c 0 0. ) -5 E 
's '5 L 
ýe 
= 
u 
U uU 
0 CJ U U 0 , a 
0 2 m u R 
.- .- 'iz u 
Out. 
U-u 
0 
0 
ce 2 
u cu 
ue 
tu u 
ES tA = o -5 20 2- 
kL 52 
X 
cu E 
w r-- E *C = A u .u o 02 
u 
> E3 
u 
v; t 5 
* r I 2 ,0ý M 
Z- = r- -, ý 
CJ c) 0 
öz = -V, = ý E I = 
r. ý- 2 r. i- 2 
ü 
r, - wý ý ,0= = E ý ý -ý M r 0 ý.: 0 
, 
-ý -ý >Z 0 iz >c 0 M < 0 u zi 0<< 0 u< 0 U u CA CD im. 
0 
U ul rA M Z UU U (D 
:. R 0 
ZA 
ei 9 15 ýn 
i ý_o to- 0 2 0 e 
0 0 
E a) 
rn 
>1 
ri) 
x 
en 
C-1 
CN 
0 
0 
0 
C14 
2 
ý3 
(U en 
ý-3 all 
-, = 
Ln 
-0 
E- 
40 
3. The client selects the preferred strategy from the shortlist. 
4. More decision criteria are presented in module three to ascertain the client's 
capabilities and attitude. 
5. The model uses the last items of information to determine the most appropriate 
project participants, basis of contract award and basis for compensation. 
The knowledge within Moshini's knowledge base comprises five hundred rules. Rules 
are sub-decisions generally expressed as IF-THEN statements (Render and Stair, 1991). 
The knowledge base also contains certainty factors which are probabilities used to 
reflect the uncertainty surrounding the rules in the knowledge base. 
Wang et al. (1996) suggested that probability theory is not an appropriate technique to 
implement within expert systems designed to aid contract strategy selection. Wang et al. 
(1996) claimed that probability theory is more suited for dealing with uncertainty in the 
form of randomness rather than uncertainty in the form of linguistic interpretation. 
Consequently they proposed that fuzzy set theory was more applicable to contract 
strategy selection models. 
Fuzzy set theory is a quantitative technique which can describe and manipulate 
imprecision and ambiguity (Wang et al., 1996). Descriptions of the numerical 
operations in fuzzy set theory can found in (Zimmen-nan et al., 1984). Contract strategy 
selection models using fuzzy logic have been reported by Sodipo (1987), Wong and So 
(1995) and Wang et al. (1996). 
The expert system developed by Wang et al. (1996) is a comparatively basic model 
designed primarily as a learning aid for young engineers and students. The model's 
contract strategy options are the six main options provided by the New Engineering 
Contract (ICE, 1993) and although the model's complete list of decision criteria are not 
disclosed, an example application of the model reported in Wang et al. (1996) used the 
following criteria: 
" minimise construction cost; 
" price certainty; 
" competition; and 
" minimise risk to the client. 
The expert system developed by Wong and So (1995) was instigated by research into 
contract decision-making in Hong Kong. The research resulted in an expert system that 
contained six decision criteria, six decision options and ten decision rules. 
The decision criteria and options within Wong and So's (1995) expert system are listed 
in Table 2.11. One of the ten decision rules is provided in Figure 2.10. 
41 
Decision criteria Contract strategy options 
" Scale of project 0 simple quotation of items (no reference to any 
" Nature of work 
standard methods of measurement) 
" Nature of client 
0 lump sum contract based on drawings and 
specifications 
" Time constraint 
0 Schedule of rates 
" Source of materials 
0 Management contract 
" Design of works 
0 Lump sum without quantities (a Hong Kong 
standard contract form) 
0 Lump sum with quantities (a Hong Kong 
standard contract form) 
Table2.11 Decision criteria and options within Wong and So's (1995) expert system 
The Management Contract option is the most appropriate when the following 
combination of fuzzy subsets of the critcria prevail: 
Scale of project: large, very large or very very large 
Nature of work: new substructure works or new superstructure works 
including specialist subcontractors 
Nature of client: private 
Time constraint: very tight 
Source of materials: innovative 
Design of works: those originated by the consultant 
Figure2.10 An example decision rule from the expert system developed by Wong and 
So(1995) 
Sodipo (1987) used both probability and fuzzy set theory. His expert system is more 
detailed than the others described in this section. The model prompts the user with up to 
forty questions. The questions are grouped under the following headings: 
1. type of client in terms of an attitude/incentive profile; 
2. expected roles of the parties to the contract; 
3. level of flexibility available in, or required by, the project; 
4. management procedure that the client or adviser wants to adopt; and 
5. identification, assessment and preferred method of managing the major project risks. 
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Despite a relatively high level of detail in the inference engine, the model is limited in 
its decision options. The model was designed to select the most appropriate type of 
organisational structure and type of pricing mechanism from the alternative options 
listed in Table 2.12. 
Organisational structure options Pricing mechanism options 
" Tumkcy/Package deal 0 Lumpsurn 
" Conventional contract 0 Admeasurcment 
" Target cost contract 0 Target cost 
" Management contract 0 Cost reimbursable 
Table2.12 Decision options within Sodipo's (1987) expert system 
Figure 2.11 illustrates which combination of user-inputs, with respect to the pre-defined 
decision criteria, satisfy the hypotheses (Main and Supportive) which in turn affirm 
'lump sum' as the most appropriate pricing mechanism type. 
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The figures on each branch of the network are Bayesian operators LS and LN (Sodipo, 1987). 
They are used to reflect the relative contributions that the factors have upon the consequent 
hypotheses. 
The higher the LS value (i. e. first value), the stronger the effect of the presence of the 
contributory factor on the consequent hypothesis. Similarly, the lower the LN value 
(i. e. second value), the stronger the effect of the absence of the contributory factor on the 
consequent hypothesis. 
Figure2.11 The inference network within Sodipo (1987) that affirms 'lump sum' the 
most appropriate pricing mechanism type 
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2.5 Critical review of contract strategy selection models 
It appears that existing contract strategy decision-aids (described in section 2.4) have 
derived from industrialists' qualitative and abstract perceptions about contract strategy 
selection. Therefore, other than imposing a structure to the decision process, these 
decision-aids mirror the industry's approach contract strategy selection. Section 2.2 
provided a critical review of the industry's approach. 
In this section, a number of aspects of the contract strategy decision-aids are examined 
critically. The examination focuses on three main areas: 
0 shortcomings in the decision criteria employed; 
lack of flexibility to accommodate different project circumstances, market 
intelligence and new research developments; and 
0 failure to rationalise uncertainties surrounding contract strategy selection. 
2.5.1 Decision criteria 
All of the models comprise a set of decision criteria against which contract strategies are 
evaluated in order to aid the decision-maker deduce the most appropriate option. It is 
apparent from section 2.4 that existing contract strategy selection models embody 
similar sets of decision criteria. For the purposes of this analysis, the decision criteria 
are divided into two distinct categories: 
9 those related to project procedures; and 
0 those relating to project circumstances. 
Table 2.13 indicates how these criteria are distinguished. 
Criteria which respond to the following 
circumstances 
Criteria which attempt to achieve the 
following through procedures 
" project size, type, location, etc. 0 appropriate or desirable risk allocation 
" experience, capabilities and resources of 0 degree of active involvement by client 
project participants 0 appropriate trade-off between likely 
" external factors such as market conditions, price/duration and price/duration certainties 
political climate, etc. 0 achieving value for money by competition 
0 scope for client to revise the brief 
Table 2.13 Two categories of decision criteria employed by contract strategy decision- 
aids 
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Z S. 1.1 Decision criteria relating to project procedures 
The 'project procedure' type criteria include: 
" risk allocation; 
" client responsibility; 
" price and duration certainty; 
" competition; and 
" flexibility. 
The above list essentially covers the 'project procedure' criteria common to all of the 
models described in section 2.4. The literature discussed in section 2.2.4 use these 
criteria to differentiate between contract strategies. 
It is perceived, however, that the models' decision logic falters when these criteria are 
used to establish a profile of the client's objectives. This is because these objectives are 
subordinate to the client's primary objectives (i. e. completion within balanced price, 
duration and quality targets (section 2.2.3)). Consequently, 'project procedure' type 
criteria ought not to be regarded as client objectives. Instead, they should be evaluated 
in terms of their potential implications to the client's primary objectives. The following 
five sub-sections elaborate on this argument for each criterion featured in the list above. 
2.5.1. LI Risk allocation 
Cooper and Chapman (1987) defined risk as "exposure to the possibility of economic or 
financial loss or gain, physical damage or injury, or delay, as a consequence of the 
uncertainty associated with pursuing a particular course of action". Hence project risks 
present some uncertain consequences to the client's primary objectives. 
There is extensive literature on the subject of efficient risk allocation which essentially 
aims to optimise the likelihood of achieving the client's primary objectives (Levitt et 
al., 1980; Porter, 1981; Barnes, 1983; Thompson and Perry, 1992; amongst others). 
Thompson and Perry (1992) listed the following principles of risk allocation: 
" Which party can best control the events that may lead to the risk occurring? 
" Which party can best manage the risk if it occurs? 
" Whether or not it is preferable for the client to retain an involvement in the 
management of the risk. 
9 Which party should carry the risk if it cannot be controlled? 
Whether the premium to be charged by the transferee is likely to be reasonable and 
acceptable. 
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" Whether the transferee is likely to be able to sustain the consequences if the risk 
occurs. 
" Whether, if the risk is transferred, it leads to the possibility of risks of a different 
nature being transferred back to the client. 
It appears that there are a variety of case-specific factors that require assessment before 
judging which allocation of risk, in a given project, is most likely to enable the 
achievement of the client's primary objectives (i. e. price, time and quality targets). 
Without an assessment of these case-specific factors, any decisions about risk allocation 
may prove to induce unfavourable consequences to the ultimate project outcome. This 
same argument underlies the following sections which address other decisions related to 
the 'project procedure' criteria. 
2.5.1.1.2 Client responsibility 
It is widely perceived that the role adopted by the client in a project can influence the 
performance of a project (Naourn and Mustapha, 1995; Potter, 1995b; Kometa et al., 
1996). Sidwell (1982) and NEDO (1988) proclaimed that the role in which the client is 
most likely to induce project success is governed by a project's particular circumstances 
as well as the client's experience, technical knowledge and in-house resources. Both 
Walker (1995) and Potter (1995b) suggested that, irrespective of a client's project 
management capabilities, projects benefit from clients who have a positive attitude and 
are prepared to involve themselves in a project to the extent that responsibilities are 
understood and assigned rationally and clearly. 
2.5.1.1.3 Price and duration certainty 
The degree of price and time certainty offered by a contract strategy is generally 
correlated with the degree of risk that the client transfers to other project participants 
(Flanagan and Norman, 1993). However, when a risk is transferred the transferee 
expects to receive a price from the transferor (Murdoch and Hughes, 1992). For 
example, to transfer risk to a contractor the client has to pay a premium to the 
contractor. As a result, a desire to attain price and time certainty may not be conducive 
to the client's primary objectives because, for example: 
" the premium may be excessive (Flanagan and Norman, 1993); 
" the contractor may compromise quality to save costs and time (Yates, 1991); 
" the contractor may claim for extensions of time and/or additional payment arising 
from delay, disruption or unexpected conditions (Aqua Group, 1990); 
" disputes may arise (Smith, 1996); and 
0 the contractor may become insolvent (Ward and Chapman, 1994). 
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Alternatively, price and time certainty may be attuned to the client's primary objectives 
if. 
" the above possibilities do not eventuate; 
" the contractor is more capable than the client to manage the risks (Thompson and 
Perry, 1992); and 
" the contractor is motivated to work efficiently and cost effectively (Chapman and 
Ward, 1994). 
2.5.1.1.4 Competition 
Competition is commonly perceived, in practice, as an efficient means of obtaining 
value for money (Smith, 1986; Ward and Chapman, 1994). However, this may not be 
true in all cases. Competition can lead to over-optimistic tender bids which prove 
unattainable (Latham, 1994; Smith, 1995). As a consequence, the contractor may 
attempt to recover costs by compromising quality, pursuing claims or alternatively the 
contractor may become insolvent. 
2.5.1.1.5 Flexibility 
Gordon (1994) acknowledged that a client's flexibility needs (i. e. capacity to make 
changes during, or offset decisions until, the construction process) is often affected by 
project constraints (e. g. the occupier is unknown, delays in permit requirements, 
considerable project uncertainty, etc. ). In which case, maintaining project flexibility is 
likely to be conducive to the client's primary objectives. However, Gordon (1994) and 
Akinsola et aL (1997) insisted that clients' indecisiveness can also inflate flexibility 
requirements. This unnecessary preference for flexibility has been widely condemned as 
a source of disruption, disputes and claims (Latham, 1994; Dobson, 1995). 
2.5.1.2 Deficiencies in the models' decision mechanisms that arise from the 'project 
proceditre'type criteria 
All of the existing contract strategy selection models contain decision criteria that make 
express reference to a client's primary 'duration' and 'quality' objectives. Only a few 
models (Sodipo, 1987; Ahmad and Morad, 1993; Moshini, 1993) include criteria that 
make reference to a client's primary 'price' objective. The majority of the models 
include the decision criteria featured in the preceding section (section 2.5.1.1). 
However, some of the models contain fixed relationships between a user's responses to 
the 'project procedure' criteria and the likely fulfilment of the client's primary 
objectives. For example, in Skitmore and Marsden's (1988) multi-attribute model, the 
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decision criterion 'price competition' is referred to as a factor that unconditionally 
increases the likelihood of attaining a low price (see Figure 2.7). 
The preceding sections argued that generalisations of this type are not valid in all 
circumstances. From all the existing decision-aids, this theory is only upheld by the 
expert systems. However, when a user is prompted to respond to the 'project procedure' 
criteria, none of the models acknowledge the relevance of project circumstances. This is 
because the models commonly frame 'project procedure' type criteria as questions. 
They, therefore, encourage clients to impart their preferences without accounting for, at 
least explicitly, the implications of their criteria-responses to their primary objectives. 
The following list of questions targeted at clients typify the models' 'project procedure' 
type criteria: 
" Do you need to choose your construction team by price competition? (NEDO, 1985) 
" To what extent do you wish one single organisation to be responsible for the project 
and transfer the risk of cost and time slippage? (Skitmore and Marsden, 1988) 
" What is your preferred allocation of the project's major risks (retain, share, 
transfer)? (Moshini, 1993) 
What level of design-construction overlap will be carried out? (Sodipo, 1987) 
it is argued that the answers to these questions ought to be the output from contract 
strategy selection models, not the input. The criteria described in section 2.5.1.1 are 
referred to as 'project procedure' type criteria because they relate to procedural options 
which, if applied in appropriate circumstances, may enable the client organisation to 
achieve its price, time and quality targets. As a consequence it is necessary to undertake 
a thorough evaluation of a project's circumstances before deciding to implement a 
particular procedural option. 
2.5.1.3 Deficiencies in the models' decision mechanisms that arise from the ýproject 
circumstances' type criteria 
The 'project circumstances' type criteria are perceived as those which relate to the 
constraints imposed by: 
a project's characteristics (e. g. type, size, location complexity, risks, etc. ); 
the capabilities of the project participants (i. e. the client and potential contracting 
parties); and 
0 external factors (e. g. construction market conditions, political climate, etc. ) 
This chapter has emphasised the fact that every project's circumstances and contract 
strategy are unique and that a contract strategy's impact on a project is dependent on the 
project's circumstances. However, only the expert systems directly account for the 
dependence between a contract strategy's attributes and a project's circumstances. 
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Furthermore, all of the existing contract strategy selection models could be accused of 
reducing the 'project circumstances' type criteria to an insufficient number and also to 
an imprecise level of detail. 
The majority of the models restricted this type of criteria to a combination of project 
size, complexity and specification completeness at tender. Like the common 'project 
procedure' type criteria, these few 'project circumstances' criteria are regularly used to 
differentiate between contract strategy types in the literature (section 2.2.4). 
Some of the expert systems facilitated a more detailed account of a project's 
circumstances. For example, Moshini (1993) addressed project location, type of client 
and legal requirements. Meanwhile, Sodipo's (1987) expert system prompts the user to 
consider: 
" level of definition of project scope and quantity of work; 
"a contractor's ability to make an accurate prediction of productivity; and 
" major risks (i. e. their likelihood of occurrence and consequential effects). 
Contract strategy selection is a complex decision problem, fundamentally because every 
project's circumstances and contract strategy are unique (section 2.2.4). The models 
described in section 2.4 have been developed to aid the selection process. However, the 
models impinge, to different extents, upon the decision-maker's freedom to select the 
most appropriate contract strategy. Given the nature of contract strategies and the 
process involved in their selection (sections 2.1 and 2.2), the flexibility of a contract 
strategy decision-aid is perceived to be a crucial property. 
2.5.2 Insufficient model flexibility 
All of the graphical aid models and expert systems contain their own pre-formatted 
knowledge which represents experts' evaluation of a particular set of contract strategy 
types. In expert systems the pre-formatted knowledge dictates not only the decision 
options, but the decision mechanism that ascertains the appropriateness of each 
available option from the user's responses to the decision criteria. In addition, the 
specific set of decision criteria within all of the models, including the multi-attribute 
analysis type, can also be considered to be pre-formatted knowledge. 
From the model types described in section 2.4, only the expert systems conventionally 
classify as knowledge-based systems. Nonetheless, the other model types clearly service 
some of the following utilities common to knowledge-based decision support systems 
(Holsapple and Whinston, 1996): 
" increase the efficiency of the decision process; 
" structure the decision problem; 
" manage knowledge; 
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* propose decision options; and 
0 supplement the decision-maker's evaluation of the options. 
In contrast, Ward et A (1991c) compared theoretical decision-aid models unfavourably 
with applied models. Theoretical models were described as those which prescribe the 
optimum decision option under a particular set of precisely defined conditions (i. e. a 
decision algorithm for a repetitive decision problem that is always treated as identical in 
nature), whilst applied models were classed as those that provide a more flexible means 
of exploring decision options. Ward et A (1991c) expressed the following perceived 
advantages of this latter model type: 
" applied models are more robust, particularly when the correctness of the 
assumptions underlying the equivalent theoretical models is disputable; 
" applied models tend to be more cost-effective to develop if there is a practical 
requirement to improve a current decision and the decision problem cannot be 
solved using optimisation; 
" applied models facilitate marginal analysis; and 
" applied models offer a more transparent approach to understanding the nature of a 
decision problem because there is the capacity to address relevant issues even 
though they have not been formally modelled. 
Owing to the fact that every project's circumstances and contract strategy are unique, 
models that contain pre-formatted knowledge present the following significant 
limitations: 
1. the knowledge cannot be validated; and 
2. the knowledge has to remain general in order to be applicable to most project 
circumstances. 
Owing to the above limitations, pre-formatted knowledge fosters conflicting knowledge 
between different experts (Hamilton, 1987; Bresnan and Haslam, 1991). All the 
developers of the expert systems described in section 2.4.3 acknowledged this fact. 
Furthermore, as a result of the second limitation cited above, the models that contain 
pre-formatted knowledge are inflexible, in the sense that: 
1. the models' contract strategy options are imprecise and limited in number; and 
2. the models' decision mechanisms are unable to account for all of the relevant case 
specific details. 
The following sub-sections describe the inflexibility imposed by the existing decision- 
aid models upon the decision options, decision criteria and thus decision mechanism. 
Section 2.5.2.2.1 makes reference to currently ongoing research into the development of 
a highly intricate and thus flexible knowledge-based system to assist contract strategy 
selection. 
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2.5.2.1 Model inflexibility: decision options 
Section 2.1 reported that contract strategy selection presents an infinite number of 
decision options. However, the expert systems and graphical aid models have restricted 
the decision options to comparatively small sets. Obviously, each model's set of 
alternatives are not comprehensive, but in addition, each option is typically referred to 
by a broad, albeit well-known, label which is open to considerable interpretation (e. g. 
Traditional, Target cost, etc. ). 
Some models made more precise references to their decision options than others. For 
example, Moshini (1993) implemented a more rigorous and systematic means of 
classifying contract strategies (see Table 2.10). In addition, the expert system developed 
by Wang et aL (1996) restricted the evaluated contract strategies to six standard contract 
forms (i. e. the New Engineering Contract options). However, this latter attempt to 
improve knowledge precision has the effect of exacerbating the model's inflexibility 
(i. e. limited number of decision options). 
In contrast, there is a lot more flexibility in the models that do not constrain the decision 
options to those for which they only contain pre-formatted knowledge (i. e. those models 
that employ multi-attribute analysis). These models effectively allow the user to 
evaluate contract strategies of their own choice. Hence the decision-maker is able to 
distinguish between the specific details of contract strategies. 
2.5.2.2 Model inflexibility: decision mechanism and criteria 
The model's deficiencies in the interpretation of contract strategy decision criteria has 
already been reported in section 2.5.1. The criteria, nonetheless, provide the models' 
structure, they supplement the decision-maker's thought process and ensure alternative 
decision options are evaluated consistently against the same criteria. These are essential 
prerequisites of decision support systems (Keen and Morton, 1978). However, owing to 
the complexity of contract strategy selection, an inflexible framework of specific criteria 
for every project may not be the optimal approach. 
it may be concluded that, instead, the model's decision criteria ought to be restrained to 
each client's particular primary objectives (i. e. balanced price, duration and quality 
targets). This is because, firstly, they are the ultimate aim of the decision process, and 
secondly, because as decision criteria they may be the only criteria which are applicable 
to every project. The only model reported in section 2.4 that used the client's primary 
objectives as its decision criteria is the multi-attribute utility analysis developed by 
Ahmad and Morad (1993). 
Although the multi-attribute analysis models contain fixed decision criteria, there is still 
flexibility for the decision-maker to refer to, and incorporate, a range of other factors 
which are relevant to a specific project's contract strategy decision problem. In contrast, 
expert systems, as a form of artificial intelligence, are designed to model humans' 
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decision mechanisms (Jackson, 1986). Owing to the nature of contract strategy 
selection, it is questionable as to whether the application of expert systems to this 
domain is both feasible and advisable. There is no standard contract strategy decision 
mechanism, nor is there an infallible means of validating any such attempt at a general, 
standard decision mechanism. Furthermore, the perceived advantages of modelling 
experienced contract strategists' decision mechanisms may be flawed given the 
deficiencies perceived to be common to the industry's approach (section 2.3.2). 
it has been widely acknowledged that artificial intelligence is most suited to decision 
problems that cover a well defined domain of knowledge (Turban, 1988; Brandon, 
1990). Perry (1985) expressed strong doubts with regards to representing contract 
strategy selection as a rigid set of rules and procedures. Consequently, Perry (1985) 
proposed a decision methodology which outlined a general approach to contract strategy 
selection. Although Perry has since been involved in the development of an expert 
system related to contract selection (Wang el aL, 1996), it was emphasised that the 
expert system was designed primarily as a leaming tool. In addition, both Perry (1995) 
and Ashworth (1991) have acknowledged that there is considerable scope for the 
industry to improve its understanding of contract strategies. 
2.5.2.2.1 Potential to improve the flexibility of pre-formatted knowledge 
Expert systems have been described in some sources as flexible (Buchanan and Duda, 
1983; Moshini, 1993). This is because knowledge can be continually added to an expert 
system's existing knowledge base. Wong and So (1995) suggested that their expert 
system can become self-learning with the aid of neural networks. 
More recently, Kumaraswamy (1997) proposed that an integrated system of artificial 
intelligence techniques (i. e. artificial neural networks, generic algorithms, case-based 
reasoning, fuzzy logic and expert systems) could optimise the intricacy of a prescribed 
contract strategy selection mechanism. Kumaraswamy (1997) also claimed that 
techniques such as the analytical hierarchy process and factor analysis, could reduce the 
subjectivity in discerning the impact that a contract strategy has had on a project. 
According to Kumaraswamy (personal communication), the results of this research are 
planned to be published in September 1999. Nonetheless, the preparatory work by 
Kumaraswamy (1997) illustrated the considerable obstacles one is faced with in the 
development of a highly structured knowledge-based model that aims to be applicable 
to most project circumstances and offer a diverse range of contract strategy options. 
2.5.3 Failure to rationalise decision uncertainty 
Section 2.2 established that: 
the impact that a contract strategy will have on a project is uncertain; and 
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a forecast of a contract strategy's impact on a project has to based upon imperfect, 
and thus uncertain and subjective, information. 
it may be inferred that all of the models described in section 2.4 are likely to reduce 
some of the uncertainty because each model imposes a structure to the decision process 
(Chapman and Ward, 1997). However, some of the models which embodied numerical 
analysis (i. e. those other than graphical aids) have not addressed the uncertainty directly 
or with notable rigour. 
The basic multi-attribute value analysis models simply prompted the decision-maker to 
assign a single value to represent the perceived performance or suitability of a contract 
strategy with respect to each criterion. The basic multi-attribute utility analysis 
developed by Ahmad and Morad (1993) incorporated the most basic probability trees 
(i. e. two alternative outcomes) to enable the decision-maker to account for the potential 
impacts that a pricing mechanism type could have on a project's price, duration and 
quality outcome. 
The expert systems used probability and/or fuzzy set theory. However, it may be argued 
that contract strategy selection expert systems introduce an additional level of 
uncertainty to the decision problem. Owing to their use of pre-formatted knowledge, 
certain aspects of the expert systems' decision-making process are open to linguistic 
interpretation. These aspects include a user's inputs, the evaluated contract strategies 
and the models' decision rules. This source of uncertainty is, in theory, avoided if an 
individual relies upon his/her own knowledge, rather than that of others. 
2.6 Conclusions and research proposals 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 described the nature of the contract strategy decision problem. In 
the light of this information together with reported criticisms of the industry's contract 
strategy selection practice, several deficiencies inherent in the industry's typical 
approach to the decision problem were identified. These deficiencies include: 
" limited appreciation of the decision options; 
" failure to set clear, realistic and balanced price, duration and quality targets; 
" failure to wholly rationalise decisions in terms of the client's primary objectives; 
" unstructured and imprecise decision mechanisms; 
" the decision process is not explicit or transparent; and 
" failure to account for the uncertainty inherent in contract strategy selection. 
Section 2.3.2 provided justification for the assumption that these deficiencies were 
expected to give rise to: 
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a reduction in the likelihood that the most appropriate contract strategy will be 
selected for a project; and 
2. a restriction on the capacity to appreciate the actual impact that a selected contract 
strategy has upon a project. 
As a result a new approach to contract strategy evaluation was proposed with the aim to 
eliminate the deficiencies perceived to exist in the industry's typical evaluation process. 
The principal facets of the new approach can be referred to simply as: 
o flexible; and 
0 quantitative. 
The subsequent sections describe these two facets of the approach and their capacity to 
resolve the above-listed deficiencies of the industry's approach to contract strategy 
evaluation. Reference is also made to the literature that supports the feasibility of the 
new approach. 
2.6.1 The capacity of a flexible approach to eliminate deficiencies in the 
industry's typical approach 
The existing contract strategy selection models imposed a structure upon the decision 
process and made the process explicit. However, it is perceived that the models 
incorporate many of the deficiencies considered to be inherent in the industry's 
approach to the decision problem. 
Section 2.5.2 listed advantages and disadvantages associated with decision-aids that 
contain pre-formatted data. Owing to the nature of contract strategies and their selection 
process, it was expounded that the models' pre-formatted knowledge constituted a 
generalisation, and thereby an oversimplification, of the decision problem. It was 
therefore concluded that an experienced and competent contract strategist would be 
inhibited by, and would be unlikely to gain insights from, the models described in 
section 2.4. Instead it appeared more appropriate to give the decision-maker the 
flexibility to: 
9 evaluate whichever contract strategies the decision-maker perceives may be the 
most appropriate; 
define each contract strategy in terms of the most appropriate level and type of 
detail; and 
0 evaluate each contract strategy in terms of the most relevant issues. 
The first and second of these flexible procedures serve to resolve the first perceived 
deficiency of the industry's typical approach listed in the preceding section; limited 
appreciation of the decision options. Meanwhile, the third flexible procedure aims to 
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facilitate a precise decision process which is specific to each contract strategy decision 
problem (thus corresponding to the deficiency listed third in the preceding section). 
It is appreciated that a decision-maker with total flexibility to direct the evaluation 
process at his/her discretion may encourage, not eliminate, the other listed deficiencies. 
However, the following section suggests how the flexible approach may become 
disciplined if contract strategy options are evaluated quantitatively. 
2.6.2 Quantitative evaluation of contract strategies 
Essentially it is proposed that, within the new approach, a contract strategy's perceived 
appropriateness for a specific project is to be reflected in estimates of the project's price 
and duration assuming that the contract strategy is implemented. Hence the new 
approach demands that prospective contract strategy options for a given project are to 
be evaluated expressly against the client's primary price and duration objectives. 
Since this chapter has emphasised the importance of all three of the client's primary 
objectives (i. e. balanced price, duration and quality targets) it may appear inconsistent 
to suddenly demote the quality objective. The following sections justify the focus upon 
price and duration with section 2.6.2.1 explaining that a project's quality requirements 
could be expressed in terms of the price and duration objectives. 
2.6. ZI Justification for demoting quality to a secondary objective to price and 
duration 
With regards to the client's primary objectives, a project's price and duration targets can 
be expressed in distinct units of cost and time, respectively. However, measures of 
quality are open to subjective interpretation because there are no express units of 
quality. As a result, a client organisation's quality target for its project is very difficult 
to: 
I. specify (section 2.2.3 made reference to Garvin (1988) who identified eight different 
dimensions of quality); and 
2. assess whether or not it has been achieved at project completion (Curtis el aL, 
1991). 
Rwelamila and Hall (1995) noted that the majority of literature on the subject of project 
management systems focused upon cost and time factors whilst quality has been largely 
ignored. There is the opinion that a project's quality outcome is exposed to less risk than 
a project's price and duration. Wright (1997) implored project managers to increase 
their efforts to enable projects to achieve the client's price and time targets, whilst he 
reduced the importance of the quality objective by claiming that projects are normally 
completed, effectively, to specification. A similar view was expressed by Turner (1997) 
who regarded project quality as dependent upon the quality of the design concept, 
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materials and workmanship. Therefore Turner (1997) claimed that a quality target 
should be attained providing: 
1. the contract specification is sufficiently detailed; and 
2. mechanisms and procedures of inspection are adequate. 
Section 2.2.3 reported that a client's primary objectives are interdependent. Therefore it 
may be concluded that a client organisation's quality target could be specified in terms 
of the amount of money and time invested, or not invested, in courses of action which 
may influence project quality (e. g. establish a client's specification, project monitoring 
resources, tender competition, etc. ). This is in addition to the qualitative specification of 
quality within a project brief. 
26.22 The capacity of the quantitative approach to eliminate deficiellcies ill the 
industry's typical approach 
Section 2.6.1 indicated which deficiencies of the industry's contract strategy selection 
practice could be resolved by a flexible approach. It is perceived that a quantitative 
evaluation process could eliminate the other deficiencies (listed at the beginning of 
section 2.6). This is because the quantitative approach: 
provides a structure to-the decision process 
The result of the quantitative evaluation process for a specific contract strategy is a 
forecast of the relevant project's price and duration. Rather than undertaking a 
holistic estimate of price and duration it is possible to obtain more accurate 
estimates by disaggregating a project's price and duration into constituent cost and 
time elements (e. g. design cost, tender process costs, construction duration). 
Therefore a structure to the decision process is imposed by establishing a set of cost 
and time elements against which contract strategies can be evaluated. This will also 
ensure that a set of alternative contract strategy options are evaluated consistently 
against the same criteria. 
does not impinge upon the decision-maker's flexibilily 
The decision-maker has the capacity to evaluate any contract strategy with respect to 
the most relevant issues. Cost and time are applicable decision criteria in all 
projects. 
facilitates setting clear. realistic and balanced price and duration targets 
Price and duration targets can be expressed in precise, unambiguous units of cost 
and time, respectively. Section 2.6.2.1 suggested that a quality target may also be 
specified in units of cost and time. Lifson and Shaifer (1982) supported quantitative 
specification of a client's objectives and requirements, wherever possible. 
In order to set realistic and balanced price and duration targets Curtis el al. (1991) 
insisted that it was necessary to "break a project down into component parts and 
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build up project goals from plans associated with components". This process can 
certainly be implemented under the quantitative approach. It has already been 
established that the decision problem can be disaggregated into a particular project's 
constituent cost and time elements in which the elements can equate to activities. 
The flexibility of the approach enables the decision-maker to plan a project at any 
level of detail and address any relevant issue. Furthermore, owing to the quantitative 
nature of the elemental evaluations and plans, it is possible to combine them to 
produce all-encompassing, explicit results in quantitative form. 
disciplines the decision-maker to wholly rationalise decisions in terms of the client's 
12rima[y 12rice and duration objectives 
The quantitative approach demands that all subjective assumptions used to 
differentiate between contract strategies make direct reference to a project's price 
and duration outcome. Hence those assumptions which are often instinctively 
interpreted as a favourable or unfavourable feature of a contract strategy (e. g. tender 
competition and risk transfer enabling value for money) have to be evaluated and 
rationalised expressly in terms of their expectant impact upon the client's price and 
duration objectives. 
disciplines the decision-maker to make all decision assUmptions and reasoning 
explici 
Quantitative analysis is more explicit and definitive than qualitative analysis 
(Chapman and Ward, 1997). Lifson and Shaifer (1982) said that "consistency, as 
well as communication and understanding, implies that information should be stated 
quantitatively". Furthermore Chapman (1992) acknowledged the significant 
assistance provided by graphical presentations of processed information to decision- 
making. 
facilitates an exl2licit account, and analysis. of the uncertainty inherent in contrac! 
strategy selection 
Quantitative estimates which reflect the decision-maker's subjective assumptions 
about a contract strategy can be represented by probability distributions. The 
distribution estimates also reflect tile uncertainty inherent in the subjective 
assumptions. By combining the estimates it is possible to obtain a quantitative 
overview of each contract strategy decision problem and therefore use the variety of 
techniques available to interpret quantitative data (e. g. mean, conditional mean, 
variance, etc. ) and to analyse the robustness of the whole quantitative process (i. e. 
sensitivity analysis). 
2.6.2.3 Feasibility of the quantitative approach 
Section 2.2.4.1 reported three cases (Pain and Bennett, 1988; Chisnall, 1991; Pedwell et 
ah, 1996) where the suspected impact of contract strategies upon particular projects 
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were estimated quantitatively in terms of the projects' cost and time performances. 
Furthermore, in these cases, the differences between a project's expected cost and time 
outcomes under different contract strategies were substantial enough to conclude that 
this approach was a valid means of distinguishing between available options in a 
particular project. 
Section 2.4.2 described a contract strategy decision-aid that modelled a very basic 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. The multi-attribute analysis 
developed by Ahmad and Morad (1993) required the decision-maker to estimate two 
alternative price and duration outcomes of the project and their corresponding 
probabilities for each contract strategy evaluated. 
It may be argued that the considerable uncertainty presented by contract strategy 
selection renders the quantitative approach implausible. It should also be noted that 
subjective estimates are highly susceptible to judgmental biases (section 2.3.1). Hertz 
and Thomas (1984) and Goodwin and Wright (1998) provided detailed explanations of 
the biases prevalent within subjective estimates, particularly probabilistic estimates. 
Vose (1996) described a variety of other sources of estimating inaccuracies. However, 
Chapman and Ward (1997) proclaimed "given that individuals are guided by their 
perceptions of uncertainty whether or not quantification is attempted, it makes sense to 
articulate these perceptions so that uncertainty can be dealt with as effectively as 
possible". 
O'Brien (1965) reported that, the then recently developed, Critical Path Method was 
greeted with some derision by professionals experienced in construction management. 
This analysis technique has since become one of the most widely used planning tools. 
Similarly, the concept of project risk analysis and management has been formalised 
over the past two decades and although it may not be implemented throughout the 
industry (Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997), the sheer volume of literature on the subject 
demonstrates that both its use and popularity has increased during this period. 
Therefore, owing to the acclaimed importance of contract strategy selection and 
deficiencies in the industry's current practice, there certainly appears to be scope and 
reason to propose an analytical approach to contract strategy selection, alternative to 
those already developed. 
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3. The development of a prototype model 
in order to clarify the stages of model development section 3.1 provides a summary of 
the complete research programme. Section 3.2 describes the development of a 
conceptual knowledge-based model, whilst section 3.3 outlines the conceptual basis for, 
and implementation of, the quantitative approach. 
3.1 A summary of the research programme 
Chapter 6 describes a series of sample analyses using a model that calculates a project's 
cost and time performance from estimates that reflect the potential impact of a contract 
strategy upon the project in question. Several phases of research led to the development 
of the model in its final form. 
initially a knowledge-based model was developed. This model is described in section 
3.2. The impetus for the design of a knowledge-based model was the fact that existing 
literature focused heavily on the relative appropriateness of different contract strategies 
in different circumstances (see section 2.2.4). 
The attempt at a knowledge-based model was a useful experience. It reinforced the 
conclusions of chapter 2; a quantitative approach offers significant advantages relative 
to a model that contains pre-fon-natted knowledge (see section 2.6). It was decided, 
therefore, to construct a probabilistic model which would allow a user to input 
quantified estimates that reflect the potential impact of contract strategies upon a project 
and which would output quantified estimates of the project's cost and time performance. 
The process and concepts employed in the development of this model are described in 
section 3.3. 
The principles of the model described in section 3.3, which is here described as the 
"prototype model", were reviewed in a survey of several construction professionals. 
This empirical study is the subject of chapter 4. 
The results of the empirical study, together with an appreciation of design compromises 
with the prototype model, led to the design of an upgraded model version. The 'refined 
model' is described in chapter 5. The refined model was used to carry out the analyses 
presented in chapter 6. 
3.2 A knowledge-based model 
Initially the aim of the research was to devise a contract strategy decision-aid that 
contained pre-formatted knowledge. This was driven by the perception that the pre- 
formatted knowledge in existing decision-aids was defective on two main levels: 
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1. The relationships between the models' decision criteria and the client's primary 
objectives relied upon theories that could be described as very general, preconceived 
and untested (e. g. in some existing models it is inferred that competitive tendering 
unconditionally induces a low project price - see section 2.5.1) 
2. Contract strategy alternatives are restricted to a limited number of pre-defined 
options, and each is imprecisely defined. 
It was decided to investigate whether it was possible to design a knowledge-based 
model that: 
" evaluated a wider range of more precisely-defined contract strategies; 
" took a greater account of a project's specific circumstances; and 
" measured the suitability of each evaluated contract strategy in terms of probable 
effects upon the cost and time performance of projects. 
Figure 3.1 shows part of a model designed to address these requirements. The particular 
section of the model featured in Figure 3.1 is designed to aid a decision-maker ascertain 
the pricing mechanism type most likely to minimise a project's construction cost. Other 
sections addressed sub-objectives additional to 'minimise construction cost' (e. g. fix 
construction costs, minimise construction time, maximise construction performance). It 
was envisaged that a similar overall approach could be applied to determine the most 
appropriate organisational structure and tender process. 
It has already been established that the section of the knowledge-based model featured 
in Figure 3.1 deals with the sub-objective 'minimise construction cost' (Column 1). It is 
considered that there are certain 'pricing mechanism resources' (Column3) which 
govern the extent to which the sub-objective is achieved. The relative contributions of 
each 'pricing mechanism resource' is reflected in the weighting factors (Column 2). For 
example, Figure 3.1 shows that profit incentive is regarded as having a greater influence 
(weight 0.3) than project scope definition (weight 0.1). 
The 'property options' (Column 4) within each 'pricing mechanism resource' (Column 
3) were intended to differentiate between pricing mechanism types (e. g. for the resource 
'scope definition', a unit price type pricing mechanism might be characterised by the 
third property option 'well-defined scope' whilst, in contrast, a cost reimbursable type 
pricing mechanism might be characterised by the first property option 'broadly-outlined 
scope'). For each pricing mechanism resource, a pricing mechanism type was assigned 
an 'ability score' (Column 5) that corresponded to the property option associated with 
the pricing mechanism type (the maximum score value was 10). Each ability score was 
then multiplied by a 'suitability factor' (Column 6). The suitability factor aimed to 
reflect the capacity of the property option to achieve the 'sub-objective' (Column 1) 
given that the project was either a low, medium or high risk project. The sizing of a 
project risk was to be determined from a separate scoring system in which the decision 
criteria related to project circumstances (e. g. project type, size, status, particular risks, 
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the client's cost and time priorities, capabilities of contracting parties, etc. ). The overall 
measure of a pricing mechanism type's capacity to minimise a given project's 
construction cost was equal to the sum of the products of the pricing mechanism type's 
ability score, suitability factor and weighting factor along each pricing mechanism 
resource branch featured in Figure 3.1. 
For example, consider the comparison of a 'unit price' and a 'cost plus fixed fee' type 
pricing mechanism for a 'low' risk project. Table 3.1 shows which property options (see 
Column 4 in Figure 3.1) correspond to the unit price mechanism and the subsequent 
quantitative values that are used to calculate a measure of the pricing mechanism type's 
appropriateness in a low risk project. Table 3.2 presents similar details for the cost Plus 
fixed fee mechanism. 
Pricing mechanism property 
resource option 
ability 
score 
suitability 
factor 
resource 
weighting 
factor 
product 
Scope definition 3 9 10 0.1 9 
Pre-award quantification 4 9 3 0.2 5.4 
Sum stability 2 7 6 0.2 8.4 
Cost controls 3 9 2 0.2 3.6 
Profit incentive 4 8 6 0.3 14.4 
TOTALSCORE 40.8 
Table 3.1 Application of the knowledge-based model to measure the appropriateness 
of a unit price type pricing mechanism for a low risk project 
Pricing mechanism property 
resource option 
ability 
score 
suitability 
factor 
resource 
weighting 
factor 
product 
Scope definition 1 3 4 0.1 1.2 
Pre-award quantification 2 5 6 0.2 6 
Sum stability 3 6 2 0.2 2.4 
Cost controls 2 5 7 0.2 7 
Profit incentive 2 3 7 0.3 6.3 
TOTALSCORE 22.9 
Table 3.2 Application of the knowledge-based model to measure the appropriateness 
of a cost plus fixed fee type pricing mechanism for a low risk project 
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Comparison of the total scores calculated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that, in a low 
risk project, a unit price type pricing mechanism, relative to a cost plus fixed fee 
mechanism, is a better option for minimising construction cost. 
Although the approach had some advantages over existing decision-aids, it gradually 
became apparent that this approach to the contract strategy decision problem was beset 
with problems. Fundamentally, it was perceived that a generalisation of the decision 
problem would inevitably be an over-simplification, regardless of the detail in the pre- 
formatted knowledge (see section 2.5.2). As a result, it was expected that an 
experienced contract strategist would gain little benefit from a model that contains 
general ly-applicable knowledge about contract strategy selection. 
Seymour et aL (1996) criticised construction management researchers for their common 
failure to acknowledge and account for the contextual nature of Pre-formatted 
knowledge embodied in generic models. Seymour et aL claimed that the knowledge is 
likely to 're-contextualised' and thus both its validity and utility are questionable. 
Clearly validity is a crucial requirement for a model that contains pre-formatted 
knowledge. However, there is no infallible means of testing the validity or utility of a 
contract strategy decision-aid model. Section 2.2.4 reported that it is not possible to 
ascertain the precise impact that a contract strategy has upon a project. Therefore any 
model tests would be inherently subjective and considerable testing would be required 
before a model could be claimed to be valid. 
The realisations which developed from the initial research direction led to a change in 
the approach to the subject. It was concluded that the development of a model that 
contained pre-formatted knowledge, of the type described earlier in this section, was 
unlikely to lead to significant improvements in contract strategy selection from an 
academic or an industrial perspective. 
it was theorised that the mental knowledge-base of each individual contract strategist 
possessed the greatest potential to become the most efficient and effective contract 
strategy decision-aid. Therefore the research set out to investigate how improvements to 
an individual's knowledge about contract strategy selection could be achieved and also 
how the individual could self-perpetuate these improvements. The concept of the 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation developed thereafter. 
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3.3 The prototype quantitative model 
Section 2.6.2 introduced the quantitative approach as a process in which a prospective 
contract strategy's appropriateness for a specific project is to be reflected in estimates of 
the project's price and duration, assuming that the contract strategy is implemented. 
Therefore the quantitative approach is essentially a methodology as opposed to a 
directly applicable tool. As such, the model had to be designed as a flexible framework 
which may be applied and interpreted by the decision-maker to facilitate quantitative 
evaluation of contract strategies in specific scenarios. 
During the design of the model, decisions had to be made which constrained the 
model's flexibility. This is because the short-terin priority was perceived to be the 
production of a model that enabled the fundamental principles of the quantitative 
approach to be tested. Although the model limitations are identified at the end of this 
chapter, they are explained in more detail in chapter 5, which also describes the 
refinements subsequently made to the model. 
The remainder of this chapter describes the first version of the quantitative model (i. e. 
the prototype model) as well as the process involved in its development. Example 
demonstrations of the model are provided. There is also guidance as to how and when to 
use the model. 
3.3.1 The outline components of the prototype model 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the basic concepts of the model: 
1. probabilistic estimates of a project's constituent cost and time elements are inputted 
into the model; 
2. the model performs a variety of computations; and 
3. the model outputs probabilistic estimates of the project's price and duration. 
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Input probabilistic Model performs Model outputs estimates of project 10 computations 
10 
project price and components' cost duration 
and duration 
Figure 3.2 The basic process involved in the application of the prototype model 
The quantitative approach is an analysis intended to estimate a project's cost and time 
performance assuming that the project is procured using a particular contract strategy. 
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Therefore it was recognised that a simulation-based analysis was required. Furthermore, 
in order to address the uncertainty surrounding contract strategy selection, the 
simulation had to be stochastic. 
A project may be considered to consist of a number of activities or elements. It was 
appreciated that the elemental project breakdown could have consisted of a simple list 
of consecutively-running activities or the more complex alternative of a precedence 
network of activities. The latter option was considered more appropriate because it 
provided the degree of realism and sophistication that enabled the outputs to be relevant 
to real project situations. 
Owing to these analytical prerequisites and the number of components to be simulated, 
it was decided to use Monte Carlo simulation in the model. As a result of this decision, 
a variety of subsidiary matters required consideration, including: 
details of the simulation technique; and 
type of probability distribution used for model input estimates. 
Each of these is discussed in the sub-sections which follow. 
3.3. LI Description of Monte Carlo sint ulation 
Bemie and Yates (1991) described Monte Carlo simulation as the appropriate technique 
to use where "the final outcome to a decision problem depends on the outcomes of a 
number of different events (sub-problems) and in the manner in which they combine". 
The technique involves randomly sampling values from the input probability 
distributions before they are suitably combined to give a value for the output variable(s) 
(Simon et al., 1997). The sampling method associated with Monte Carlo simulation 
generally adhere to the following procedure, regardless of the input distribution type 
(Vose, 1996): 
ea random number is generated from a uniform distribution of values ranging from 
zero to one; 
the value sampled from the input distribution is that which has the cumulative 
probability value equal to the randomly generated number. 
This process is performed for each input distribution and subsequently all of the 
sampled values are used to calculate the simulated value of the output varlable(s). 
Repetition of this whole process many times generates a distribution of simulated values 
for the output variable(s). 
With respect to the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation, application of 
Monte Carlo simulation aims to calculate a probability distribution of project price and 
duration for each contract strategy evaluated. Therefore the input variables are the 
constituent cost and time elements of a project's price and duration which a contract 
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strategy is expected to have some impact upon. The assumed impact of a contract 
strategy is to be reflected in each element's probability distribution estimate. The 
distribution estimates are subsequently combined using Monte Carlo simulation. The 
following section reports and justifies the use of triangular probability distributions to 
model the potential value of the input variables. 
3.3.1.2 The use of triangular probability distribution functiolls 
A decision was made to model the values of the uncertain input variables using 
triangular probability distribution functions (Figure 3.3a). This distribution type has 
previously been used for construction cost and time estimates (Raftery, 1991; Newton, 
1992; Williams, 1992). However, it has been claimed that triangular probability 
distributions do not provide realistic representations of construction cost data (Flanagan 
and Stevens, 1990; Chau, 1995a; Chau, 1995b; Wall, 1997). According to Chau (1995a 
and 1995b) they inherently induce over-estimation of risk exposure when the maximum 
value of a variable is estimated at its maximum extreme value. The broken line in 
Figure 3.3b is considered to be a more realistic representation of the possible cost 
outcome beyond the most likely value. 
Figure 3.3a Triangular probability distribution Figure 3.3b A more realistic representation of 
construction cost uncertainty (Chau, 1995b) 
Consequently the probability distributions which have been proposed as more accurate 
models of construction cost data include: 
" Beta distribution (Flanagan and Stevens, 1990); 
" Lognormal distribution (Tauron and Wiser, 1992); and 
" Log-triangular distribution (Chau, 1995b). 
These three distribution types are derived mathematically (i. e. parametric distributions) 
whereas the triangular probability distribution function is defined by the required shape 
which in turn dictates the distribution's mathematics (i. e. non-parametric distribution). 
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Owing to their non-parametric property, triangular distributions have been described as 
particularly useful for subjective estimates as opposed to estimates based upon 
historical, objective data (Williams, 1992; Vose, 1996; Chapman and Ward, 1997). 
Vose (1996) reported that non-parametric distributions (i. e. Uniform, General, Triangle, 
Cumulative and Discrete) are more reliable and flexible than parametric distributions 
(e. g. Normal, Beta, Lognormal, etc. ) because: 
" parametric distributions are more difficult to review later because the parameters 
which define the distribution have no Intuitive appeal; 
" models that utilise parametric distributions are less transparent and therefore it is 
more difficult to assure the decision-maker of the model's validity; 
" parametric distributions are difficult to revise when new relevant information 
becomes available because the distribution's parameters are not directly related to 
the real data; and 
parametric distributions are difficult to refine because the effects of changes in the 
distribution's parameters are difficult to understand. 
As a result, triangular distributions appeared to be a suitable means of representing the 
uncertain variables in the model. It also appeared appropriate to investigate 
industrialists' reactions to the distribution type during the empirical research. 
3.3.2 Model structure 
The model is intended to simulate a contract strategy's impact upon a proJect's price 
and duration performance. Therefore the design of the model involved decisions as to 
how, and to what detail, should the model simulate both a project and a contract 
strategy. The subsequent sub-sections concentrate on the following two issues: 
" which particular aspects of a project's performance and contract strategies are 
simulated by the model; and 
" numerical relationships between the simulated elements and the measure of a 
project's performance which reflects the impact of a contract strategy. 
One should also note that a decision was made to code the model within Microsoft 
Excel. The decision was based upon the following realisations about Excel: 
" readily accessible; 
" very useful in-built analysis appropriate for the particular purposes of the model; 
" straightforward user-interface; and 
" availability of relevant expertise. 
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3.3.21 Simulatimi ofprojeaperformance 
A project's price and duration can be simulated by suitably building up the constituent 
cost and time elements. The identification of the time elements simply involves a 
breakdown of a project into a series of activities. Although the cost of the project 
activities contributes to the attainment of a project's price, the price that a client pays for 
production activities (i. e. design and construction) is also dependent upon the type of 
contract strategy used to procure the project. Therefore the simulated price elements do 
not solely comprise the project activities, but also include parameters that are dictated 
by the contract strategy type or, more specifically, the pricing mechanism type. These 
parameters and the calculation process required to determine a project's price are 
described in detail in section 3.3.2.3.1. 
3.3.2.1.1 Production activities 
The two primary production activities in any construction project are design and 
construction. For simplicity with respect to the model design, it was decided to impose 
some restrictions on the breakdown structure of project production. The design activity 
was fixed as a single activity and the user was able to divide construction into a 
maximum of four activities. All of the activities chosen to represent project production 
are referred to as individual cost and time elements. 
3.3.2.1.2 Tender process activity 
According to Corrie (1991 ) there are generally four stages to tendering: 
1. selection of tenderers; 
2. invitations to bid; 
3. tender preparation and delivery; and 
4. appraisal of tenders, negotiation and decision. 
It was intended to include the costs incurred by the client during these stages in the 
determination of a project's price as well as to include the duration of the activity's 
procedures within the calculation of project duration. The user of the model is simply 
prompted to estimate the cost (incurred by the client) and the duration of the overall 
tender process. Therefore the user can use his/her discretion to include whichever items 
are appropriate given the project circumstances and the type of tender process under 
evaluation. Like each production activity, the tender activity is referred to as a cost and 
time element. Section 3.3.2.2 explains that the model is designed to simulate just one 
tender activity within each contract strategy. 
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3.3.2.1.3 Transaction costs 
This section concerns a cost element as opposed to a project activity. A description of 
the cost element follows together with justification for its inclusion in the simulation of 
a project's performance. 
Transaction costs within the construction industry and their relevance to contractual 
arrangements has been highlighted by Rene and Levitt (1984) and Winch (1989). 
Transaction costs essentially refer to administrative type costs which are incurred when 
one party employs another party to perform a service. 
Winch (1989) suggested that the transaction costs incurred on construction projects can 
be significant because construction projects are executed by a temporary coalition of 
independent organisations. As a result, the relationships between the different 
organisations are market-orientated and incite opportunistic behaviour, particularly 
given the considerable uncertainty presented by construction projects. In other words, 
the level of transaction costs is largely effected by a contract strategy's type of 
organisational structure, since this governs the number and type of contractual 
interfaces. 
Winch (1989) included the following general items under the title of transaction costs: 
" preparation of bills of quantities and other contract documents; 
" estimating effort by subcontractors; 
" dispute resolution; and 
" contract management by designers, quantity surveyors and contractors to deflect 
opportunistic behaviour of the other parties. 
Rene and Levitt ( 1984) recognised that all costs of this type, irrespective of whichever 
project party directly expended them, will eventually be borne by the client. 
The model prompts the user to estimate a distribution of transaction costs, which the 
client may incur, for each contract strategy that is evaluated. Since there is no definitive 
list of items within the transaction costs element, the user is given the flexibility to 
include items which appear most appropriate in a given application of the analysis. It is 
important, however, to avoid duplication of cost items within the series of elemental 
estimates. 
3.3.22 Simulation of contract strategies 
Owing to the complex nature of contract strategies (section 2.1), it was decided to 
simulate only certain general features that are common to most contract strategies. 
Primarily, these features included work packaging, together with the type of tender 
process and pricing mechanism implemented within the contract between the client and 
the contractor that is assigned responsibility for the construction. 
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It was recognised that it would be difficult to develop a model which provided a general 
framework with which any contract strategy could be defined in terms of the previously 
identified features. Therefore it was decided to make a compromise in this first version 
of the model. 
The development of the prototype model coincided with the development of the 
empirical research strategy. Section 4.3.3 describes the design of a questionnaire that 
requested respondents to evaluate three specific contract strategy types. It appeared 
appropriate to define each of the three contract strategies within the questionnaire in 
terms of its work packaging, together with its type of tender process and pricing 
mechanism implemented within the contract between the client and the contractor that is 
assigned responsibility for the construction. Therefore it was decided to restrict the 
contract strategy options within the prototype model to the same three alternatives 
presented in the questionnaires. The contract strategies were defined as follows: 
Traditional: a team of design consultants complete the design and administer the project. The 
design is complete before the construction is let to a general contractor using a negotiated tender 
process. The client's detailed bill of quantities is used to negotiate a Guaranteed Maximum Price (any 
cost savings are shared equally) and it also provides a basis for re-measurement of the price. 
2. Design-Build: the remainder of the design and the entire construction work is let as a single 
package using a competitive one-stage tender process. The package is let on the basis of a fixed lump 
sum price. 
3. Management Contract: a management contractor is appointed during the conceptual design stage 
following a pre-qualification process and negotiation of the management contractor's fees. The pre- 
construction fee is a lump sum, while the fee for services during construction is based on a target cost 
arrangement where the management contractor receives a percentage value of the construction cost, 
but any cost savings or overruns relative to a negotiated target cost are shared equally between the 
client and management contractor. The management contractor divides the construction into work 
packages and each package is tendered competitively on the basis of a cost plus percentage fee 
payment mechanism. The management contractor administers the tender process for each work 
package. 
It is assumed that these alternatives limit the number of contracts between the client and 
contracting parties to those displayed in Table 3.3. Table 2.1 presented the common 
arrangement associated with each of these orgamsational structure labels. The contracts 
correspond to the simulated work packaging enforced within each contract strategy. 
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Tasks allocated by the contracts within each contract strategy option 
Contract Strategy contract I contract 2 contract 3 
Traditional construction design 
design and Design-Build 
construction 
Management Contract construction design management services 
Table 3.3 A breakdown of the prime contracts held by the client within each modelled 
contract strategy option 
The contracted party responsible for, at least, project construction (Contract I in Table 
3.3) is hereafter referred to as the 'principal contractor'. Table 3.4 shows the common 
title used to refer to the principal contractor in each of the three contract strategy 
options. An assumption was made to treat the series of works contractors under the 
Management Contract arrangement as one single principal contractor. 
Contract Strategy Common title of principal contractor 
Traditional General contractor 
Design-Build Design-Build contractor 
Management Contract Works contractors 
Table 3.4 The principal contractors within each modelled contract strategy option 
The description of the Management Contract option includes reference to the tendering 
procedure and pricing mechanism associated with the management services contract 
(Contract 3 in Table 3.3). However, other than with the Management Contract option, 
the descriptions of the three alternative contract strategies define the type of tender 
process and pricing mechanism implemented solely within the contract between the 
client and the principal contractor. These descriptions reflect the decision made to focus 
the model predominantly upon this contract. The decision was considered justifiable 
because construction typically accounts for the greatest proportion of a project's price 
and its inherent uncertainty. The model's focus upon this contract manifests as a more 
rigorous analysis to calculate the contract price. This is demonstrated in section 
3.3.2.3.1.1. 
72 
Beforehand, however, it is important to acknowledge that the user is obliged to interpret 
and appreciate the specific details of each evaluated contract strategy option and reflect 
these in the estimates. Therefore, although the model restricts the simulated contract 
strategies to three alternatives, the user must recognise that each alternative presents an 
array of options. For example, a set of alternative Traditional-Negotiated-Guaranteed 
Maximum Price options could differ with respect to: 
" allocation of particular risks; 
" delegation of responsibility to the client's principal advisor; 
use of specialist subcontractors; or 
quality control measures. 
The model facilitates this type of marginal analysis. Iterative analyses are perceived as 
very useful given the complexity and uncertainty presented by contract strategy 
selection. 
3.3.23 Numerical analy. sk 
The following sections describe the mathematical relationships between the model's 
input and output variables. The input variables are the estimated cost and time elements, 
while the output variables equate to a project's price and duration performance for a 
specified contract strategy. 
3.3.2.3.1 Project Price 
Project price is obtained by summing the price, paid by the client, for each of the 
client's prime contracts together with the tender process cost and transaction costs. It 
was established in section 3.3.2.2 that each modelled contract strategy option comprises 
a different set of prime contracts. As a result, the project price calculation is different 
for each of the three contract strategy options. A further difference in the calculation is 
caused by the contract strategies' different pricing mechanism types. 
The subsequent sub-sections describe the calculation required to obtain the price of each 
type of contract identified in Table 3.3. 
3.3.2.3.1.1 Calculation of the price of the principal contractor's contract 
The analysis used to calculate the price of the contract between the client and principal 
contractor is governed by the type of pricing mechanism implemented within the 
contract. This is because each pricing mechanism type presents a different method of 
establishing the price of a contract (see Table 2.2 in section 2.1.2). Essentially most 
pricing mechanism types can be represented by a mathematical formula that determines 
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the contract price from the actual contract costs and/or the values of the tender bid 
parameters particular to the pricing mechanism type. 
The tender bid parameters are so called because their values are typically established at 
a contract's tender stage. Table 3.5 lists the tender bid parameters relevant to the pricing 
mechanisms employed in the contract between the client and principal contractor in 
each of the three modelled contract strategy options. Table 3.5 also presents the 
mathematical relationship which relates these parameters and the actual contract costs 
with the contract price. The contract price formulae derive from Gilbreath (1983), 
Hendrickson and Au (1989) and Chapman and Ward (1994). 
Contract Pricing mechanism 'Fender bid parameters Contract price formula Strategy 
Traditional Guaranteed * Guaranteed maximum if 
Maximum Price price (G) C+ F+b(T-C)<G Then 
General contractor's 
" Target contract cost contract price = 
(T) C+F+ b(T -Q 
" Target fee (fixed) (F) Else 
" Sharing rate (b) 
General contractor's 
contract price 
G 
Design-Build contractor's Design-Build Fixed lump sum Fixed sum (V) contract price =V 
Management Cost plus percentage Percentage fee level Works contractors' contract 
Contract fee price = C(I + f) 
C= Actual contract costs to the principal contractor 
The sharing rate (b) is treated as a deterministic variable because it is assumed that this value is 
dictated by the client. In the context of the above formulae, the sharing rate is interpreted to 
mean the proportion of savings/losses of the actual contract cost, relative to the target contract 
cost, that the client pays/receives to/frorn the principal contractor. 
Table 3.5 The tender bid parameters and pricing mechanism formulae relevant to the 
three modelled contract strategy options 
The following four steps outline the model's operation, common to all three contract 
strategy options, which lead to the calculation of the price of the contract between the 
client and the principal contractor: 
each cost element that the principal contractor is contracted to complete is to be 
estimated as the cost to the principal contractor (note: each element is estimated as a 
triangular probability distribution of values); 
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2. the model accumulates the cost estimates using Monte Carlo simulation to produce a 
histogram which represents a probability distribution of the principal contractor's 
contract costs (i. e. actual contract costs); 
3. the calculated distribution of the principal contractor's contract costs are displayed 
to aid the user to estimate values of the tender bid parameters particular to the 
contract's pricing mechanism type (note: each* tender bid parameter is estimated as 
a triangular probability distribution of values); 
4. during the subsequent Monte Carlo simulation the sampled values in each 
simulation are used to calculate the contract price using the appropriate pricing 
mechanism formula. 
The input variables in the above operation require the user to take the perspective of the 
principal contractor. Firstly, the actual production costs involved in the principal 
contractor's contract have to be estimated as costs to the principal contractor. Secondly, 
the user is required to estimate the values of the contract's relevant tender bid 
parameters. This second set of estimates require an assessment and forecast of bidding 
strategies that may be adopted by potential principal contractors. A contractor's bidding 
strategy aims to secure a contract price which covers the actual contract costs and 
provides the contractor with an adequate profit (i. e. mark-up). 
Mark-up estimation has been extensively researched and several bidding theories exist. 
Skitmore (1989) and Harris and McCaffer (1995) reviewed and analysed competitive 
fixed price type bidding strategies. Meanwhile Chapman and Ward (1994), Jafaari 
(1996) and Chapman and Ward (1997) have described and suggested bidding theories 
pertaining to incentive and cost-reimbursable type pricing mechanisms. However, 
owing to its complexity, mark-up estimation is non-nally based upon the estimator's 
experience and intuition (Li, 1996). 
A common conclusion prevalent in bidding theory literature is that the quality of tender 
bids is dependent upon the quality of the estimates of project perfon-nance (Harris and 
McCaffer, 1995). Therefore it appeared appropriate to give the user the flexibility to 
estimate the values of the relevant tender bid parameters on the basis of a distribution of 
contract cost aggregated from the elemental cost estimates. 
Exampig calculation of the principal contractor's contract -i 
A contract strategy has to be selected for a road-bridge project. Assume the model's 
Traditional contract strategy option is under evaluation. The user chose to divide project 
construction into the following activities: 
" foundations and abutments 
" deck 
" surface road 
* the sharing rate (b) is fixed at a single value because it is assumed that this value is dictated by the client 75 
Within the Traditional option, the contract between the client and the principal 
contractor involves construction. Therefore the model prompts the user to estimate each 
construction activity's cost to the principal contractor (i. e. general contractor). Assume 
the estimates shown in Table 3.6 were inputted into the model. 
Construction activity 
Cost (imillion) to the general contractor 
Minimum Most likely Maximum 
foundations and abutments 0.90 1.00 1.20 
deck 0.65 0.70 0.80 
surface road 0.25 0.30 0.35 
Table 3.6 Construction cost estimates assuming the Traditional contract strategy is 
used to procure the bridge project 
The model performs Monte Carlo simulation to sum these three estimated distributions 
to obtain a distribution estimate of the general contractor's total contract costs (Figure 
3.4). The model displays the calculated distribution to aid the user to estimate the values 
of the relevant tender bid parameters. Since the Traditional contract strategy is under 
evaluation, the tender bid parameters are those listed in Table 3.7. This table also 
displays the user's estimates of the tender bid parameters' values. 
The estimated values in Table 3.7 derive from judgements based upon the general 
contractor's total contract cost (displayed graphically in Figure 3.4). The most likely 
Target contract cost is taken as the mean value of the contractor's total cost (i. e. 
E2.050M). The minimum and maximum target cost values were estimated at +/4100k 
difference from the mean total cost value. The approximate level of the contractor's 
target fee was estimated at 5% of the mean total cost value. Therefore the minimum, 
most likely and maximum Target fee values were estimated as MOW, fO. 100M and 
Lo. II OM. Given that the Target fee level would be approximately f 0.1 M and that the 
maximum total cost value is f2.270M it was deemed appropriate to estimate the 
minimum, most likely and maximum GMP values at f 2.200M, E2.3000M and f 2.400M, 
respectively. 
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Tender bid parameter minimum most likelv Maximum 
Guarantccd maximum price (G) L2.2M f2.3M f2.4M 
Target contract cost (T) fl. 950M L2.050M L2.250M 
Targct fcc (F) LO. 095M LO. I OOM LO. I 10M 
Sharing ratc (b) * 0.5 
* sharing rate (b) is assumed to be a deterministic variable (estimated as a single value) 
Table 3.7 Estimates of the tender bid parameters' values for the Traditional option 
Figure 3.4 The calculated distribution of the principal contractor's contract costs 
Once the tender bid estimates are inputted, the model performs Monte Carlo simulation 
again. In each simulation the model randomly samples values from the distributions of 
the relevant variables (i. e. those that feature in the relevant pricing mechanism type 
formula). An example contract price calculation for the Traditional contract strategy is 
provided below. For this example, assume the randomly sampled values from the 
inputted distributions in a single simulation are those displayed in Table 3.8. 
Variable Randomly sampled value 
Foundations and abutments (X) L1.027M 
Deck (Y) LO. 781M 
Surface Road (Z) LO. 271M 
Target contract cost (T) L2.045M 
Target fee (F) LO. 102M 
Guaranteed maximum price (G) L2.269M 
Table 3.8 A set of values sampled in a single simulation 
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Actual contract cost to the general contractor (C) =X+Y+Z 
= E2.079M 
Contract pricing mechanism formula =C+F+ b(T - C) 
= £2.079M + £0.1 02M + 0.5 (£2.045M - £2.079M) 
= E2.164M 
E2.164M < E2.269M (i. e. simulated value of G) 
hence, 
Simulated contract price = E2.164M 
The result of this calculation process is the simulated price of the contract between the 
client and principal contractor (i. e. party responsible for undertaking the construction 
work). This contract price is added to the simulated values of the other cost elements 
incurred by the client (i. e. design price, tender costs and transaction costs) in order to 
obtain the simulated project price for the evaluated contract strategy. The following 
sections describe how the model simulates values of the client's costs, other than the 
principal contractor's contract price. 
3.3.2.3.1.2 Calculation of the price of an independent design contract 
This analysis applies to the Traditional and Management Contract options within the 
model. Under the Design-Build option the design price would have been accounted for 
in the analysis described in the preceding section. 
it was decided to simply model the price of an independent design contract as a lump 
sum amount. Therefore the model prompts the user to directly estimate the price which 
the client is likely to pay for design services, as a triangular probability distribution of 
values. Hence the price of an independent design contract in each simulation is simply 
the randomly sampled value from the estimated distribution. 
3.3.2.3.1.3 Calculation of the price of the management services contract 
The client appoints a management contractor under the Management Contract option to 
act solely in a supervisory role. Unlike the independent design contracts, it was decided 
not to model the management contractor's fee simply as a lump sum amount. Instead, 
the fee determination mechanism was defined in such a way that it may be modelled as 
a mathematical function similar to those of the pricing mechanisms. 
In the description of the Management Contract option, the following reference was 
made to the management contractor's fee: 
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The pre-construction fee is a lump sum, while the fee for services during construction is 
based on a target cost arrangement where the management contractor receives a 
percentage value of the construction cost, but any cost savings or overruns relative to a 
negotiated target cost are shared equally between the client and management contractor. 
Therefore the mathematical fon-nula used to calculate the management contractor's fee 
in each simulation is: 
S+ kC + b(T-C) (Equation 3.1) 
where: 
S= management contractor's pre-construction lump sum fee 
k= percentage fee level 
C= actual construction cost 
b= sharing rate (= 0.5) 
T= target construction cost 
A value for each variable in the above equation (with the exception of the sharing rate, 
b) is randomly sampled from their estimated triangular distribution in each simulation. 
3.3.2.3.1.4 Calculation of the tender process cost and transaction costs 
Both of these cost elements, borne by the client, are simply estimated as triangular 
probability distributions of values. Hence the tender process cost and the transaction 
costs in each simulation assume the values randomly sampled from their corresponding 
distributions. 
3.3.2.3.2 Project duration 
At this stage of the model's operation the user is prompted to specify the schedule links 
between the previously-cited project activities. A project's programme is effectively 
modelled as a precedence diagram. Therefore the relationships between the activities 
can be represented by the following types of links (Pilcher, 1992): 
" Start - Start 
" Finish - Start 
" Start - Finish 
" Finish - Finish 
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The model allows each lag to be simulated either as a percentage completion of the 
precedent activity or as a specified duration. 
The duration of each activity is estimated as a triangular probability distribution of 
values. Each activity link is specified as a single value. The model randomly samples 
values for each activity's duration in each simulation. The model then performs 
standard deterministic schedule analysis within each simulation. 
Standard deterministic schedule analysis is demonstrated in the following example. The 
example also shows the model format used to define a project's schedule. 
The analysis is applied to the example bridge project used to demonstrate contract price 
calculation in section 3.3.2.3.1.1. Figure 3.5 illustrates the project schedule estimated in 
the form of a precedence diagram. The schedule is inputted into the model using the 
format shown in Table 3.9. Table 3.10 displays the calculation process used to calculate 
the start and finish time of each activity. The project duration equates to the latest 
activity finish time. Therefore in this example analysis, the project duration is 59 weeks 
(finish time of the surface road activity). 
3.3.24 When to apply the model 
The model is intended to be applied, primarily, at the outset of projects (i. e. before a 
significant contract strategy commitment is made). However, the model principles may 
be applied at every project stage. Figure 3.6 shows an example set of stages at which it 
may be useful to apply the model. 
outline contract strategy submission of' When project is 
scheme selection 10 lenders 10 half-complete 
Figure 3.6 An example set of project stages at which the model may be applied 
At the first stage in Figure 3.6, 'outline scheme', the model may be used to compare 
different project concepts (e. g. different building types, different routes for a 
prospective road, etc. ). At the final stage in Figure 3.6 the project is half-completed. 
Although, at this stage, the selected contract strategy is defined and the cost and time 
uncertainty would have reduced, the model analysis may still prove useful in the 
management of the remaining project work. 
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Finish-Finish 
Design lag -2 wecks 
Tender process Finish - Start 
lag -0 
Foundations and Abutments Finish - Start lag=O 
Deck 
Start - Stan 
Surface road 
lag p- 80% 
10 
Figure 3.5 The bridge project schedule 
Schedule links (lags) 
Activity 
no. 
Activity name Activity 
Duration 
Precedent 
Activity 
START-START 
pIwd 
FINISII-START 
pIwd 
START-FINISH 
pwId 
FINIS11-FINISH 
pwd 
Design 13 (start) 0 
2 Tender 5 1 2 
3 Found. & Abuts. 25 2 0 
4 Dcck 15 3 0 
5 Surfact: road 7 4 80 
(Note: each activity may be linked to a maximum of three precedent activities) 
Key: 
p percentage completion of precedent activity 
w number of weeks 
d number of days 
Table 3.9 Model inputs which define the bridge project schedule depicted in Figure 3.5 
Activity no. Activity name Start time (weeks) Finish time (weeks) 
START(l) + DURATION(l) 
Design 0 0+ 13 = 13 
FINISH(2) - DURATION(2) FINISH(l) + LAG 2 Tender 15- 5= 10 13 +2= 15 
Found. & FINISH(2) + LAG = START(3) + DURATION(3) = 
3 Abuts. 15+0= 15 15 + 25 = 40 
FINISH(3) + LAG = START(4) + DURATION(4) = 4 Deck 40+0=40 40 + 15 = 55 
START(4) + 80% DURATION(4) START(5) + DURATION(5) = 5 Surface road 40 + (0.8 x 15) = 52 52 +7= 59 
Table3.10 Calculation of the project activities' start and finish times 
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Obviously the work presented in this thesis has focused upon the second stage in Figure 
3.6, 'contract strategy selection'. However, another important stage, which is regarded 
as integral to contract strategy selection, is where contractors' tenders are submitted. At 
this stage the user can find out whether the client's analysis agrees with the contractors' 
predictions of project performance that is reflected in their tender bids. If they do not 
agree, the client organisation can at least take rational action (whether this involves a 
review of the client's analysis or making a variation to the contract strategy) on the 
basis of its own analysis, rather than blindly accepting a contractor's bid. 
Although Figure 3.6 displays contract strategy selection as a particular project stage, it 
is important to appreciate that all contract strategy decisions are not taken 
simultaneously. Some decisions need to be taken at the project outset (e. g. those 
concerning organisational structure), while others can be offset until later (e. g. those 
relating to risk allocation, type of pricing mechanism or tender process). However, 
section 2.2.2 made reference to numerous sources that have acknowledged the necessity 
to perform a holistic evaluation of contract strategies at the project outset owing to the 
interdependencies between contract strategy components. 
3.3.25 Diagrammatic representation of the model structure 
Figure 3.7 presents a flowchart of the complete prototype model structure. It details 
which inputs are required of the user as well the operations executed by the model for 
each of the three modelled contract strategy options. 
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Figure3.7 Flowchart of the prototype model structure (continuedoverleafi 
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Figure 3.7(continued) Flowchart of the prototype model structure(continuedoverleafi 
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Figure 3.7 (con lin liceb Flowchart of the prototype model structure 
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3.3.3 Model output 
Section 3.3.2.3 used a hypothetical bridge project to demonstrate certain aspects of the 
analysis performed by the prototype model. This section makes reference to the same 
bridge project together with the same estimates utillsed in the previous demonstrations. 
Therefore, with respect to the example bridge project, the values in Table 3.11 complete 
the full set of inputs for the Traditional contract strategy. 
Variable 
Cost estimate (imillion) 
Minimum Most Maximum 
likely 
Time estimate (weeks) 
minimum Most Maximum 
likely 
Design 0.220 0.250 0.300 12 13 16 
Tender process 0.018 0.020 0.022 4 5 6 
Transaction costs 
I 
0.070 
I 
0.080 
I 
0.100 
I -- I -- 
Table 3.11 Estimates to complete the model inputs for the Traditional contract 
strategy's evaluation for the example bridge project 
Section 3.3.2.3.2 demonstrated the method used to simulate the bridge project in order 
to calculate its duration. Section 3.3.2.3.1 described how the price of the contract 
between the client and the general contractor is calculated in a single simulation. The 
simulated project price for the Traditional contract strategy is subsequently obtained by 
adding this contract price value to the simulated values of the randomly sampled design 
price, tender process costs and transaction costs. For example: 
simulated design price = fO. 266M 
simulated tender process costs =f0.020M 
simulated transaction costs =f0.075M 
simulated price of general contractor's contract =f2.164M (see section 3.3.2.3.1.1) 
simulated PROJECT PRICE = L2.525M 
simulated PROJECT DURATION = 59 weeks (see section 3.3.2.3.2) 
The following sub-sections use the example bridge project together with estimates for 
the Traditional option to demonstrate how the results of the simulation can be presented 
and interpreted. 
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3.3.3.1 Presen fation of th em odel ou tpu t 
In the preceding section a simulated project price and duration were obtained. The 
results of the single simulation can be presented as shown in Figure 3.8a. The single 
point in Figure 3.8a represents one simulation of the project using the Traditional 
contract strategy. Figure 3.8b shows the results of 1000 project simulations. 
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Figure 3.8a The result of a single simulation Figure 3.8b One thousand simulation results 
(i. e. a project price and duration value) (i. e. 1000 project price and duration values) 
The scatter plot of example results in Figure 3.8b indicates that certain price and 
duration values were calculated more frequently than others amongst the 1000 
simulations. It is possible to display the results as histograms and contour plots to 
clearly indicate which ranges of price and duration values were simulated more 
frequently than others. 
A histogram displays the number of simulated price or duration values that lie within 
certain intervals (see Figures 3.9a and 3.9b). Alternatively, contour plots accommodate 
the fact that each simulated result comprises both a project price and duration value. 
The remainder of this section describes how a contour plot can be generated from 1000 
simulated results. 
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Figure 3.9a A histogram plot of the 
project price results displayed in Figure 3.8b 
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Figure 3.9b A histogram plot of the 
project duration results displayed in Figure 3.8b 
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Projed Price (Emlillon) 
The first step in generating a contour plot is to establish a set of intervals in matrix form. 
Each matrix row corresponds to a project price interval while each matrix column 
corresponds to a project duration interval (see Table 3.11i). In simple statistical terms, 
each matrix entry equates to a price-duration bin. These bins are used to tally each 
simulated result. 
When all of the results have been tallied, the matrix displays the frequency with which a 
result corresponded to each price-duration bin (see Table 3.11i). The ratio of each bin's 
frequency to the total number of results equates to the probability that a result will occur 
within that price-duration bin. 
Contour lines at selected frequency levels may then be interpolated. Table 3.11i shows 
which price-duration bins are contained within each of three contour intervals. For 
example, the bins shaded yellow in Table 3.11i correspond to a frequency of between 10 
and 20. Clearly, this means of presenting the results would be more precise if the price 
and duration intervals were smaller. 
An approximate estimate of the cumulative probability of the simulated results at each 
contour level can be calculated as the following ratio: 
number of results within the specified contour interval 
total number of simulated results 
Figure 3.10 shows the cumulative percentile level at each of the three contour lines. 
The contour plots presented subsequently in the thesis were obtained using Stanford 
Graphics software. This package interpolates a data matrix, like that shown in Table 
3.11i, to establish a series of frequency contours. 
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3.3.3.2 Interpretation of the mtx1eloutput to aid decision-making 
Vose (1996) presented a comprehensive set of statistical techniques and measures 
particularly applicable to the interpretation of data calculated using stochastic 
simulation. The majority of these are listed and described in Table 3.12. 
88 
Statistical measure Description Formula 
Mode Value with highest probability (i. e. most likely to 
occur) 
Median Value at which the variable has equal probability 
(0.5) of being above or below (i. e. 50'h 
percentile) 
Mean Avcmge/cxpcctcd value IX, 
n 
Conditional mean Expected value of a portion of a distribution 
Variance Average of the squared distance of all the ( 
- 3F) 
2 
variable's values from the mean* 
XI 
V 
n-I 
Standard deviation Square root of the variance* 0, V_V 
Range Difference between a variable's maximum and 
minimum values 
Mean deviation Average of the absolute differences between the 
' -XI variable s values and their mean (note: in same 
units as the variable)* 
MD 
Semi-variance The variance of a variable above/below a k )2 E (Xi -X 
threshold value (x,, ) (i. e. spread of a distribution . 
= V portion) , k 
Semi-standard Square root of semi-variancc 
0', = FV, deviation 
Normalised standard Standard deviation as a traction of the mean 
deviation (note: useful for comparing a variable with large 0*. 
x Und cy and a variable with small x Mrid cr) X 
Cumulative percentiles Probability that a variable will be less than or 
equal to a value 
Confidence limits Range of values within which the variable has a 
specific probability of occurrence 
Applicable principally to Normal distributions or approximately Normal distributions. 
Rees (1995) stated that a distribution is approximately Normal when the following 
criteria are satisfied: 
approx. 68% of the area lies within one standard deviation of the mean 
approx. 95% of the area lies within two standard deviations of the mean 
approx. 99.7% of the area lies within three standard deviations of the mean 
Table 3.12 Statistical measures that can be used to interpret the model output 
89 
Example analysis application and intea2retation of the model output 
In this example, the results previously-calculated from the evaluation of the Traditional 
contract strategy option for the hypothetical bridge project are contrasted with results 
calculated from an evaluation of a Design-Build option for the same project. The 
reasons behind the different values estimated for the Traditional and Design-Build 
options (see Figure 3.11) are based upon the following hypothetical assumptions: 
The design under the Design-Build contract strategy is expected to be completed in 
a shorter time period than under the Traditional contract strategy and as a result the 
Design-Build's design cost is expected to be higher. 
When the Design-Build contractor is required to accept and cost the risk presented 
by the foundations and abutments activity, less information is known than when the 
general contractor is appointed under the Traditional arrangement. As a result the 
Design-Build contract strategy is assigned a higher cost estimate for this activity 
than the Traditional alternative. However, the time risk presented by the foundations 
and abutments activity is expected to be reduced under the Design-Build option 
because the contractor, assumed to be the party most capable of dealing with the 
associated risks, is able to manage the risk earlier, and thus reduce the maximum 
possible delay related to this activity, under the Design-Build option relative to the 
Traditional option. 
Neither contract strategy option is expected to offer a notable cost and time 
advantage with respect to the deck activity. 
A more competitive price for road surfacing materials or even for a subcontractor 
are expected to be procured under the Design-Build option relative to the Traditional 
option. Based on the same reasoning, a reduction in the road surfacing activity 
duration is expected to accompany the cost reduction. 
The Design-Build's competitive tender process is expected to be more costly and 
take longer than the Traditional's negotiated tender process. This is principally 
because the Design-Build tender decision pertains to a greater allocation of 
responsibility, a subjective evaluation of design information and an agreement of a 
fixed price at the project outset. 
The Design-Build option is expected to induce a lower level of transaction costs 
because the majority of project responsibility is delegated within the one 
organisation, the Design-Build contractor (see section 3.3.2.1.3). 
The estimated project schedules for the two contract strategy options differ in as 
much as the order and precedence links of the design and tender process activities, 
and also the Design-Build option facilitates some overlap between the design 
activity and the foundations and abutments activity. 
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Figure3.11 Estimates based on the assumption that the hypothetical bridge project is 
procured using the Traditional and Design-Build contract strategy option 
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Figure 3.12 displays and compares the contour plots of the price and duration results 
calculated for both the Traditional and Design-Build contract strategy options. Table 
3.13 reports a series of statistical measures of each contract strategy's results. An 
example means of interpreting the model output in order to direct the selection process 
is provided below. 
Figure 3.12 shows that the Traditional option is likely to induce a lower project price, 
but a longer project duration than the Design-Build option. The mean project price for 
the Traditional contract strategy is E240k less than that for the Design-Build contract 
strategy while the mean project duration for the Traditional option is 5.6 weeks more 
than that for the Design-Build option. 
For the purposes of this example, assume that the client has established project price 
and duration budgets at E2.75M and 60 weeks. The Traditional option clearly does not 
impinge upon the budgeted price level while there is a 0.58 probability of exceeding the 
price target if the Design-Build option is implemented. This probability is considered to 
be high, but it is tempered by the information that there is only a 0.025 probability that 
the price will exceed flOOk above the budget level (the Design-Build's upper 95% 
confidence limit) and the average price value, if the price exceeds the budget, is only 
E44k above the budgeted price level. 
With regards to project duration, a major advantage offered by the Design-Build option 
is greater time certainty. The standard deviation of the Design-Build's duration results is 
approximately 70% of the standard deviation of the Traditional's duration results. In 
addition, the Design-Build option presents only a 0.05 probability that the target 
duration of 60 weeks is exceeded, while, in contrast, there is a 0.78 probability that the 
Traditional contract strategy will exceed the target. The conditional mean of values 
above the target duration is approximately 63 weeks for the Traditional contract strategy 
and its upper 95% confidence limit is nearly 68 weeks. If it is assumed that the client 
perceives the Traditional option is too risky with regards to project duration, the specific 
details of the Traditional contract strategy option may be adjusted to enable time to be 
saved, Since the Traditional option offers a significant price advantage, it appears that 
the client may be well-advised to invest money to facilitate time reduction measures 
under the Traditional contract strategy. 
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Figure 3.12 Comparison of the model output calculated for the Traditional and Design- 
Build contract strategy options 
Statistical measure 
Price 
Traditional Design-Build 
Duration 
Traditional Design-Build 
Mean L2.530M L2.766M 62.28wks 56.65wks 
standard deviation 0.051 0.042 2.725 1.830 
Minimum L2.352M 12.676M 56.22wks 51.42wks 
Maximum L2.692M L2.884M 71.00wls 62.76wks 
P(X > Target value) 0 0.58 0.78 0.05 
[Conditional] mean of 
X> Target value 
0 L2.794M 63.14wks 60.93wks 
95% confidence limits 
L2.430M - 
L2.630M 
L2.684M - 
L2.848M 
56.94wks - 
67.62wks 
53.06wks - 
60.20wks 
Table 3.13 Comparison of statistical measures between the Traditional and Design- 
Build contract strategy options 
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3.3.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is an analytical process which aims to test whether the conclusions 
drawn from an analysis are likely to significantly alter if the input data and their 
underlying assumptions change (Thesen and Travis, 1992). This section uses the 
example bridge project again and the estimates provided for the Traditional contract 
strategy option to describe and demonstrate several techniques which can be used to 
undertake sensitivity analysis. Like the statistical measures featured in Table 3.12, the 
majority of these techniques were described by Vose (1996) as being particularly 
applicable to the interpretation of data calculated using stochastic simulation. It should 
be noted that the results and interpretation of the sensitivity analyses described in this 
section are specific to the hypothetical bridge project and the example model inputs. 
Furthermore, 1000 simulations are undertaken in the sensitivity analyses that are applied 
to a set of simulated results. 
The spider plot in Figure 3.13 illustrates how the project price result is affected by each 
price element's estimated distribution of values (with exception of the tender process 
and transaction costs because these cost elements were insignificant relative to the 
others). The plotted line for each variable is produced by varying the value of the 
respective variable from its minimum to maximum estimate while maintaining the other 
input variables at their mean values. Given that the vertical axis in the spider plot 
registers the change in value of the output variable, it can be inferred that the greater the 
vertical distance covered by an input variable's plotted line, the more sensitive the 
output is to that input variable. 
Figure 3.13 suggests that project price is unaffected by the estimated distribution of 
Guaranteed Maximum Price (G). This is not strictly true. It just happens that the price of 
the principal contractor's contract when all of the variables are set at their mean values 
is less than the estimated range of Guaranteed Maximum Price values. This may have 
been expected since the value of the Guaranteed Maximum Price is intended to protect 
the client from paying an excessive price, not an average price. As an aside, a simple 
calculation determined that there was a 0.02 probability that the actual price of the 
principal contractor's contract would exceed the mean value of the Guaranteed 
Maximum Price. 
Figure 3.13 shows that project price is most, and approximately equally, sensitive to the 
foundations and abutments cost (X) and the target cost (T). The cause of this result can 
be explained with reference to the following equation used to calculate project price for 
the Traditional contract strategy option: 
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when (X+Y+Z)+F+b(T-(X+Y+Z))<G 
Project Price = (X +Y+ Z) +F+ b(T - (X +Y + Z)) +F+D+Q+R 
Sharing rate (b) is fixed at 0.5, hence 
Project Price = 0.5T + 0.5(X +Y+ Z) +F +D+Q+R 
The above equation shows that the same proportion (0.5) of T and X contribute to the 
project price value. Therefore because the estimated distributions of T and X both cover 
the same range magnitude (1300k) and the same distribution shape (see Tables 3.6 and 
3.7), the project price is equally sensitive to the foundations and abutments cost (X) and 
the target cost (T). Since the range magnitude covered by T and X are greater than that 
covered by the other variables the project price is most sensitive to T and X. Essentially 
the same principles reason why the project price sensitivity to the design cost (D) and 
deck cost (Y) are roughly equal second highest. 
Figure 3.14 is a tornado chart that reiterates the sensitivity results depicted in the spider 
plot. The tornado chart plots the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between each 
variable and the project price. The higher a variable's correlation coefficient the greater 
the effect that the variable has on the model output. 
265 
Design (D) 
26 Fdn. and Abuts. QQ 
ý2 55 
Deck (Y) 
E Surface road (Z) 
25 
- Target contract cost (T) 
0 - Fixed target fee (F) &2 45 
- Guaranteed Max Price 
(G) 
24 
235 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Percentile Wei ofvaried input (%) 
Figure 3.13 A spider plot which indicates the relative sensitivity of the project price to 
the cost elements (with the exception of tender process and transaction costs) 
95 
Design (D) 
Tender process (Q) 
Transaction costs (R) 
Fdns. and Abuts. QQ 
Deck (Y) 
Surface road (Z) 
Target contract cost (T) 
Fixed target foe (F) 
Guaranteed Maximum 
Price (G) 
-01 0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
Rank correlation coefficient betymen inptd veriable and project price 
Figure 3.14 A tornado chart indicating the sensitivity of the price to the cost elements 
Table 3.14 reports the results of a conditional median analysis on the Traditional 
contract strategy's project duration results for the bridge project. The analysis 
determined the relative extent to which each project activity generates a simulated 
project duration which exceeds the 85h cumulative percentile value of the project 
duration distribution. This measure ((x), for each activity, is calculated using the 
following equationý 
()t = 
ian value of the activit-, SImulat [d m ýuslali 
dI 
ýan value of all the simulated tion values when the sim, ite 0 
ýCct 
tj u 
ý4 
j1 
[d 
at on values of the activitv 
me 
duration exceeds the 85"' percentile value] 
tandard deviation of all the simulated 
duration values of the acti, 
I 
Activity a value 
Design 0.038 
Tender process 0.243 
Foundations and Abutments 1.946 
Deck 0.218 
Surface road 0.341 
Table 3.14 The results of a conditional median analysis on the example project 
duration results 
96 
The higher an activity's value of (x is, the more sensitive the project duration is to that 
activity. Table 3.14 shows that project duration is most sensitive to the duration of the 
foundations and abutments activity ((x = 1.946). All the other activities' cc values are 
less than 0.5 which is suggested by Vose (1996) as the level below which the impact of 
the input variable upon the output variable can be regarded as insignificant. 
The result of the conditional median analysis was reinforced by the result of another 
sensitivity analysis which determined each activity's relative contributions to the 
duration uncertainty. Table 3.15 reports that 85.7% of project duration uncertainty was 
generated by the distribution estimated for the foundations and abutments activity. 
The results in Table 3.15 were obtained by determining the reduction in standard 
deviation of the simulated project duration values when each activity, in turn, was set at 
its mean value. Each activity's normalised change in standard deviation was 
subsequently calculated by dividing the change in standard deviation induced by each 
activity by the sum of the standard deviation reduction induced by all of the activities. 
Variable set to mean Standard deviation Change in standard 
deviation 
Normalised change 
2.725 -- -- 
Design 2.583 0.142 7.4% 
Tender process 2.723 0.002 0.1% 
Fdns. and Abuts. 1.090 1.635 85.7% 
Deck 2.635 0.090 4.7% 
Surface road 2.685 0.040 2.1% 
Table 3.15 The results of a sensitivity analysis to determine the relative extent to 
which each activity generates the uncertainty in the project duration results 
In some respects the results of the sensitivity analyses described in this section could 
have been predicted without the application of the techniques. The largest and most 
uncertain input variables were clearly going to affect the output variables the most. 
Nonetheless, in more detailed applications of the model analysis, sensitivity analysis 
may offer more valuable insights. 
It is important, however, to remain aware that owing to the nature of contract strategy 
selection the analysis will inevitably be highly subjective and uncertain. Therefore it is 
intended that the model analysis be applied and interpreted efficiently. In other words it 
is advised not to perform over-elaborate applications of the analysis, instead, take 
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advantage of the quantitative and probabilistic nature of the analysis to test theories and 
gain less-intuitive insights to aid decision-making. 
3.3.3.3.1 Sensitivity of the analysis results to the number ofshnulations 
In this chapter, whenever reference was made to a set of simulated results, 1000 has 
always been cited as the number of simulated results. The decision to perform 1000 
simulations was a conservative estimate intended to ensure that the number of resultant 
values would generate a distribution sufficiently equivalent to the distribution that 
would be obtained if the input distributions could be combined with absolute precision. 
Law and Kelton (1991) described a method which aimed to ascertain the number of 
simulations required to estimate the actual mean result value within a specified error. 
This method involved performing a number of independent simulation runs, where each 
run comprised a specified number of simulations. The intention was to measure whether 
each run's mean value exceeded a specified error. A test, based on similar principles, 
was undertaken to check the consistency of the calculated price and duration results for 
the example bridge project when the results comprised different numbers of simulations. 
To begin with the model was used to perform ten independent simulation runs where 
each run comprised a single simulation. The mean value of each simulation run was 
calculated. (In this first case the mean value of each run was equal to the actual 
simulated value because only one simulation was executed within each run. ) This was 
performed for both the Traditional and Design-Build contract strategy options. The 
model then performed ten independent simulation runs where each run comprised 10 
simulations. Therefore the whole process described for the runs comprising single 
simulations was repeated for runs comprising 10,100 and 1000 simulations. 
Figure 3.15 is a plot of each run's mean project price value against the number of 
simulations executed in each run. Figure 3.16 is the corresponding plot for project 
duration. Both figures illustrate that the mean result value becomes more consistent as 
the number of simulations increases. At 1000 simulations the difference between the 
95% confidence limits of the ten mean price values calculated for the Traditional 
contract strategy is just LIM whereas this measure increases to OR, E50k and E170k 
as the simulation number decreases to 100,10 and finally 1. The project duration results 
show that if only one simulation is executed it is possible that the Design-Build's mean 
duration value could exceed that of the Traditional option even though this is highly 
unexpected (deducible from the results when a greater number of simulations are 
executed). 
it may be inferred from both Figures 3.15 and 3.16 that 100 simulations are sufficient, 
but since the model running time is negligible, 1000 simulations is the more accurate, 
and still practical, option. It is important to note that the results and interpretation of the 
analytical check on the number of simulations are specific to this particular example. 
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Nonetheless, a conservative estimate appears to be a valid approach. It is equally 
important to recall the concluding point of the preceding section, apply and interpret the 
model analysis efficiently. 
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Figure 3.15 Sensitivity of the example project price results to the number of simulation 
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3.3.4 Limitations of the prototype model 
It was acknowledged at the outset of section 3.3 that practical constraints were 
purposely placed upon the model's design. This is because priority was given to the 
production of a model that enabled testing of the fundamental principles of the 
quantitative approach. As a result, the major limitations of the prototype model 
included: 
" inflexibility with respect to the contract strategies that can be simulated and thus 
evaluated; 
" imprecision in the definition and simulation of contract strategy options; 
" inflexibility owing to constraints on the number of activities which may be used to 
simulate a project; 
" the uncertainty inherent in each cost and time element has to be implicitly accounted 
for in the triangular probability distribution estimates; 
" in each model simulation there is no correlation between the calculated values of 
project price and project duration; and 
" there is no facility to account for dependencies between the individual cost and time 
elements. 
These limitations are described in more detail in Chapter 5 along with refinements that 
correct these limitations. The refinements derived from ideas that were set aside during 
the development of the prototype model as well as from insights gained from the 
empirical research which is described in the following chapter. 
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4. Survey of industrialist opinion 
Up until this point, the research had been based purely upon theory derived from the 
literature. It appeared that the research would benefit from industrialist opinion and 
experience about contract strategy selection. Therefore a survey was undertaken to 
obtain: 
" an insight into the conventional approach taken by industrialists to contract strategy 
selection and to gain an appreciation of the practical constraints related to this 
decision problem; 
" an indication as to whether industrialists perceive the quantitative 
approach/prototype model is workable and may aid contract strategy selection; and 
" sample cost and time data, provided by industrialists, that could be processed by the 
prototype model for illustrative purposes and to highlight scope for model 
development. 
In order to collect this type of data the survey utilised questionnaires and a loosely- 
structured interview. Furthermore it 
' 
was necessary to constrain the survey to a small 
number of industrialists. Despite its unconventional nature, the survey is referred to, 
throughout the thesis, as empirical research. The survey did not obtain objective 
measures of the validity, utility and practicality of the newly-proposed methodology for 
contract strategy selection. Nonetheless, it provided a meaningful reflection of people's 
valuable experience. 
The constraints imposed by the research subject upon the type of empirical data that 
could be captured were reflected in the objectives of the survey. These objectives are 
presented in section 4.1. Section 4.2 describes some of the methodological issues that 
were considered when the survey was planned. Development of the data collection 
techniques is described in section 4.3. The results are presented in section 4.4 and a 
discussion and appraisal of the results appear in section 4.5. 
4.1 Objectives of the empirical research 
The objectives of the empirical research were to investigate whether industrialists: 
approach contract strategy selection in a manner which concurs with the literature- 
instigated deduction that numerous deficiencies exist within current practice; 
perceive that different contract strategies are expected to have different cost and 
time impacts upon a particular project; 
could reflect their subjective assumptions about contract strategies into estimates of 
their potential impacts upon a project's constituent cost and time elements; 
were able to explicitly account for the uncertainty inherent in their subjective 
assumptions and quantitative estimates using triangular probability distributions; 
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perceived the process, and results, of the application of the quantitative approach 
aided contract strategy decision-making; and 
a could highlight how the quantitative approach could be developed and improved. 
In order to establish these objectives it was necessary to acknowledge methodological 
issues relevant to the research. These issues are discussed in the following section. 
4.2 Empirical research methodology 
According to Root et al. (1997), a methodology is the philosophical approach to 
research out of which research methods evolve. Research methods are the particular 
techniques used to collect empirical data (Edum Fotwe et aL, 1996). 
The traditional, scientific view is that knowledge derives from human experience (the 
empiricist perspective) or from human reasoning (the rationalist perspective) (Phillips, 
1992). It is this traditional view that directs a positivist research methodology. 
Positivism is a philosophical concept in which it is assumed that phenomena exist in 
causal relationships that can be observed, tested and measured (Bilton et aL, 1996). Up 
until the 1960s, sociological researchers increasingly followed their natural science 
counterparts and adopted comparative positivist methodologies (McNeill, 1990). 
Although social scientists appreciated the inherent subjectivity in their measurements of 
the social world they perceived objectivity was attained when the implemented research 
methods satisfied certain procedural standards (Phillips, 1992). For example, McNeill 
(1990) acknowledged that data collected within a sociological study was typically 
perceived to be objective providing: 
the collected data was quantitative because causal correlations could be detennined 
with the use of statistical tests; and 
0 the researcher did not affect the collected data. 
In recent decades the objectivity of all knowledge, and thus positivism, has been 
disputed (Popper, 1968; Feyerbrand, 1978; amongst others). Not surprisingly, the debate 
about research methodology has been most intense within the sociological research 
community. Hughes (1980) referred to Dilthey as one of the first to propound that an 
improved understanding of human discourse and action would be gained by analysing 
the meaning, and the origin, of individuals' mental models and not by treating such 
phenomena as systems of causal relationships. The research methodology supported by 
Dilthey equates to the concept of interpretivism. 
Baker (1994b) reported that the following two issues are very relevant in the 
development of an empirical research approach: 
1. validity (i. e. obtaining a measure of what is intended to be measured); and 
2. reliability (i. e. obtaining a consistent measure if the test is repeated). 
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It would appear that positivists instinctively presume their research methods procure 
data which satisfy both of the above criteria. In contrast, interpretivists consciously 
accept a compromise in data reliability by designing research methods that optimise 
data validity (McNeill, 1990). 
Construction management researchers have conventionally tended towards positivism. 
Edum Fotwe et al. (1996) claimed this is a product of the fact that construction 
management has derived from building and civil engineering which have significant 
links with the natural and physical sciences. However, in recent years, and particularly 
while the research reported in this thesis has been undertaken, the traditional positivist 
approach to construction management research has been challenged (Seymour and 
Rooke, 1995; Crook et aL, 1996; Loosemore et al. 1996; amongst others). 
Consequently, methodological issues related to the empirical research presented in this 
chapter have received notable attention. The following section identifies and describes 
theseissues. 
4.2.1 Methodological issues particular to the research 
The second and third chapters described the theoretical development of the quantitative 
approach to contract strategy evaluation. Empirical research was undertaken to 
investigate the feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach. However, this 
empirical study presented a problem from a positivist perspective. It could only be 
realised by collating the views of practising professionals. 
The ideal experiment within the positivist paradigm was simply impractical. This is 
because it would require a representative sample of industrialists to apply the 
quantitative approach to at least one actual contract strategy decision problem (ideally 
all of the industrialists would experience the same decision problem conditions). It was 
presumed that the industrialists would have to apply the quantitative approach before 
they could provide an informed judgement about its feasibility and utility. 
Despite the impracticality of the ideal positivist experiment, positivism invoked a 
consideration of a questionnaire survey in which the respondents were presented with 
the same hypothetical project and were requested to apply the quantitative approach in 
order to distinguish between the appropriateness of a set of contract strategies for the 
project in question. 
obviously the intention was to design the questionnaire so that the respondent's task 
was as straightforward as possible. However, it was considered more important to 
ensure that the empirical data provided a meaningful indication of the feasibility and 
utility of the quantitative approach. In order to satisfy this criterion it became apparent 
that the questionnaire would, inevitably, be demanding for the respondent. 
Consequently, mail distribution of the questionnaire was quickly ruled out. 
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Face-to-face interviews was considered to facilitate a more detailed and responsive 
introduction to the quantitative approach than that which could be included within a 
questionnaire. Furthermore, this approach provided an opportunity to attain additional 
empirical data to the questionnaire responses, the quality of which were expected to be 
impaired given the questionnaire complexity. 
The enforced decision to conduct face-to-face interviews was expected to constrain the 
number of empirical research participants and thus any intention to infer generalisations 
from the collected data was negated when this decision was made. As a consequence, 
the research falls short of an ideal positivist experiment. However, the increasingly- 
voiced argument against positivist methodologies amongst construction management 
researchers corresponds to a claim that global theories about culture, attitude and 
motivation are, intrinsically, an over-simplification of complex phenomena (Seymour 
and Rooke, 1995). The argument is supplemented by the view that data acquired using a 
positivist approach to construction management research are not particularly meaningful 
and useful from an industrial perspective (Seymour et aL, 1996). This is a significant 
criterion given that construction management research is particularly 'industry- 
interactive' (Kumaraswamy et aL, 1997). 
The critics of positivism have proffered interpretative methodologies as more 
appropriate for construction management research (Crook et aL, 1996; Lenard et aL, 
1997; Rooke, 1997; amongst others). A variety of qualitative research methods have 
evolved out of the interpretative paradigm. Tesch (1991) categorised qualitative 
research methods into the following: 
I. Language based; investigate the source, meaning and significance of the language 
related to the subject. 
2. Descriptive; obtain a coherent and comprehensive account of the respondents' 
perspective about the subject. 
3. Theory development; construct theories from the collected data rather than prior to 
data collection. 
It was acknowledged that an application of language-based research methods from the 
interpretative perspective would certainly have produced relevant insights. This is 
because the concept of the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation 
developed from a literature-instigated deduction that numerous deficiencies are inherent 
in contract strategy selection practice. However, contract strategy selection is a very 
complex and case-specific decision problem (see sections 2.1. and 2.2). Therefore an 
investigation into industrialists' understanding of the whole decision problem on a 
general basis was perceived to present a very demanding task. Firstly, this approach was 
considered to be beyond the capabilities of a relatively novice researcher. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the potential scope of subject material in the collected data appeared 
so immense that it was judged likely to dilute the primary objective of the study (i. e. test 
the feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach). 
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In order to satisfy the research objectives and the practical constraints of the research, it 
was decided to use face-to-face interviews and questionnaire research techniques to 
attain a coherent and explicit review of the quantitative approach. This approach 
corresponds, essentially, to the second type of qualitative research method identified by 
Tesch (199 1) (see previous page). 
A feasibility study was undertaken to obtain industrialists' views about the subject of 
contract strategy selection and assess how to refine the empirical research strategy. The 
feasibility study is reported in section 4.3.2, but it is necessary at this point to highlight 
a very significant insight gained from the study. It confirmed the suspicion that the 
industrialists would have difficulties in understanding what was entailed in the 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. 
Cannel and Kahn (1968) claimed the following three conditions as crucial to the 
execution of successful interviews: 
" accessibility; the respondent's ability to obtain the required information 
" cognition; the respondent's understanding of what is required of him/her 
" motivation; the respondent's willingness to provide the required inforination 
Given the results of the feasibility study, the second of these conditions, cognition, 
became a major objective in the development of the research methods. It was decided to 
design a fairly flexible and informal interview structure and also to present the empirical 
research participants with a significant amount of information about the quantitative 
approach. The research methods and their design process are described in detail in 
subsequent sections. 
A conscious decision was made to adopt a research methodology that was a departure 
from the conventional positivist approach. Although the extreme interpretivist 
perspective was not adopted, the reasons for its increasing popularity, within 
construction management research, provided considerable guidance. For instance, in 
order to optimise the validity and utility of the empirical data, a compromise in 
reliability was made. Harvey and MacDonald (1993) surmised that nothing is gained if 
the collected empirical data is invalid. Furthermore, Gunning (1994) and Buchanan et 
aL (1988) insisted that a researcher should not be oppressed by traditional approaches 
to research. 
it has also been reported that the adopted research methodology and methods were 
notably dictated by the research subject. The process of testing a contract strategy 
decision-aid presents a very difficult and unanswerable problem. However, this does not 
mean that the subject should not be researched. On the contrary, the unconventional 
nature of the empirical research methodology is a reflection of the complexity of 
contract strategy selection which, in turn, is a reflection of its importance (see section 
2.2.1). McNeill (1990), with reference to sociological research, said that "... we must 
105 
not dismiss experiments in social science. They may not give final answers, but can 
provide some very important insights". 
A controlled and systematic approach was adopted when the empirical research was 
planned and executed. However, within this approach, pragmatism and opportunism 
were required to design the empirical research methods and establish the study's 
objectives. 
4.3 Empirical research methods 
The purpose of the empirical research was to investigate the feasibility and utility of the 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. It has already been acknowledged 
that the ideal means of testing the quantitative approach would have been to observe 
experienced contract strategists as they applied the approach at the outset of actual 
projects. For practical reasons this was not possible. However, it was perceived possible 
to design a questionnaire which simulated a contract strategy selection scenario at the 
outset of a project. 
Section 4.3.1 outlines the general requirements for effective questionnaire design and 
describes the initial questionnaire (referred to as Questionnaire IA). The questionnaire 
was shown to industrialists during a stage which is referred to as the empirical research 
feasibility study. During this period, discussions were held with seven construction- 
related organisations. Section 4.3.2 reports the crucial insights provided by the study 
and justifies the subsequent decisions made about the empirical research methods. 
Section 4.3.3 describes the questionnaire re-design process and presents the resultant 
questionnaire (referred to as Questionnaire IB). The issues that were addressed in the 
design of a face-to-face interview structure are summarised in section 4.3.4. 
Finally, section 4.3.5 reports the result of a decision to alter an aspect of the empirical 
research approach whilst the study was in progress. Owing to a poor response rate to 
Questionnaire 113, a new questionnaire (referred to as Questionnaire 2) was designed 
with the intention to avert the intrinsic limitations of Questionnaire 113. 
4.3.1 Description of the initial questionnaire and its design concept 
The questionnaire described in this section was labelled Questionnaire IA. A copy of 
the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. 
The questionnaire aimed to simulate a contract strategy decision scenario at the outset 
of a particular project. Therefore the questionnaire had to provide information about the 
circumstances of the particular decision problem. Obviously constraints had to be 
placed upon the amount of information that could be included in a questionnaire. As a 
result, the descriptions of the project circumstances and the contract strategy options 
were not comprehensive. 
106 
The description of the project circumstances included reference to the project's size, 
type, status, site conditions, locality and complexity. Section 2.2.4 provided some 
indication that contract strategy evaluation typically addresses factors of this type. 
Figure 4.1 presents the project description featured in Questionnaire IA. 
In order to investigate whether consistencies existed between the questionnaire 
responses, the questionnaires prompted the respondent to evaluate a particular set of 
contract strategy options. Again it was impractical to include an exhaustive description 
of each contract strategy in the questionnaire. Therefore each option's description 
included reference to: 
1. commonly perceived arrangements associated with particular labels (e. g. 
Traditional); and 
2. broad details of the contract between the client and the contractor responsible for the 
project's construction (i. e. referred to as the contract between the client and 
principal contractor in Chapter 3) 
The project is a large factory building with offices. The overall project cost is estimated at 
E15 million and project duration at 5 years. The building will occupy approximately 20,000 
square metres. The building requires an original design because it is a one-off project. 
The building will house some specialiscd equipment. The building's structure will be 
complex and will comprise different structures. It is unlikely that the construction process 
will need to employ any new technology. The building's steel frame will be prefabricated 
locally and transported to the site for erection. 
The site is currently occupied by disused warehouses. Therefore the construction contract 
includes demolition of these buildings and clearing of the site. The soil is relatively strong 
and ground problems are unlikely. 
The site is located on the outskirts of a city centre. The adjacent buildings could impose 
some construction restrictions. Physical access onto the site is easy, but traffic congestion 
on the surrounding road infrastructure is not uncommon. 
Figure 4.1 The project description featured in Questionnaire IA 
The questionnaire presented four different contract strategy options: 
TradMonah The client appoints an organisation to undertake the design. The design is completed 
before obtaining tenders by means of a competitive one-stage process. A full bill of quantities will 
be the basis of the tender, although the firm price agreed at the tender stage will be subject to re- 
measurement. The appointed contractor is to be an independent organisation from that of the client 
and designer. 
0 Accelerated Tradotional: As with the Traditional option, the client appoints an organisation to 
undertake the design and the appointed contractor is to be an independent organisation from that of 
the client and designer. The construction contractor is appointed, before design completion, 
following a negotiated tender which is based upon outline drawings and a detailed project 
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specification. The contractor is to reimbursed for the actual construction costs and also receives a 
fixed fee agreed at the tender stage (i. e. cost plus flxed fee type pricing mechanism). 
Management ContraCji= The client appoints an organisation to undertake the design. 
During the early design stages, another organisation is appointed to act as a management contractor. 
This appointment follows a pre-qualification process and negotiation of a management fee which 
is quoted as a percentage of the construction cost. The construction work is divided into five 
packages. Tenders are obtained for each work package by means of single-stage selective tendering. 
Tenders are based upon drawings and approximate quantities. The works contractors are to be 
reimbursed using cost plus percentage fee type pricing mechanisms. 
Design-Build: The entire design and construction work is let to a single organisation following a 
two-stage tender process. First stage tenders, based upon a detailed project specification, lead to a 
shortlist of, no more than, two contractors. At the second stage the contractor is selected on the basis 
of the design proposals and a fixed lump sum price. 
The remainder of the questionnaire comprised four sections. 
agQLJQn-J Separated Design and Construction 
The questionnaire presents the minimum, most likely and maximum values of- 
" design cost; 
" design time; 
" construction cost; 
" construction time. 
The estimates were based upon the assumption that the project was to be procured using 
the Traditional option. 
The questionnaire prompts the respondent to estimate corresponding values assuming 
that the project is to be procured using, firstly, the Accelerated Traditional option and, 
secondly, the Management Contracting option (all costs incurred by the client). 
Integrated Design and Construction 
Section 2 was specifically designed for the evaluation of the Design-Build type contract 
strategy. The design and construction cost and time estimates for the Traditional 
contract strategy are summed. The questionnaire provides both total cost and total 
duration estimates in terms of their minimum, most likely and maximum values. The 
respondent is prompted to estimate the corresponding total values based upon the 
assumption that the project is to be procured using the Design-Build option. 
Design-Construction Overlap 
The respondent is requested to estimated the length of time between the start of the 
design until the start of construction (i. e. design-construction overlap) for each of the 
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three contract strategy options other than the Traditional arrangement. Unlike the other 
sections, this time element is to be estimated as a single value for each contract strategy. 
Section 4 Tender Process Cost/Duration and Transaction Costs 
For all four contract strategies the questionnaire prompts the respondent to estimate a 
minimum, most likely and maximum value of the tender process costs, tender process 
duration and the transaction costs (all costs incurred by the client). Unlike Sections I 
and 2, it was decided not to include estimates for the Traditional option. 
In the case of the Management Contracting option, the respondent is requested to 
estimate the tender costs associated with the management contractor's appointment in 
addition to the cost and duration of the entire tender activity in which works contractors 
are appointed. 
The questionnaire was subsequently revised. This is explained in Section 4.3.3. Owing 
to the modifications this initial questionnaire was labelled Questionnaire IA. A copy of 
Questionnaire IA is included in Appendix A. 
Although the questionnaire did not precisely simulate a contract strategy decision 
scenario at the outset of a project, its concept nonetheless had the potential to 
demonstrate whether industrialists: 
" perceive that different contract strategies are expected to have different cost and 
time impacts upon a particular project; 
" could reflect their subjective assumptions about contract strategies into estimates of 
their potential impacts upon a project's constituent cost and time elements; 
" were able to express their estimates as triangular probability distributions; and 
" held consistent views about general contract strategies' expectant cost and time 
impacts on projects. 
Therefore it was perceived that the questionnaire concept would provide a meaningful 
indication as to whether the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation was 
feasible and useful. 
4.3.2 Empirical research feasibility study 
The feasibility study aimed to provide the industrialists with an opportunity to express 
their own views on the subject of the research and investigate how the empirical 
research methods could be optimised. Given these aims it was decided to conduct the 
feasibility study using fairly informal face-to-face or telephone interviews. 
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During March 1997, twenty three industrialists were informed, via mail, about the 
research subject and also about the fact that the research was an investigation into a new 
approach to contract strategy selection. They were asked whether they would be 
prepared to discuss these issues. 
Seven industrialists agreed to participate in the feasibility study (i. e. a response rate of 
30%). Five of the industrialists agreed to a face-to-face interview, while the other two 
were interviewed over the telephone. The interviews took place between April 9th and 
May 13 th 1997. Each industrialist is referred to individually by a label to maintain their 
anonymity. The label and profession of each of the seven industrialists interviewed is 
shown in Table 4.1. 
The five industrialists that were interviewed face-to-face were shown a copy of 
Questionnaire IA during the interview and asked to give their opinion about its design 
and infon-nation requirements. Meanwhile all of the interviews comprised a flexible 
framework of questions, including: 
" Which types of contract strategy do you normally deal with? Are there any other, 
less familiar types of contract strategy that you have had experienced of? 
" Do you consider that the suitability of a contract strategy is dependent upon a 
project's circumstances? 
* How would you nonnally evaluate the suitability of a contract strategy to a project's 
circumstances? 
" What types of criteria typically rule the suitability of a contract strategy? 
" Do you think that these criteria can be reduced to the client's price, time and quality 
objectives for the project? 
" Do you consider that each client prioritises their price, time and quality objectives 
for the project? 
* Do you think the contract strategy used on a project affects the project's price, 
duration and quality? 
" Do you consider that each type of contract strategy has a different likelihood of 
enabling the achievement of the client's price, time and quality objectives? 
" When you are selecting the contract strategy for a project do you make assumptions 
about the effect that a contract strategy is likely to have on the project's price, time 
and quality? 
" On a specific project, could you use these assumptions to estimate, in terms of 
pounds and weeks, the cost and time that certain contract strategies were likely to 
save relative to other contract strategies? 
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Label Interview Iývpc Profession 
Pi Face-to face Design consul tan t/Project manager 
P2 Face-to face Quantity surveyor/Project manager 
P3 Face-to face Design consultant/Project manager 
P4 Face-to face Quantity surveyor/Project manager 
PS Face-to face Quantity surveyor/Project manager 
P6 Telephone Quantity surveyor/Project manager 
P7 Telephone Quantity survcyor/Project manager 
Table 4.1 Participants in the feasibility study 
Four of the industrialists (P2, P3, P4 ad P5) agreed to be interviewed again in greater 
depth. Hence their responses with regards to their current approach to contract strategy 
evaluation and their initial reactions to the quantitative approach are included in section 
4.4.2. The other three industrialists (PI, P6 and P7) preferred not to be interviewed 
again. PI rejected the quantitative approach outright. Meanwhile P6 and P7 reasoned 
that they had insufficient time available. Both P6 and P7 expressed reservations about 
the feasibility of the quantitative approach, but P7 supported the idea of undertaking a 
more structured and transparent evaluation of contract strategies. 
The feasibility study provided particularly useful information about the empirical 
research strategy. Foremost, all seven industrialists experienced difficulties in 
understanding the quantitative approach. Therefore it was presumed that, in order to 
obtain empirical data of sufficient quality, the industrialists had to be introduced to the 
quantitative approach gradually. In addition, they must be given the opportunity to ask 
their own questions about the approach. Therefore it appeared that face-to-face 
interviews, as opposed to mail surveys and telephone interviews, had to be undertaken. 
Furthermore it was evident that the interviews had to adopt a fairly flexible structure in 
order to obtain infonTied views from the industrialists. A description of the interview 
structure is provided in Section 4.3.4. 
Four of the five industrialists who were interviewed face-to-face in the feasibility study 
were shown a copy of Questionnaire IA. Their reactions are summarised below: 
all four industrialists commented that the questionnaire appeared to require a lot of 
time and effort to both read and complete; 
some of the industrialists required a more a detailed definition of 'transaction costs' 
than that featured in the questionnaire; 
some of the industrialists were a little confused as to whose costs were to be 
estimated; 
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two of the industrialists perceived that the hypothetical project description presented 
in the questionnaire was not sufficient to enable a realistic contract strategy 
evaluation process to be undertaken. One of the industrialists claimed that the 
project description needed to include information about the client and outline details 
of the design. 
The four industrialists' views about Questionnaire IA were somewhat conflicting. All 
four considered the questionnaire was too demanding, whilst two of these industrialists 
added that the description of the hypothetical project scenario needed to be extended. 
However, it was perceived that both these problems could be reduced if the 
questionnaire was completed during, or after, a face-to-face interview. In other words, it 
appeared that the interviews could be used not only to introduce the quantitative 
approach and attain industrialists' reactions to the approach, but also to explain the 
questionnaire. 
It was also rccognised that if the questionnaires were completed during facc-to-facc 
interviews there was an opportunity to obtain the industrialists' reasoning for their cost 
and time estimates. This would provide further insights into the industrialists' views 
about contract strategies and provide an indication as to whether consistencies existed 
between their views. 
The industrialists' reactions to the questionnaire and the decision to explain the 
questionnaires during face-to-face interviews led to a re-design of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire modifications are described in the following section, whilst the 
structure of the main interviews is described in section 4.3.4. 
4.3.3 Re-design of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire described in this section was labelled Questionnaire 1B. A copy of 
the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. 
Although it was decided to conduct face-to-face interviews, it was considered 
appropriate to enclose a copy of the questionnaire with the letter that requested 
industrialists' participation in the research. Since all seven industrialists who 
participated in the feasibility study experienced some difficulty in understanding the 
quantitative approach, the questionnaires appeared a to be a means of both introducing 
the quantitative approach and outlining the type of information which the study 
required. As a consequence it was decided to include a thorough and prominent 
introduction and description of the respondent's tasks in the questionnaire. 
During the feasibility study one of the industrialists suggested that the project 
circumstances description ought to include information about the client and conceptual 
design. This suggestion was incorporated into the questionnaire re-design. However, it 
was considered that the factory building which featured in Questionnaire IA was not the 
ideal project if the questionnaire was to present design details. It appeared that a more 
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standardised building project would restrict the amount of design detail to a reasonable 
level. Therefore it was decided to change the project from the factory building to a 
seven-storey reinforced concrete-framed office building in which the floors were 
effectively uniform. Figure 4.2 shows the introductory information about the project 
that is presented within the questionnaire. 
Project scenario: 
A relatively new insurance company wishes to build a new headquarters. The company has had 
very little construction experience and has no in-house resources to assist in administering the 
project. The company is deciding whether or not to build on a prospective site. The company has 
employed a team of consultants to perform a feasibility study for a fee of f 15,000. The study 
included an investigation of the ground and site characteristics and some preliminary design was 
undertaken. I'lic main items of the feasibility report are summariscd below. 
Project description: 
The project Is a 7-storey reinforced concrete framed office block which will provide a gross floor 
area Of 10,00OM2 (900OM2 of office space). The building must provide office space for 1300 people. 
The overall project cost Is estimated at E8 million and project duration of 21 months. 
The soils on the site are mainly clay with some sand mixed in. The soil Is relatively strong and its 
bearing capacity Is estimated at 200kN/M2. 
The site was previously occupied by a cinema which has since been demolished and cleared. The 
site Is located on the outskirts of a city centre. The adjacent buildings could Impose some 
construction restrictions and traffic congestion on the surrounding road Infrastructure is not 
uncommon (see Site Plan on page 2). 
The main aspects of the preliminary design are outlined In Table 1 and the sketches on page 2. 
Figure 4.2 Introductory infonnation about the hypothetical project presented within 
Questionnaire 1B 
Given that Questionnaire IB would provide design details, there appeared scope to 
request the respondent to estimate more specific cost and time elements than those 
which feature in Questionnaire IA (i. e. break the evaluation process down further). 
Therefore, whereas Questionnaire 1A deals with the overall construction price and 
duration, it was decided to separate the construction activity into a series of activities. It 
was acknowledged that the Building Cost Information Service separate construction into 
the following six activities: 
1. substructure 
2. superstructure 
3. internal finishes 
4. fittings 
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5. services; and 
6. external works 
In order to avoid placing excessive demands upon the respondent, the third, fourth and 
fifth activities in the above list were grouped together. Therefore Questionnaire IB 
divided construction into four activities. It was noted in section 3.3.2.2 that the 
development of the empirical research strategy coincided with the development of the 
model that facilitated the application of a quantitative approach to contract strategy 
evaluation. The decision to use four activities to represent the construction process of 
the project governed the model design decision to permit the user to specify up to four 
construction activities. 
The respondent was prompted to estimate the cost of each activity as the cost to the 
contractor rather than the cost to the client. The construction price was to be calculated 
using each contract strategy's corresponding pricing mechanism formula once the 
respondent had estimated the values of the relevant tender bid parameters (see section 
3.3.2.3.1.1). 
it should be noted that the questionnaire describes a simplified pricing mechanism, 
within the Traditional contract strategy, than that simulated by the prototype model. The 
model simulates quite an elaborate Guaranteed Maximum Price system which involves 
a Target cost and a Target fee (see section 3.3.2.3.1.1). However, to reduce the number 
of estimates required from the respondent, it was decided to reduce this pricing 
mechanism type to a system in which there is no Target fee and the Guaranteed 
Maximum Price equates to Target cost in the respective pricing mechanism formula. 
It was considered that the modifications to the respondent's tasks in Questionnaire IB 
would provide a better demonstration of whether the industrialists were able to discern 
which particular aspects of a project's performance were expected to be affected by 
contract strategies. This appeared to justify the fact that the revised questionnaire 
requested more infort-nation from the respondent than Questionnaire IA. In addition, it 
was perceived that the decision to complete the questionnaires during, or after, face-to- 
face interviews would increase the efficiency with which the questionnaires could be 
completed. A concession was, however, necessary to reduce the number of contract 
strategies, which the respondent is asked to evaluate, to three from the four which 
appear in Questionnaire IA. The 'Accelerated Traditional' type contract strategy was 
excluded from Questionnaire IB and the descriptions of the other three contract 
strategies were slightly altered to the following: 
1. Traditional: a team of design consultants complete the design and administer the project. The 
design is complete before the construction is let to a general contractor using a negotiated tender 
process. The client's detailed bill of quantities is used to negotiate a Guaranteed Maximum Price (any 
cost savings are shared equally) and it also provides a basis for re-measurement of the price. 
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2. Design-Build: the remainder of the design and the entire construction work is let as a single 
package using a competitive one-stage tender process. The package is let on the basis of a fixed lump 
sum price. 
3. Managenient Contract: a management contractor is appointed during the conceptual design stage 
following a prc-qualification process and negotiation of the management contractor's fees. The pre- 
construction fee is a lump sum, while the fee for services during construction is based on a target cost 
arrangement where the management contractor receives a percentage value of the construction cost, 
but any cost savings or overruns relative to a negotiated target cost arc shared equally between the 
client and management contractor. Ilic management contractor divides the construction into work 
packages and each package is tendered competitively on the basis of a cost plus percentage fee 
payment mechanism. Ilic management contractor administers the tender process for each work 
package. 
Similarly to the system used in the original questionnaire, Questionnaire IB provides 
the various cost and time elements' minimum, most likely and maximum estimated 
values which are based upon the assumption that the project is to be procured using the 
Traditional type contract strategy. The respondent is requested to estimate new values 
for the two contract strategy alternatives to the Traditional option. In addition, 
Questionnaire 113 describes the estimates provided for the Traditional option as those 
made by a junior estimator and therefore permits the respondent to alter the estimates 
provided for the Traditional option. 
Questionnaire 113 featured a specifically-designed system for the respondent to record 
his/her estimates. It was designed to assist the respondent to cross-reference the 
estimates, for each cost and time element, between the three contract strategy 
alternatives. A description of the system was included within Questionnaire 113 
including a demonstration using 'design cost' as the example cost element. The 
demonstration is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Another significant adjustment to the questionnaire was the respondent's task to 
estimate a project schedule for each of the three contract strategy options. The schedule 
was to include the six project activities for which the respondent had previously 
estimated the cost and duration. 
A copy of Questionnaire IB is provided in Appendix A. 
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An example of the type of chart on which you must display your estimates for each cost and time element 
TR (J) 
TR 
DB 
mc 
300 400 500 600 700 800 900 Design 
Cost (Ek) 
KEI ' 
Junior estimator's Design cost TR (J) 
estimates for the Traditional 
contract strategy 
TR Design cost estimates for the 
Traditional contract strategy 
DB Design cost estimates for the 
Design-Build contract strategy 
MC Design cost estimates for the 
Management Contracting 
contract strategy 
The above chart has a cost scale. The 3 black marks on the chart use the cost scale to represent the 
junior estimator's minimum, most likely and maximum estimates of the Design cost. 
These black marks lie along the horizontal line labelled TR(J) which In the KEY Is defined as the junior 
estimator's estimates for the Traditional contract strategy. 
In this example you would be asked to complete the chart by: 
I. Displaying your minimum, most likely and maximum Design cost estimates for the Traditional 
contract strategy on the horizontal line labelled TR (if you consider the junior estimator's estimates for 
the Traditional contract strategy are Incorrect). 
2. Displaying your minimum, most likely and maximum Design cost estimates for the Design-Build 
contract strategy on the horizontal line labelled DB. 
3. Displaying your minimum, most likely and maximum Design cost estimates for the Management 
Contracting contract strategy on the horizontal line labelled MC. 
IfI 
The example chart completed TR (J) -AO --------- TR 
DB 
ITT --- I Mc 
1-11''i PDesign 
300 400 500 600 700 800 900 Cost (Ek) 
Figure 4.3 An example of the system used in Questionnaire IB for the respondent to 
record his/her estimates 
4.3.4 Design of the interview structure 
it has already been established (section 4.2.1) that the decision to use face-to-face 
interviews was necessary to ensure that the empirical research participants thoroughly 
understood the quantitative approach as well as to assist them in the completion of the 
questionnaire. In addition, it was decided to adopt a fairly informal and flexible 
interview structure. It was appreciated that this interview type exposed the collected 
data to a greater risk of bias effects induced by the interviewer than a highly structured 
interview. However, Robson and Foster (1989) acknowledged that flexible and informal 
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Minimum Most likcly Maximum 
interviews are likely to obtain a more accurate account of the respondent's opinion 
about a subject where the subject is particularly complex. 
In accordance with the interview types described by Moser and Kalton (197 1), the result 
of the interview design process equated to a 'guided' interview. The method allows the 
interviewee to respond to questions in their own terms, but there are pre-established 
topics which the interview must cover. The topics are referred to herein as 'Question 
Areas'. 
The question areas began with an introduction. The introductions were brief, but fairly 
detailed explanations about an aspect of the quantitative approach which was the subject 
of the ensuing questions. The explanations, along with the accompanying visual aids, 
were designed prior to the interviews. Although key questions within each question area 
were also designed, it was anticipated that improvised probing during the interviews 
would be required to support the key questions. 
it was recognised that the explanation preceding the questions within each question area 
and the fairly flexible interview structure would generate a rapport between the 
interviewer and interviewee. Buchanan et aL (1988) reported that the interviewee must 
be satisfied in the sense that: 
1. they understand the aims of the study and feel they can contribute to it; and 
2. they perceive the interviewer is trustworthy and genuinely wants to listen. 
it proved to be extremely difficult to obtain empirical research participants. The 
industrialists who refused to participate in the research oflen made reference to the 
reason that they were unable, or not prepared, to disclose information about their 
organisation's contract strategy selection policies. The problem of confidentiality was 
also evident when two of the participants in the feasibility study insisted that the 
interview was not tape recorded. During the feasibility study, it was observed that an 
interviewee was noticeably more open where even the suggestion of tape recording was 
not raised. Moser and Kalton (197 1) suggested that tape recording interviews can hinder 
the response rate and data validity. Therefore it was decided to rely upon note-taking 
during and after each interview. In addition to the above reasons behind this decision, it 
was also considered to be a reasonable concession given the pragmatism underlying the 
empirical study's objectives. 
4.3.4.1 The aint, subject and sequencing of the question areas 
Miles and Huberman (1994) reported that research questions readily fon-nulate from the 
conceptual framework of the research hypothesis. Therefore it was inferred that the 
interview questions should directly relate to the principles of the quantitative approach 
to contract strategy evaluation and also to the reasons that led to the development of the 
approach. 
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The motivation to research into the subject of contract strategy selection was instigated 
by the deduction, from relevant literature, that current practice was typically defective 
(see section 2.3.2). It was therefore imperative to question industrialists about their 
current approach to contract strategy selection. This area of questioning was intuitively 
considered to provide an appropriate opening to the interview (i. e. Question Area 1). 
The decision was supported by Patton (1990) who reported that a question that prompts 
a descriptive response at the interview outset can ease the interview atmosphere. 
Furthermore, Patton (1990) recognised that this question type can assist the interviewee 
to establish a context which therefore may be used by the interviewee as a base against 
which his/her subsequently elicited opinions could be contrasted. Therefore more 
accurate and meaningful responses are gained. 
Following a description of the quantitative approach, the interviewee was asked to give 
their initial reaction to its feasibility (Question Area 2). The decision to ask for a holistic 
reaction at the outset was based upon a suggestion by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
They claimed that clarity and specificity were promoted by the use of major general 
questions each of which are followed up with subquestions. The technique where issues 
are introduced by a general question and pursued by more detailed questions was 
defined by Fellows and Lui (1997) as 'funnelling'. Therefore the question areas that 
followed Question Area 2 were related to specific principles of the quantitative 
approach. The principles and the questions areas in which the principles feature are 
listed in Table 4.2. 
Question Area 3 requests the respondents to give their opinions about the general 
concept of systematically evaluating contract strategies in terms of a project's 
constituent cost and time elements. Although Question Area 4 repeats this inquiry, it 
requires the respondent to consider the concept applied to four different examples. 
Patton (1990), who refers to this technique as simulation questioning, suggested that a 
line of questioning may be more profitable if the interviewee is provided with a context 
within which to respond. 
It was not until after the interviews had begun when it was realised that diplomacy was 
particularly required when the interviewee was questioned about triangular probability 
distributions (i. e. Question Area 5). Very few of the industrialists appeared familiar with 
probabilistic techniques and, despite the explanation provided during the interview, the 
majority of industrialists were seemingly uncomfortable with answering questions on 
the subject. Moser and Kalton (1971) acknowledged that over-probing about a 
knowledge type question, when the interviewee's knowledge on the respective subject is 
limited, can have a significant effect upon the interviewee's motivation to co-operate 
further. Therefore this advice was subsequently heeded for Question Area 5. 
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Principle of the quantitative approach Question Area(s) in which the 
corresponding principle is the question 
subject 
Structured breakdown of contract strategy evaluation Q. A. 3 
Explicit evaluation of contract strategies in terms of 
' 
Q. A. 3, Q. A. 4, Q. A. 5 
s outset cost and time at a project 
Explicit account of the uncertainty inherent in contract Q. A. 5 
strategy evaluation 
Explicit, quantitative results of contract strategy Q. A. 7 
evaluation 
Setting clear, realistic and balanced price and duration Q. A. 7 
objectives 
Capacity to make better contract strategy decision and 
gain an improved understanding of contract strategy Q. A. 8 
selection from application of the quantitative approach 
Table 4.2 The principles of the quantitative approach that were the subjects of the 
interview questions 
Question Area 6 involves an explanation of the questionnaire (Questionnaire IB and, 
later, Questionnaire 2) together with an inquiry as to whether the interviewee would be 
prepared to complete a questionnaire. It is perhaps useful to note at this point that the 
questionnaire aimed to investigate the following principles of the quantitative approach: 
translation of subjective assumptions about contract strategies into cost and time 
estimates (albeit not at the outset of a real project); 
0 explicit reasoning behind the subjective assumptions and quantitative estimates; 
0 flexibility to evaluate contract strategies with respect to the most relevant issues; and 
0 explicit account of the uncertainty inherent in contract strategy evaluatign. 
The same principle behind Question Area 4 underlies Question Area 7. The interviewee 
is presented with an example set of results calculated from an application of the 
quantitative approach and is subsequently questioned about the utility of the results and 
again about the feasibility of the process involved in obtaining results of this type. 
Therefore the example results provided the interviewee with a context which may be 
addressed in the response. 
Since Question Area 8 concerned the long-term effects of the quantitative approach 
applied to contract strategy selection, this appeared a suitable issue on which to 
conclude the interview. Although it was acknowledged that this issue was somewhat 
abstract, it was perceived that the responses could indicate, firstly, whether the 
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interviewee had understood the quantitative approach, and secondly, which particular 
aspects of the quantitative approach were perceived to aid the decision process. 
It could be argued that the context of the question areas highlight only the advantages of 
the proposed quantitative approach and thereby bias the interviewee. However, it was 
inferred that a contributory factor to the low response rate as well as to the negative 
responses received during the feasibility study was because the quantitative approach 
was intended to change the industrialists' current practice. Chapman and Ward (1997), 
with regards to institutional isi ng risk management within organisations, recognised the 
following reasons for resistance to such change: 
1. parochial self-interest in maintaining the status quo; 
2. inability to perceive a need for change; 
3. pressure of other work; 
4. concern about the costs of introducing new procedures; 
5. individuals concerned that they will be unable to carry out the new procedures; 
6. uncertainty and suspicion about the nature of the change. 
The interview structure aimed to ensure that the interviewed industrialists explicitly and 
rationally considered: 
" the degree of discipline within their current approach to contract strategy evaluation; 
" how their approach could become more disciplined; and 
" the potential advantages of a more disciplined approach. 
It was perceived that the subtle promotion of the quantitative approach would 
counterbalance the interviewees' innate resistance. 
4.3.5 Design of the second questionnaire 
The questionnaire described in this section was labelled Questionnaire 2. A copy of the 
questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. 
Section 4.4.1 reports that from the fifty industrialists sent Questionnaire 1B only two 
completed it (i. e. response rate of 4%). The excessive demands of Questionnaire IB 
were cited amongst the reasons for non-responses. In addition to the sizeable amount of 
information requested by Questionnaire I B, it was also appreciated that the difficulty of 
the tasks was compounded by the questionnaire's inability to accurately simulate a 
contract strategy selection scenario. This is because only a limited description of the 
project circumstances and contract strategy options could be included in the 
questionnaire. 
During these early interviews, including those regarded as the feasibility study, it was 
observed that the industrialists occasionally made reference to projects that they had 
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previously been involved in. For example, they recalled instances where a contract 
strategy-related decision could have, or did, lead to cost and time savings. 
It was deduced that the constraints upon the decision scenario description in 
Questionnaire 113 would be avoided if instead the respondent was asked to relive an 
actual decision scenario. The respondent would be able to recall all of the relevant 
details about the chosen project's circumstances. It was acknowledged that the 
respondent would be inclined to call upon details which were unavailable at the 
project's outset. Therefore an industrialist's application of the quantitative approach to a 
past project would be susceptible to numerous biases. However, owing to the difficulties 
associated with simulating an actual contract strategy decision problem and because 
Questionnaire 1B generated a very low response rate, it was decided to design a second 
questionnaire which prompted the respondent to apply the quantitative approach to a 
project that they had previously been involved in. A copy of the resultant questionnaire, 
referred to as Questionnaire 2, is presented in Appendix A. 
In Questionnaire 2 the respondent is required to specify details about the project and 
client and then make a series of cost and time estimates for at least two contract 
strategies. The questionnaire requests the respondent to estimate fewer cost and time 
elements than Questionnaire 113 because it groups the four construction activities 
featured in Questionnaire IB into a single activity. 
In order to negate the problem of imperfect descriptions of the contract strategy options, 
the respondent in Questionnaire 2 is able to evaluate any contract strategies. Therefore 
the respondent is able to fully appreciate and account for the finest details of each 
option evaluated. 
It was expected that one of the contract strategies that is evaluated would be the actual 
contract strategy used to procure the project. In which case, the cost and time estimates 
would, in theory, equate to historical, objective data rather than a representation of 
uncertain, subjective estimates made at the project's outset. However, this would not 
apply for the other respondent-selected contract strategy(s) evaluated for the project. 
It should be noted that the decision to introduce Questionnaire 2 had the following 
effect upon the empirical research: 
" It was necessary to retract one of the empirical study's objectives; to ascertain any 
generalities amongst the industrialists' subjective perceptions about the specific 
contract strategies and project circumstances presented in Questionnaire 113. 
" Since the prototype model (reported in Chapter 3) was designed to simulate the 
three specific contract strategies that featured in Questionnaire 113, it was necessary 
to extend the model in order to simulate the contract strategies which the 
respondents of Questionnaire 2 were free to select and evaluate. However, the 
adjustments to the model were expected to be fairly straightforward because 
Questionnaire 2 prompts the respondent to define each contract strategy in the same 
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manner as those featured in Questionnaire IB. 
4.4 Empirical research results 
The empirical research results include a brief review of the number and type of 
empirical research participants. This section also contains summaries of the data 
collected from the fourteen interviewed industrialists and the six completed 
questionnaires. 
4.4.1 Empirical research participants 
Section 4.3.2 reported that seven industrialists were interviewed during a feasibility 
study. This study took place during March, April and May 1997. The main part of the 
empirical research was designed and executed once the feasibility study had concluded. 
Data within the main empirical research were collected up until November 1997. 
In the main part of the empirical research seventy five industrialists were asked to 
participate. Fourteen industrialists contributed to the research (i. e. a response rate of 
19%). Each industrialist was assigned a label to maintain their anonymity (see Table 
4.3). 
Amongst the fourteen participants in the main empirical research were four 
industrialists who had participated in the feasibility study. They had agreed to be 
interviewed again, at a later date and to a greater depth. The shaded area of Table 4.3 
covers these industrialists. 
During the period June to August 1997, fifty industrialists were sent Questionnaire 113 
along with a letter enquiring as to whether they would be prepared to discuss the 
research. From the fifty, only nine industrialists agreed to be interviewed (P2, P3, P4, 
P5, P8, P9, P 10, PII and P 16). From these nine, only two of the industrialists completed 
Questionnaire IB (P 10 and P 16). 
During the period August to November 1997, Questionnaire 2 was sent with an 
accompanying letter to thirty one industrialists which included six of the seven 
industrialists who had already been interviewed, but had not completed Questionnaire 
1B (P2, P3, P4, P5, Hand P9). From the twenty five new industrialists targeted, five 
agreed to be interviewed (P12, P13, P14, P15 and P17) and three completed 
Questionnaire 2 (P 12, P 14 and P 15). One of the six previously-interviewed industrialists 
completed Questionnaire 2 (P4). 
122 
Label Profession Research Participation 
P2 Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview 
P3 Design consultant/ Project manager Interview 
P4 Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview & Questionnaire 2 
P5 Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview 
P8 Design consultant/ Project manager Interview 
P9 Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview 
PIO Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview& Questionnaire IB 
PII Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview 
P12 Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview & Questionnaire 2 
P13 Design consultantJ Project manager Interview 
P14 Design consultant/ Project manager Interview & Questionnaire 2 
P15 Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview & Questionnaire 2 
P16 Quantity surveyor/Project manager Interview& Questionnaire IB 
P17 Design consultant/ Project manager Interview 
Table 4.3 The label, profession and participation level of the empirical research 
industrialists 
4.4.2 Interview data 
The general design of the interview structure was reported in section 4.3.4. Section 
4.3.4 introduced the concept of 'question areas' as, basically, question topics. The 
following sub-sections deals with each of the eight designed question areas in turn. 
An outline of the information and type of questions that the interviewees were presented 
with in each question area is provided. Then the interviewees' responses to each 
question area are reported. 
The interviewees' responses to each question area have been organised into categorises. 
In order to categorise the interview data it was necessary to slightly interpret the 
interviewees' responses. However, the categories have been designed to provide 
reasonably accurate reflections of each interviewee's expressed perceptions. 
The key notes taken for each industrialist interviewed are provided in Appendix B. 
These notes are paraphrases of the industrialists' comments. 
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4.4. ZI Question Area 1 
4.4.2.1.1 Description of Question Area I 
Each interview began with a brief introduction to the subject of the research which 
included a definition of the tenn 'contract strategy'. 
The industrialists were questioned about their usual method of selecting the type of 
contract strategy to use on a project. The general line of questioning was as follows: 
1. Does the industrialist undertake a contract strategy decision process at the beginning 
of projects? 
2. Which criteria do the industrialist aim to satisfy in the decision process? 
3. How does the industrialist distinguish between contract strategies in the decision 
process? 
4.4.2.1.2 Responses to Question Area I 
The most notable responses to these questions are summarised as follows: 
All fourteen industrialists had experience with Traditional and Design-Build type 
contract strategies. All of the industrialists$ except P3 and P8, also had experience 
with Management type contract strategies. None of the industrialists had experienced 
a contract strategy that did not comprise a standard form of contract, although the 
majority indicated that normally these standard contract forms were highly amended 
versions. 
P2, P5, P8, P 11, P 13 and P 17 did not attach a great deal of importance to the contract 
strategy decisions made at the outset of projects (i. e. those which established the 
overall organisational and contractual framework). These industrialists perceived that 
the contract strategy decisions which related to contractual details (e. g. timing of 
payments, variation clauses) had a more significant impact on a project's price and 
duration. 
P2, P5 and PII asserted that there are some projects where they do not undertake an 
evaluation process because a particular contract strategy is the obvious choice. 
P3, P9 and P 15 reported that in some projects the client selects the contract strategy, 
occasionally overriding an alternative decision recommended by the industrialists. 
P2, P4, P8 and P 14 claimed that contract strategy decisions are not expressly made at 
the outset of some projects, instead they are planned and designed using an incidental 
arrangement until the contractual details are defined. 
All of the industrialists perceived that different contract strategies had a different 
impact on the price, duration and quality of projects. 
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" All of the industrialists reported that a project's contract strategy evaluation process 
relied upon their experiential knowledge to forecast the likely impacts that different 
contract strategies would have on the project. 
" All of the industrialists were aware of the interrelationship between the price, 
duration and quality of projects. They all perceived that most clients will either 
consciously or subconsciously assign different levels of importance to each objective 
relating to their project's price, duration and quality. 
" All fourteen industrialists acknowledged that, for a given project, different contract 
strategies have different likelihoods of enabling the achievement of the client's 
prioritised price, time and quality objectives. 
" The most commonly cited criteria, with which the industrialists claimed they 
evaluated the suitability of contract strategies, made reference to the client's price, 
time and quality objectives, but they also made reference to contract strategies' 
suitability with respect to a project's circumstances (e. g. the type of client, project 
size, project type, major project risks, market conditions). 
P9, PI I, P12 and P17 asserted that not all factors that influence contract strategy 
selection relate to cost or time. 
P3, P9, P10 and P15 indicated that the criteria considered in their contract strategy 
evaluation process were indirect measures of contract strategies' potential impact on 
a project's price, duration and quality. The industrialist P9 held the view that even 
quality-related objectives could be considered as a secondary objectives to the 
clients' price and duration objectives (i. e. the clients' desired quality level is 
dependent upon the amount of time and money which a client is prepared to expend). 
4.4.2.2 Question Area 2 
4.4.2.2.1 Description of Question Area 2 
The industrialists were asked to give their initial view on the feasibility of undertaking a 
quantitative evaluation of contract strategies at the outset of projects. 
Each of the industrialists' responses can, essentially, be classified into one of the 
following two categories: 
1. a quantitative approach is not feasible because projects present too much uncertainty 
at their outset and because the perceived differences between contract strategies are 
subjective. 
2. it is possible to quantify, at a project's outset, the impacts that contract strategies are 
likely to have upon the project's performance. 
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4.4.2.2.2 Responses to Question Area 2 
Table 4.4 shows which category each industrialist's response classifies under. 
Industrialist Category 1 
UNFEASIBLE 
Category 2 
FEASIBLE 
P2 x 
P3 x 
P4 x 
PS 
P8 x 
P9 x 
PIO x 
I'll x 
P12 x 
P13 x 
P14 x 
P15 x 
P16 x 
P17 x 
Table 4.4 The industrialists' initial reaction to a quantitative evaluation of contract 
strategies at the selection stage 
The five industrialists who responded positively to this opening question were asked 
whether they had previously undertaken a quantitative evaluation of contract strategies. 
The industrialists' answers to this question can be surnmarised as follows: 
P3 and P4 reported that they had never performed a quantitative evaluation of 
contract strategies. 
P9, P12 and P15 claimed that, in some projects, the impacts that contract strategies 
might have on a project's overall price and duration were estimated. However, only 
P15 had formally reported these estimates at the contract strategy selection stage to 
aid both the decision and communication with clients. 
4.4.2.3 Question Area 3 
4.4.2.3.1 Description of Question Area 3 
The proposed quantitative approach was described in more detail. The industrialists 
were informed that the research was investigating whether it was possible to estimate 
the impacts that contract strategies were likely to have on specific cost and time 
elements at the outset of a project. 
The industrialists were shown a list of the following cost and time elements: 
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" design cost and duration; 
" tender process cost and duration; 
" administration costs; 
" construction costs and duration; 
contractor's mark-up; and 
project schedule. 
A discussion based upon the following two questions ensued: 
1. is it possible to identify and quantify the potential impact that contract strategies 
could have on these specific cost and time elements at the outset of a project? 
2. Is there any value in evaluating alternative contract strategies against the same set of 
criteria? 
4.4.2.3.2 Responses to Question Area 3 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be summarised as follows: 
" All fourteen industrialists perceived that different contract strategies could have 
different impacts on the listed cost and time elements. 
" Owing to the high level of uncertainty, all of the industrialists indicated that they 
could not identify the specific way in which contract strategies could effect each cost 
and time element at a project's outset. However, P3, P9, P 15 and P 16 indicated that 
they could intuitively forecast, in qualitative terms, the relative impacts that different 
contract strategies could have on the cost and time elements at the outset of projects. 
P9 and P14 expressed a favourable response to the proposal of a methodical 
evaluation process. They considered that because so many factors need to be 
considered when evaluating the suitability of a contract strategy there would be value 
in separating the evaluation process into a series of sub-decisions. In addition, P14 
believed that there is a smaller risk of making irrational decisions because the 
structured process aids the decision-maker to evaluate prospective contract strategies, 
for each project, in terms of the same key decision criteria. 
owing to the high level of uncertainty surrounding contract strategy selection at the 
outset of projects, P2, P5, P8, P 11, P 13 and P 17 claimed that it was more practical to 
maintain their current approach to contract decisions. The industrialists implied that 
their current approach was less systematic and more efficient (i. e. focused upon the 
issues perceived to be the most important). It was also apparent that their current 
approach relied upon intuitive assumptions which tended to remain implicit. 
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4.4.2.4 Question Area 4 
The industrialists were asked whether they expected particular issues, related to contract 
strategies, could have any impact on the cost and time elements cited earlier in the 
interview. The issues concerned fast-track construction, pricing mechanism types, early 
contractor appointment and the project roles of clients. If the industrialist perceived the 
issues could have a cost and/or time impact upon a project they were also asked as to 
whether they perceived it possible to quantify the level of impact at the outset of a 
project when contract strategy decisions addressing these issues are made. 
4.4.2.4.1 Question, 4rea W 
4.4.2.4.1.1 Description of Question Area 4i 
The industrialists were first asked: 
Are there some projects where you would expect a contract strategy that enables the 
design and construction to overlap (i. e. fast-track construction) to reduce the project 
duration relative to a contract strategy that requires the design and construction to be 
completed sequentially? 
If the industrialist gave an affirmative response to this question the industrialist was 
then asked: 
If, at the outset of a particular project, you perceived a fast-track contract strategy was 
likely to reduce the project duration relative to a sequential design and construction 
arrangement, could you give an approximate estimate of the possible time saving? 
4.4.2.4.1.2 Responses to Question Area 4i 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be summarised as follows: 
All of the industrialists perceived it possible to identify, at the selection stage of a 
project, whether time could be savcd using fast-track construction. 
P3, P4, P8, P9, PIO, P12, P14, P15 and P16 were reasonably confident that, at the 
contract strategy selection stage of a project, they could give an approximate estimate 
of the possible time saving. 
P2, P5, P 11, P 13 and P 17 conceded that they could give an approximate estimate of 
the possible time saving, but stressed that the highly intuitive estimates may lead to 
ill-founded decisions. 
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4.4.2.4.2 Question Area 4ii 
4.4.2.4.2.1 Description of question Area 4ii 
The industrialists were first asked: 
Are there some projects where you would expect the contractor's mark-up, including 
the contractor's profit and the contingency to cover the contractor's risk, to be any 
different between the two options of paying the contractor on a fixed price basis or 
paying the contractor on a cost-reimbursable basis? 
If the industrialist gave an affirmative response to this question the industrialist was 
then asked: 
If, at the outset of a particular project, you perceived such a difference was probable, 
could you give an approximate estimate of the possible difference in the contractor's 
mark-up between these two payment options? 
4.4.2.4.2.2 Responses to Question Area 4ii 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be summarised as fOllOws: 
All of the industrialists considered that in most projects the contractor will demand a 
higher mark-up for a fixed price type pricing mechanism than for a cost reimbursable 
type. 
All of the industrialists indicated that they could estimate the contractor's mark-up. 
In many cases, the industrialists suggested that their ability to make this estimate was 
dependent upon the information available at the time of the estimates. The type of 
information that they referred to included details of the contract strategy (i. e. its risk 
allocation), general project details and details of the particular contractor 
organisation that is awarded the contract. 
4.4.2.4.3 Question Area 4iff 
4.4.2.4.3.1 Description of Question Area 4iii 
The industrialists were first asked: 
Are there some projects where you would expect a contract strategy that enables a 
contractor to contribute to the design and planning stages of the project, to lead to any 
cost and time savings relative to a contract strategy that does not accommodate early 
involvement of a contractor? 
if the industrialist gave an affirmative response to this question the industrialist was 
then asked: 
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if, at the outset of a particular project, you perceived the early involvement of a 
contractor was likely to lead to cost and time savings, could you give an approximate 
estimate of these possible savings? 
4.4.2.4.3.2 Responses to Question Area 4iii 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be summarised as follows: 
" P4, P9, P 10, P 13, P 14, P 15 and P 16 perceived that in some projects the contractor's 
involvement at the design and planning stages can result in cost and time savings. 
Each of these industrialists claimed that they would be prepared to speculate, at the 
outset of a project, as to whether advantages could be gained from early contractor 
involvement. However, only P14 and P16 showed an inclination to quantify their 
subjective assumptions. 
" P2, P3, PII and P 17 perceived that in some projects the contractor's involvement at 
the design and planning stages can result in cost and time savings. However, owing 
to the uncertainty at a project's outset, they asserted that the impact of early 
contractor involvement could not be identified and quantified until a later project 
stage. 
" P5, P8 and P12 considered that a contractor's involvement at the design and planning 
stages of a project did not lead to any cost and time savings. 
4.4.2.4.4 Question Area 4iv 
4.4.2.4.4.1 Description of Question Area 4iv 
The industrialists were first asked: 
Are there some projects where you would expect the project price and duration to be 
any different between the two options of the client taking an active role during the 
project and the client having a very limited involvement once the main contract was 
awarded? 
if the industrialist gave an affirmative response to this question the industrialist was 
shown the list of cost and time elements and asked: 
If, at the outset of a particular project, you perceived such a difference was probable, 
could you: 
1. identify which cost and time elements were likely to be affected by each of these two 
types of client involvement; and 
2. give an approximate estimate of these identified cost and time elements incorporating 
the probable impact of the type of client involvement? 
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4.4.2.4.4.2 Responses to Question Area 4iv 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be summarised as follows: 
Many of the industrialists considered that the type of client and the type of client 
involvement in a project can influence a project's cost and time performance. 
However, all of the industrialists, except PIO and P14, perceived that the high level 
of uncertainty at the selection stage made it impossible to make subjective 
evaluations about the level of impact that different types of client and of client 
involvement may have on the cost and time elements. 
PIO and P14 held a similar view to the other industrialists except they claimed in 
some circumstances it is possible at the selection stage, to identify whether avoidable 
costs and delays will be incurred as a result of the client's active involvement in the 
project. Furthermore, in such a case, PIO and P14 claimed that they could give a 
highly intuitive estimate of the cost and time elements incorporating this subjective 
judgement. 
4.4.25 Question Area 5 
4.4.2.5.1 Description of Question Area 5 
The industrialists were given a brief explanation about uncertainty and how it can be 
accounted for in quantitative estimates using triangular probability distributions. 
The industrialists were then asked whether the application of these probability 
techniques alleviated any of their reservations about: 
1. making subjective assumptions about contract strategies' likely impacts upon a 
project's cost and time elements at the selection stage; and 
2. translating these subjective assumptions into quantitative estimates. 
4.4.2.5.2 Responses to Question Area 5 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be summarised as follows: 
P2, P4, P8, P 10, P 12, P 16 and P 17 supported the use of probability distributions in so 
far as they perceived it more pertinent to estimate a range of values rather than a 
single value for each cost and time element because of the high level of uncertainty 
at the outset of projects. However, only P4, P 10 and P 16 considered that they may be 
able to incorporate their subjective assumptions about contract strategies into 
probability distribution estimates for each cost and time element. 
4P P3, P5, P8, P9, PI 1, P13, P14 and P15 did not make any noteworthy comments about 
the applicability of probability distribution estimates. Nevertheless, P3, P9, P14 and 
P 15 acknowledged that the quantitative approach could be feasible. 
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P2, Pll, P13 and P17 maintained that the quantitative approach was unfeasible 
owing to the considerable uncertainty at the outset of projects and the uncertainty in 
their subjective assumptions about contract strategies. 
4.4.2 6 Question Area 6 
4.4.2.6.1 Description of QuestionArea 6 
The industrialists were asked whether they would be prepared to complete a 
questionnaire in order to perform an example application of the quantitative approach. 
Owing to the protracted period during which the questionnaires were developed, some 
of the industrialists were asked to complete Questionnaire IB while other industrialists 
were asked to complete Questionnaire 2. 
4.4.2.6.2 Responses to Question At-ea 6 
Table 4.5 summarises: 
1. which industrialists' expressed a willingness to complete a questionnaire; 
2. which type of questionnaire each industrialist agreed to complete; 
3. under which circumstances the industrialists preferred to complete a questionnaire; 
and 
4. which industrialists completed a questionnaire. 
The industrialists' questionnaire responses are reported in Section 4.4.3 At this stage, 
the interview sometimes changed according to whether the industrialist had agreed to 
complete a questionnaire. Nonetheless, all of the industrialists' interviews included 
Question Areas 7 and 8. 
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industrialist (Questionnaire Type) Industrialists' Reactions to Question Area 6 
P2 (Questionnaire 113) These industrialists agreed to complete a questionnaire in 
P3 (Questionnaire 113) their own time after the 
interview, but did not complete the 
questionnaire. 
P5 (Questionnaire 2) 
P8 (Questionnaire 2) 
P9 (Questionnaire 2) 
P4 (Questionnaire 2) These industrialists agreed to complete a questionnaire in 
P16 (Questionnaire 113) their own time after the 
interview and did complete the 
questionnaire. The industrialists reasons for their estimates 
were collected during interviews conducted at a later date. 
plO (Questionnaire 113) These industrialists completed the questionnaire during the 
P12 (Questionnaire 2) 
interview. 
P14 (Questionnaire 2) 
P15 (Questionnaire 2) 
PH These industrialists did not wish to complete a 
questionnaire. P13 
P17 
Table 4.5 Summary of the industrialists' reactions once asked whether they would be 
prepared to complete a questionnaire 
4.4.2.7 Question Area 7 
4.4.2.7.1 Description of Question Area 7 
The industrialists were introduced to the prototype model described in Chapter 3. The 
prototype model was described as providing a framework to input probability 
distribution estimates of a project's cost and time elements for each contract strategy 
under evaluation (i. e. it is intended that any subjective assumptions about a contract 
strategy's probable impact on these cost and time elements are incorporated into the 
estimates). The model description made reference to Monte Carlo simulation. 
Subsequently, the industrialists were presented with example model output for two 
different contract strategies (Figure 4.4). 
The industrialists were then questioned about: 
1. whether the type of data, displayed in the example results, could be of assistance to 
contract strategy selection; 
2. the practicality the model. 
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Figure 4.4 The example set of'results shown to industrialists during the interview 
4.4.2.7.2 Responses to Question Area 7 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be surnmarised as follows: 
e All of the industrialists except P 11, P 13 and P 17 indicated that the results provided a 
useful overview of the likely differences between contract strategies. 
P8, PIO, P14, P15 and P16 appreciated the quantitative nature of the results since 
they recognised that it was possible to measure the differences between contract 
strategies in quantitative terms and also measure whether contract strategies were 
likely to enable the achievement of project price and duration targets. 
P5, P8, P10,1112, P14 and P16 perceived the results provided a useful means of 
reporting their evaluation of contract strategies, particularly to clients at the selection 
stage of projects. 
P4, P5, P8, P 11, P 12 and P 13 claimed the model and Its required evaluation process 
was impractical because of the time and money constraints at the beginning of 
projects when the contract strategy is selected. 
P5, P8, P 11, P 13, P 14, P 16 and P 17 expressed concerns about the value of the model 
based upon the observation that the results would simply reflect, and even magnify, 
the high level of uncertainty and subjectivity that a model-user inputs into the model. 
4.4.28 Question Area 8 
4.4.2.8.1 Description of'Question Area 8 
At this final stage of the interview the industrialists were questioned about: 
1. whether they would prefer to perforrn a less subjective evaluation of contract 
strategies; and 
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2. whether they considered the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation 
could lead to a less subjective evaluation of contract strategies. 
4.4.2.8.2 Responses to Question Area 8 
The industrialists' responses to this area of questioning can be summarised as follows: 
" P2ý P8, PI I and P17 perceived the quantitative approach would not provide any 
additional decision support to their normal contract strategy selection process. 
" P2, P 10, P 11, P 12 and P 17 commented that the high level of uncertainty which 
projects present at the contract strategy selection stage was compounded by the fact 
that every project is individual. These industrialists considered that attempting to 
acquire a more scientific understanding of the impacts that contract strategies have 
had on completed projects is unlikely to be of assistance on future projects because 
the decision will always have to rely upon subjective judgement. 
P2, P5, P8, P 11, P 13 and P 17 claimed that the quantitative approach to contract 
strategy evaluation focused too heavily upon the decision which is made at the 
beginning of projects. These industrialists expressed the view that the important 
decisions relating to contractual arrangements were not necessarily made at the 
beginning of projects. Therefore they insisted that contract strategy evaluation at the 
beginning of projects did not warrant the level of effort that the quantitative approach 
demands. 
P3, P4, P9, P 10, P 14, P 15 and P 16 considered that that there is a need to understand 
more about the cost and time impacts that contract strategies have had on completed 
projects because this may lead to less subjective evaluations of contract strategies. 
P3 and P14 commented that the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation 
may help to understand more about the cost and time impacts that contract strategies 
have had on completed projects. 
P4, P9 and P14 indicated that the breakdown of the evaluation process into a series 
of decisions resulted in a more manageable and deservedly more rigorous evaluation 
of contract strategies. 
P14 perceived that quantification of subjective assumptions about contract strategies 
demanded more consideration and justification than making the initial subjective 
assumption. Consequently, he said that the quantification process provided a useful 
safeguard against irrational decisions being made instinctively. 
P3, P4, P14 and P16 also highlighted that many of the important decisions are not 
necessarily made at the beginning of projects, but remarked that they would prefer to 
make these decisions at the beginning of projects because this would lead to better- 
managed projects. 
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4.4.3 The questionnaire data 
Six of the fourteen industrialists who were interviewed completed questionnaires (P4, 
PIO, P12, P14, P15 and P16). Two of these industrialists (PIO and P16) completed 
Questionnaire IB while the other four completed Questionnaire 2. 
The questionnaire responses include quantitative estimates of cost and time that reflect 
the impact of contract strategies upon specific projects. The responses also include the 
industrialists' justifications for their estimates. The quantitative estimates were 
processed using the prototype model reported in Chapter 3 to calculate a distribution of 
project price and duration for each contract strategy evaluated. The following sections 
present the calculated distributions together with the estimates and reasons for all six 
completed questionnaires. However, it was decided to focus upon the responses gained 
from three questionnaire respondents while the other three are summarised briefly. 
4.4.3.1 Data gainedfront Questionnaire IB 
Section 4.3.3 described Questionnaire IB in detail and a copy of Questionnaire IB is 
provided in Appendix A. It presents the respondent with a hypothetical project and three 
contract strategy alternatives. The respondent is requested to reflect the expected impact 
of each contract strategy upon the project in estimates of the project's constituent cost 
and time elements. 
The project is described as a seven-storey concrete-framed office block that is to 
provide a gross floor area of 10,000m 
2. Some preliminary design of the building has 
been performed (details are provided in the questionnaire - see Appendix A). The 
brown-field site is located on the outskirts of a city centre where traffic congestion is 
not uncommon. The overall project cost and duration are roughly estimated at 
E8 million and 21 months. 
The client is an insurance company that wishes to occupy the building once complete. 
The company has had very little construction experience and has no in-house resources 
to assist in administering the project. 
Table 4.6 outlines details of the contract strategies presented in Questionnaire 113. 
Although PIO and P16 were presented with the same contract strategy decision 
problem, it was not considered valid to compare the two industrialists' questionnaire 
responses because the decision problem is open to considerable interpretation. This is 
particularly evident by the fact that there was a maximum difference of f5million 
between the project price results calculated from the two industrialists' estimates (see 
Figures 4.6 and 4.8) 
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rga 0 nisational structure Traditional 
7, rproces-v ende Full bill of quantities used to negotiate a Guaranteed Maximum 
Price (GMP) 
Pricing mechani. vin GMP (if construction price is less than the GMP then the 
savings are shared equall% between the client and contractor. but 
the contractor is solch re-potisible forzill cost,, o%er the GMP) 
7" Design-Build 
Tender proce. u Tender Competitive single-stagc on the basis of fixed price 
Pric-ing inecham-wn I: i\cd pricc 
Organi. vational. vtructure Management Contract 
Tender proceu Pre-qualification followed by negotiation of fees 
(management contractor) 
Tenderproce, v, v Competitive singic-stagc 
(each work. v contractor) 
Pricing mechanivm Prc-construction lump sum fee and fee (for during-construction 
(management contractor) services) is a fixed percentage of the construction cost plus any 
savings or overruns relative to a negotiated target cost arc 
shared equally between client and management contractor 
Pricing mechani-vm cost plus percentage fee 
(work. v contractors) 
Table 4.6 The contract strategies presented in Questionnaire IB 
4.4.3.1.1 Questionnaire responses. from indusiriahsl P 10 
The following sub-sections describe the questionnaire responses from P 10 in detail. A 
copy of the questionnaire completed by P 10 is provided In Appendix C. 
4.4.3.1.1.1 The estimates provided by P 10 
Figure 4.5 shows the estimates provided by P 10. 
It is important to note that the industrialist P 10 estimated a minimum, most likely and 
maximum Guaranteed Maximum Price for two variations of the Traditional contract 
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strategy. The first set of Guaranteed Maximum Price values were based upon the 
assumption that the construction contractor's accounts would be accessible to the client 
(i. e. open book accounting). The second set of Guaranteed Maximum Price values were 
based upon the assumption that the construction contractor's accounts would not be 
accessible to the client (i. e. closed book accounting). The industrialist's estimates of the 
cost and time elements that precede the tender bid parameters estimates do not 
differentiate between these variations of the Traditional contract strategy. However, 
where the tender bid parameter estimates and processed results are presented, the 
Traditional contract strategy is referred to as CONTRACT STRATEGY IA (OPEN) and 
CONTRACT STRATEGY IB (CLOSED). 
4.4.3.1.1.2 The reasoning behind the estimates provided by P 10 
The range of each elentent's estintate. PIO focused upon the most likely value 
estimated for each cost and time element and did not evaluate the uncertainty related 
to each element. It was apparent that the minimum and maximum values estimated 
by PIO were simply intended to cover the same range as the estimates presented in 
the questionnaire for CS 1. 
4P Design cost. PIO claimed that the design would cost the least if CS 2 was used 
because CS 2 produces an eff icient design. P 10 considered that the design would cost 
the most if CS 3 was used because under this arrangement there is a tendency for the 
parties involved to be unsure as to their precise roles and thus additional costs would 
be incurred. 
Design duration. PIO perceived that the design duration would be the same under 
CS 1 and CS 2, but slightly longer under CS 3. This is because PIO claimed that the 
longer design duration estimated for CS 3 was intended to reflect the need for more 
co-ordination because more parties would be involved at the design stage if CS 3 was 
used. 
Tender process cost and duration. PIO considered that the competitive tender 
process used by CS 2 would take the same period of time, but cost the client slightly 
less than the negotiated tender process used in CS 1. P 10 claimed that the direct costs 
which the client incurs are generally expected to be higher for a negotiated tender 
process than a competitive process. PIO estimated a higher cost and longer duration 
for the tender process used in CS 3 compared to those estimated for the other two 
contract strategies. PIO explained that the estimates for CS 3 reflected the series of 
tendering demanded by the nature of CS 3. 
Transaction costs. PIO estimated the same transaction costs for all three contract 
strategies and this estimate was the same as that presented in the questionnaire for 
CS 1. The industrialist indicated that he was unsure as to what to include in this cost 
element. 
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* most likely total cost calculsted opproximatelY as file mmmsti" of the 9PPropliste Clemesit's most likely cod values 
The cost and duration of all the construction components (i. e. substructure 
superstructure, services, internal finishes, fittings and Wernal work). For each 
construction component, PIO estimated the same duration for all three contract 
strategies (and each component's duration estimate was the same as that provided in 
the questionnaire). PIO explained that it was difficult to relate to the particular 
circumstances of the hypothetical project and thus it was difficult to speculate about 
the contract strategies' potential impact on the project. PIO made reference to this 
issue again when asked to reason why the same cost values had been estimated for 
CS I and CS 2. However, following the summation of the construction cost totals 
P 10 claimed that the construction cost total for CS 2 ought to be less than that of CS 
1, not the same. He attributed this assumption to his experience and indicated that the 
contractor, under CS 2, had more incentive to minimise costs. However, PIO chose 
not to refine the construction cost estimates. Instead lie reflected this late assumption 
in the fixed price tender bids for CS 2 (see Figure 4.5). When PIO was asked to 
explain why he had estimated higher costs for the construction components under CS 
3 than those for CS I and CS 2 he claimed that the additional cost was intended to 
reflect the fact each construction component would be undertaken by different 
contractors. He perceived this would inevitably increase costs. 
Contractor's niark-itp. The most likely total design and construction cost for CS 2 is 
flOAM. Given the late assumption with regards to CS 2, PIO assigned zero mark-up 
to the minimum, most likely and maximum design and construction cost totals for 
CS 2 to give the minimum, most likely and maximum fixed price tender bid 
estimates for CS 2. PIO considered that once a mark-up was added to CS I the 
contrast between CS I and CS 2 would reflect the assumption that CS 2 would be 
more economical than CS 1. The most likely total construction costs for CS I and CS 
3 are E9.5M. and flO. OM, respectively. PIO chose to estimate two different levels of 
mark-up for CS 1. PIO estimated an average mark-up of 7.9% of the total 
construction cost estimated for CS I based upon the assumption that the contract 
strategy would employ 'open book' accounting (i. e. the client has access to the 
contractor's actual costs). PIO then estimated an average mark-up of 10.5% of the 
total construction cost estimated for CS I based upon the assumption that the 
contract strategy would employ 'closed book' accounting. Meanwhile PIO estimated 
an average mark-up of 6% of the total construction cost estimated for CS 3. PIO 
claimed that the client assumes the majority of the project risk under CS 3 and CS 1 
because payment is made on a re-measurement basis. However, PIO claimed that the 
difference between 'open book' and 'closed book' accounting can amount to a 
considerable sum because of the contractor's opportunity to exploit the client. 
ip project schedule. PIO agreed with the project schedule for CS I which is presented 
in the questionnaire. Although PIO reproduced similar schedules for the other 
contract strategies, he demonstrated that, relative to CS 1, CS 2 enables more 
activities to overlap while CS 3 enables even more activities to overlap. PIO 
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explained that the estimated schedules realistically show that the project would be 
completed within the shortest period under CS 3 and within the longest period under 
CS I. 
4.4.3.1.1.3 The reaction of P 10 to the results 
Figure 4.6 shows the results calculated from the estimates provided by PIO. The results 
for each evaluated contract strategy are presented as a contour plot. 
PIO agreed with the general ordering of the contract strategies' contour plots. For 
example, he agreed that the project price results of CS 2 ought to cover a lower part of 
the price scale than those of CS I and also agreed that the project price results of CS I 
ought to cover a lower part of the price scale than those of CS 3. He expressed a similar 
response about the project duration results. 
However, PIO indicated some concern about the reliability of the specific price and 
duration values calculated for each contract strategy. He stated that the way in which the 
results were presented (Figure 4.6) could be misleading. He claimed that the results may 
be interpreted without appreciating the fact that the results derived from approximate 
and highly speculative estimates. 
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4.4.3.1.2 Questionnaire responsesfrom industrialist PI 6 
The following sub-sections describe the questionnaire responses from P16 in detail. A 
copy of the questionnaire completed by P 16 is provided in Appendix C. 
4.4.3.1.2.1 The estimates provided by P 16 
Figure 4.7 shows the estimates provided by P 16. 
4.4.3.1.2.2 The reasoning behind the estimates provided by P 16 
The range of each element's estimate. P16 stated that the probability distribution of 
values estimated for the cost and time elements were intended to reflect the potential 
level of risk related to the elements which could occur. P16 did not clarify which 
specific risks were related to the cost and time elements. 
Design cost P 16 perceived that the design would cost the least under CS 2. P 16 said 
that relative to CS I and CS 3, the amount of work involved in the design, 
particularly during the detailed design stage, would be reduced if the designer is also 
the builder. P16 also claimed that design consultants appointed by a contractor have 
a tendency to receive a smaller fee than if they were appointed by the client. P16 
estimated that the design would cost slightly more for CS 3 than for CS I because 
letting the construction in packages under CS 3 generates additional costs. 
Design duration. P16 estimated that the design duration under CS 2 and CS 3 would 
be equally less than that under CS I because of the contractors involvement at the 
pre-construction stage. P16 claimed that this feature of CS 2 and CS 3 ensured the 
design would be undertaken more efficiently. 
Tenderprocess cost andditration. P16 considered that the negotiated tender process 
used in CS I was likely to cost slightly more but take less time than the competitive 
tender process used in CS 2. P 16 did not specifically reason this view other than to 
state that the view was based upon experience. P 16 explained that the tender cost and 
duration associated with CS 3 were expected to be higher than those estimated for 
CS I and CS 2 because the tender process involves the letting of many work 
packages. 
0 Transaction costs. P16 claimed that CS 2 would induce the least transaction costs 
because virtually all responsibility is being assigned to a single organisation to 
design, build and manage the project and this is expected to reduce the amount of 
paper work and prevent the contractor from trying to recover unforeseen costs. P16 
considered that the client was likely to incur the highest transaction costs under CS 3 
because this contract strategy presents the client with a greater risk of cost 
uncertainty. Therefore P16 claimed that the client will need to employ considerable 
cost monitoring resources if CS 3 was used. 
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Suhstructure costs and duration. P16 expected that the substructure would be 
completed within the same period of time regardless of which of the three contract 
strategies was used. P16 also expected the substructure to cost the same if either CS 
2 or CS 3 were used, but cost slightly more if CS I was used. P16 claimed that the 
early involvement of the contractor under CS 2 and CS 3 was likely to lead to some 
buildability cost savings relative to CS 1. P16 also made reference to the likelihood 
that the early involvement of the contractor will ensure construction plant and 
materials will be available when required. 
Sqperstructure costs and duration. P 16 estimated that the superstructure cost and 
duration would be highest under CS 1. P16 again made reference to cost and time 
savings ensuing from the contractor's involvement during the design stage under CS 
2 and CS 3. P16 perceived that these buildability savings would be greater under CS 
2 than CS 3 because under CS 2 the contractor has a greater incentive to produce a 
cost effective design and work at a higher productivity rate. 
Services, internalfinishes andfittings cost and duration. P16 estimated that these 
construction components would cost the least under CS 1. P16 claimed that the 
building's services were likely to incur fewer problems under CS I than under CS 2 
and CS 3. This is because, firstly, the design of the services is expected to be more 
integrated with the building's design under CS 1, and secondly, the time constraints 
surrounding the services' installation are not expected to be as severe as those under 
CS 2 and CS 3. P16 added that the time constraints exerted by the management 
contractor under CS 3 would induce faster construction but a higher cost for these 
components compared to CS 2. 
External work cost and duration. P 16 perceived that CS 2 and CS 3 would induce a 
shorter duration for this activity compared to CS 1. P16 claimed that this was 
because the contractor under CS 2 and CS 3 had a greater incentive to minimise 
construction time. 
Cowractor's mark-up. The industrialists' estimates of the cost elements were 
combined to give approximate values of each contract strategies' most likely total 
construction cost. The most likely total construction cost for CS I and CS 3 were 
taken as 0.01M and E7.12M, respectively, whilst the most likely design and 
construction cost was taken as E7.75M for CS 2. The average mark-up for CS 1, CS 
2 and CS 3 was 4.0%, 6.0% and 7.3% of the contract strategies' respective 
construction cost totals. P16 claimed that CS 2 allocated the contractor with the 
greater proportion of project risk relative to CS I and CS 3 and this was reflected in 
the high mark-up estimated for CS 2. P16 also expressed that CS 3 allocated the 
client with the greater proportion of risk relative to the other two contract strategies. 
P 16 explained that despite this feature of CS 3, this option is expected to demand the 
highest mark-up. 
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Project schedule. P16 virtually replicated the project schedule provided in the 
questionnaires (which was estimated for CS 1) for all three contract strategies. The 
project schedule estimated for each contract strategy accounted for each contract 
strategy's different time estimates, but this was the only aspect used to distinguish 
between their impact on the project schedule. The estimated project schedules 
indicated that P16 perceived that the project was likely to be completed within a 
similar period if CS 2 or CS 3 was used, but the project duration would be longer if 
CS I was used. Another significant aspect of the schedule estimates was that P16 
considered that under all three contract strategies the design would be complete 
before construction commenced. 
4.4.3.1.2.3 The reaction of P 16 to the results 
Figure 4.8 shows the results calculated from the estimates provided by P16. The results 
for each evaluated contract strategy are presented as a contour plot. 
P16 stated that he did not expect the mean price value for CS 2 to be slightly higher 
than that of CS 1. P16 expressed that this presumption was based upon experience. He 
indicated that he expected a Design-Build type arrangement, for this type of project, to 
induce the lowest project price relative to the other two contract strategy options. 
He did not wish to review or revise his original estimates. With the exception of the 
price results for CS2, P 16 considered the results provided an adequate representation of 
his perception about the differences between the three contract strategies. 
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4.4.3.2 Data gainedfroin Questionnaire 2 
Section 4.3.4 described Questionnaire 2 and a copy of Questionnaire 2 is provided in 
Appendix A. Questionnaire 2 requests the respondent to evaluate any contract strategies 
for a project that the respondent had been involved in. Therefore, in addition to the 
industrialists' estimates and their justifications, the responses to Questionnaire 2 
includes details of the project and contract strategies which the respondent chose to 
consider (in contrast to Questionnaire IB that provided these details). 
The data gained from the four industrialists who completed Questionnaire 2 (P4, P12, 
P14 and P15) are reported in the subsequent sub-sections. 
The questionnaire responses provided by one of the four industrialists (P15) who 
completed Questionnaire 2 are reported in detail. Meanwhile the other three 
industrialists' questionnaire responses are summarised. 
4.4.3.2.1 Questionnaire responsesfi-oin industrialist P15 
The following sub-sections describe the questionnaire responses from P15 in detail. A 
copy of the questionnaire completed by P 15 is provided in Appendix C. 
4.4.3.2.1.1 Description of the decision problem considered bY P 15 
The project was described as a learning resource centre (i. e. a library building). The 
building was built on a brown-field site located in a city centre. The project was a one- 
off and P15 claimed that the project was highly complex. It required an innovative 
design and the accessibility of the site presented a problem. 
The client had some construction experience and had its own in-house project 
management team. The project brief was complete at the conclusion of the project's 
feasibility study. The client stipulated high standards with respect to the functionality 
and aesthetics of the building. 
Table 4.7 outlijies details of the contract strategies evaluated by P15. 
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F 
Organisational structure Traditional 
Tender process Competitive single stage based on full bill of quantities 
Pri(mv inc(hell'i sill 
Orgarusalional struciurc Managenicnt Contract 
Tender process Competitive on the basis of management fees 
(management contractor) 
Tender process Competitive on the basis of a specification and drawings 
(each works contractor) 
Pricing mechanism Fixed percentage of the construction price 
(management contractor) 
pricing mechanism Lump sum or cost plus fixed fee 
(works contractors) 
Table4.7 The contract strategies chosen and evaluated by P15 
4.4.3.2.1.2 The estimates provided by P 15 
Figure 4.9 shows the estimates provided by P 15. The notes below clafify why some of 
the values featured in Figure 4.9 are not written down in the actual questionnaire 
completed by P 15 (which is included in Appendix C). 
Notes about the estimatesý 
I. P15 estimated most likely values for the design cost, tender process cost and 
transaction costs. However, rather than estimating minimum and maximum values for 
each of these individual cost elements, P 15 estimated the minimum and maximum 
values of the total sum of the design, tender and transaction costs. Therefore the 
minimum and maximum values of each these individual cost elements were defived by 
distfibuting the estimated total range between the three cost elements in proportion to 
the relative level of each cost element's most likely value. 
2.1315 only specified the most likely values for CS 2. When asked to specify the 
minimurn and maximum values, P 15 stated that the minimum and maximum values for 
each element would cover the same percentage variation from the most likely value as 
the minimum and maximum values estimated for CS 1. 
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4.4.3.2.1.3 Reasoning behind the estimates provided by P 15 
Design cost. The most likely cost of the design for both CS I and CS 2 were 
estimated at E400k. P15 reported that the same designer would be appointed for 
either contract strategy. The designers in mind had previous experience with a 
similar project. There also appeared to be scope to benefit from this particular 
designer's knowledge of the project's locality. 
Design dtiration. The most likely duration of the design process was estimated at 26 
weeks for CS I and 52 weeks for CS 2. P15 illustrated in the project schedule 
estimate that CS 2 facilitates fast-track construction. Therefore the design duration 
estimate for CS 2 reflected the design progressing alongside the construction. 
Tenderprocess costs. The client's most likely tender process costs was estimated at 
; E60k for CS I and fI 00k for CS 2. P 15 asserted that the cost of appointing both the 
main contractor under CS I and the management contractor under CS 2 would be 
roughly the same. The additional cost of E40k estimated for CS 2 accounted for the 
likely costs incurred for appointing the works contractors. P15 claimed that although 
both contract strategies entail subcontracting the client pays the associated tender 
costs more directly under CS 2. 
Teiider process ditration. The duration of the tender process was estimated at 
10 weeks for CS I and 40 weeks for CS 2. P 15 explained that the management 
contractor in CS 2 would typically be appointed sooner and quicker than the main 
contractor in CS 1. The protracted tender process estimated for CS 2 was intended to 
represent the total time during which the works contractors would be appointed 
intermittently. 
Traiisactimi costs. The most likely value of the transaction costs was estimated at 
E60k for both CS I and CS 2. P15 claimed that the transaction costs estimate was 
difficult because a client's administration is not regarded as a collective package of 
work. 
Collstriiction price. The most likely construction price was estimated at f6M for 
CS I and E6.6M for CS 2. P 15 perceived that CS I was the more appropriate contract 
strategy to use relative to CS 2 because of the project circumstances. P15 
acknowledged that CS 2 may generate some cost and time savings relative to CS I 
owing to the appointment of tile management contractor at the pre-construction 
stage. However, P 15 asserted that these savings under CS 2 would be diminished by 
the additional costs and time expected to arise from an incomplete design when 
construction commences. P15 considered that since the designer had previous 
experience of a similar project and possessed valuable knowledge about the project's 
locality, the designer-led approach of CS 1 would have a positive effect on the cost 
and time performance of the project. 
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Construction ditration. The most likely duration of the construction process was 
estimated at 65 weeks for CS I and 60 weeks for CS 2. P15 specified during the 
project description that the project presented a difficulty with respect to site access. 
P15 perceived that if CS 2 was chosen to procure the project the management 
contractor appointed at the pre-construction stage was likely to suppress the site 
access problem and optimise the project plan. However, P15 asserted that the 
measures implemented by the management contractor to reduce the duration of the 
construction process relative to CS I would contribute to the higher construction 
price estimated for CS 2. 
Contractor's mark-up. The main contractor's most likely mark-up for CS I was 
estimated at 5% of the construction price. With regards CS 2, the management 
contractor's most likely fee was estimated at 1% of the construction price. P15 
defended these estimates by claiming that, generally, CS I allocates more risk to the 
main contractor than CS 2 allocates to the management contractor. 
Project schedule. The most likely project duration was calculated at 101 weeks for 
CS 1 and 72 weeks for CS 2. P 15 acknowledged that CS 2 would enable the 
construction to commence much earlier than CS I could. However, P15 reiterated 
that this was expected to hinder the execution of the project and give rise to 
additional costs. 
4.4.3.2.1.4 The reaction of P 15 to the calculated results 
Figure 4.10 shows the results calculated from the estimates provided by P15. The 
results for each evaluated contract strategy are presented as a contour plot. 
P15 indicated that the difference between the contract strategies' most likely price and 
duration values were as expected. However, P15 considered that the maximum duration 
of CS 1 displayed in Figure 4.10 was excessive. Nevertheless, following a review of the 
original estimates, P15 believed that his estimates were reasonable. 
P 15 made a number of references to the project's actual contract strategy decision. P 15 
explained that the client had prioritised the project quality and price requirements ahead 
of the time criterion. In addition, the client was prepared to pay a moderately higher 
price for CS 2 than CS I because the client perceived that the appointment of the 
management contractor under CS 2 would lead to a higher standard of quality. In 
contrast, P15 perceived that the designer-led approach of CS I was the better option 
because P 15 considered that it would induce better quality and a lower price. 
However, on reflection of the results, P15 appeared to be reconsidering which of the 
two contract strategies was the better option. P15 highlighted that although the client 
had not prioritised the time aspect of the project, the maximum project duration 
depicted in Figure 4.10 would have been deemed unacceptable. P 15 was also unsettled 
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that Figure 4.10 shows the maximum duration for CS 2 as being approximately the same 
as the minimum duration for CS 1. 
P 15 reviewed the original estimates again and declared that the two contract strategies' 
maximum time values estimated for each element should have received more attention. 
P 15 declined to revise the estimates. 
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Figure4.10 Results calculated from the estimates provided by P15 
4.4.3.2.2 Queslionnaire responses. from the illd"strialisis P4 
The following sub-sections summarise the questionnaire responses from P4. A copy of 
the questionnaire completed by P4 is provided in Appendix C. 
4.4.3.2.2.1 Description of the decision problem considered by P4 
The project was described as a 30,000 square foot retail store. The building was built on 
a green-field site located in the centre of a city. The project was a one-off and P14 
regarded the project as being of medium complexity. It was necessary to carry out 
enabling works to stabilise a cliff face (50 metres high) and embankment that surrounded 
the site. 
The client was a property developer. The client had similarly developed an adjacent site 
ten years previous to this new project. Although the client had some construction 
experience, it had no in-house resources to directly contribute to the project. 
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The client stipulated medium standards with respect to the functionality of the building. 
The project brief was fixed by the occupier at the project outset. 
Table 4.8 outlines details of the contract strategies evaluated bV P4. 
7 
Organisational structure rý Traditional 
, Tender process Competitive on the basis of a full bill of quantities 
Pricing int-1-11, sill 
Orgamsational. %fruc no-c 
Lump sum 
LXýsign-Bufld 
Tender process Competitive on the basis of drawings and specification 
pri(vng mc(hwum? i 
r0rXanisationol 
%tr"(11-c 
Lump ý; uni 
Nlaiiagcnicnt Contract 
Tender process 
(management contractor and 
works contractors) 
Negotiated on the basis of drawings and specification 
pricing mechanism (management 
contractor and works conirm lors) . 
Lump sum 
Table 4.8 The contract strategies chosen and evaluated by P4 
4.4.3.2.2.2 Summary of the reasoning behind the estimates provided by P4 
The actual values estimated by P4 can be found in Appendix C. This section outlines the 
key distinctions made between the evaluated contract strategies. 
P4 considered that the project's design was relatively straightforward because of the type 
of project (i. e. retail unit). Therefore P4 claimed that the appointment of design 
consultants to both undertake and manage the design would be unnecessarily expensive 
and thus estimated the design cost under CS I at 125k higher than that estimated for CS 
and CS 3. 
P4 claimed that the cost of construction to the contractor would effectively be the same 
under all three contract strategies (f I M). However, he perceived the construction price 
would be the least under CS I and the highest under CS 3. This is because P4 asserted 
that CS I through to CS 3 allocated an increasing proportion of the project risk to the 
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contractor. In the case of CS 3, P4 regarded the management contractor, rather than the 
works contractors, as being exposed to the bulk of project risk. 
P4 estimated the contractor's average mark-up at 10%, 15% and 20% of the 
construction cost for CS 1, CS 2 and CS 3, respectively. P4 expressed that the mark-up 
estimates reflected his perception about each contract strategies' general division of risk 
between the client and contractor. He also claimed that the higher price values estimated 
for CS 3 reflected the fact that the construction and overall project was likely to be 
completed within a shorter period of time than if the other two contract strategies were 
used. In addition, P4 claimed that the project was too small to use CS 3. 
4.4.3.2.2.3 The reaction of P4 to the calculated results 
Figure 4.11 shows the results calculated from the estimates provided by P4. The results 
for each evaluated contract strategy are presented as a contour plot. 
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Figure4.11 Results calculated from the estimates provided by P4 
Basically, P4 expressed agreement with the results. He considered the results reflected 
quite accurately his perception about the differences between the three contract 
strategies that were evaluated. In addition, P4 conceded that his perceptions about the 
three contract strategies were generally applicable to most projects, not just the retail 
store development considered in this exercise. 
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4.4.3.2.3 Questionnaire responses. from the industrialists P12 
The following sub-sections summarise the questionnaire responses from P 12. A copy of 
the questionnaire completed by P 12 Is provided In Appendix C. 
4.4.3.2.3.1 Description of the decision problem considered by P 12 
The project was described as the fitting out of an airport lounge. It required an 
innovative, one-off design. P 12 described the project as being of medium complexity and 
highlighted the fact that site-security was a very important requirement and hindrance. 
The client had some construction experience and was very high profile. The client had in- 
house designers and project managers The client stipulated high standards with respect 
to the functionality and aesthetics of the building. The project brief was fixed at the time 
oftender. 
Table 4.9 outlines details of the contract strategies evaluated by P 12. 
Organisaflonal. vIrm lure Traditional 
Tender pro(-(,. sý% Two-stagc negotiated 
First stage - preliminaries 
Second stage - drawings and specification 
Prj(111, ý,, Fiwd price 
I radI11011,11 
Tender process Single stage based on full bill of quantities 
pricing mechanism Fixcd price 
Table4.9 The contract strategies chosen and evaluated by P12 
4.4.3.2.3.2 Summary of the reasoning behind the estimates provided by P 12 
The actual values estimated by P12 can be found in Appendix C. This section outlines 
the key distinctions made between the evaluated contract strategies. 
P12 chose to evaluate two contract strategies where the only difference was the type of 
tender process employed for each contract strategy. P 12 simply demonstrated that, for 
the project under consideration, a negotiated two-stage tender process could reduce the 
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overall project duration because the tender process can take place whilst the design is 
ongoing. 
4.4.3.2.3.3 The reaction of P 12 to the calculated results 
Figure 4.12 shows the results calculated from the estimates provided by P12. The results 
for each evaluated contract strategy are presented as a contour plot. 
P12 said that the difference between the two contract strategies' most likely duration 
values appeared to be reasonable estimates 
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Figure 4.12 Results calculated from the estimates provided by P 12 
4.4.3.2.4 Questionnaire responses. from the industrialists P14 
The following sub-sections summarise the questionnaire responses from P14. A copy of 
the questionnaire completed by P 14 is provided In Appendix C. 
4.43.2.4.1 Description of the decision problem considered by P 14 
The project was described as a lift-footbridge over water. It was to be built on a fairly 
developed, but old, quayside close to a city centre. The project was a one-off and P14 
claimed that the project was complex, especially its mechanical and electrical services. 
The conceptual design was the product of a design competition. 
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The client had limited construction experience. The client had its own in-house engineer 
and quantity surveyor. The client had a strict construction budget of 14.5M and was 
keen to transfer all risk to the construction contractor. 
According to P14 the client had no intention to make changes once a construction 
contractor was appointed. The client stipulated high standards with respect to the 
functionality, durability and aesthetics of the bridge. 
Table 4.10 outlines details of the contract strategies evaluated by P 14. 
Organisationalstructure Traditional 
Tender process 
Competitive. single stage based on full bill of quantities. 
drawings and specification 
Jýrjcillgy mcý ham S/11 
Organisalional. %fru(Itire 
Unit pricc 
LX, %, elop &, Bmld 
Tender process Negotiated on the basis of drawings and fixed construction 
price LPricing 
mechanism Fixed price 
Table4.10 The contract strategies chosen and evaluated by P14 
4.4.3.2.4.2 Summary of the reasoning behind the estimates provided by P14 
The actual values estimated by P14 can be found in Appendix C. This section outlines 
the key distinctions made between the evaluated contract strategies. 
P14 estimated a higher design cost for CS 2. This is because P14 declared that the 
contractor's design services additional to the conceptual design consultants would result 
in a higher cost than if the design was undertaken solely by the design consultants. 
However, P14 asserted that the contractor's input into the design would lead to 
significant cost and time savings. 
P14 claimed that the contractor's design contribution under CS 2 would ensure that the 
design was produced efficiently, and that the majority of construction risks would be 
ccengineered-out" of the project. In other words, P14 expected the construction cost to 
be significantly less for CS 2 than CS 1. He estimated that the construction price under 
CS 2 would be fO. 5M less than that under CS I and acknowledged that the estimated 
price for CS 2 included a larger mark-up than the price estimated for CS 1. 
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P14 estimated that the design would take 3 months less to complete under CS 2. In 
addition, P14 made reference to the facility of CS 2 to overlap design and construction 
when he estimated that the project would be completed within sixty percent of the 
project duration estimated for CS 1. 
P14 acknowledged that under CS 2 the client required an agent to monitor the 
construction on behalf of the client. Subsequently P 14 estImated II Ok for the transaction 
costs under CS I and estimated f20k for the transaction costs under CS 2. 
4.4.3.2.4.3 The reaction of P 14 to the calculated results 
Figure 4.13 shows the results calculated from the estimates provided by P14. The results 
for each evaluated contract strategy are presented as a contour plot. 
P14 confirmed that the results provided an accurate representation of his perception 
about the differences between the two contract strategies for the considered project. P14 
also expressed support for the explicitness of the results. He said that it would have been 
very helpful to have shown these results to the client of the project when the initial 
contract strategy-related decisions were made. 
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4.5 Discussion and conclusions of the empirical research 
The empirical research set out to gain insights into the construction industry's typical 
approach to contract strategy evaluation and to obtain the views of industrialists on the 
feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach. This section summarises the key 
results of the empirical research. It offers explanations for certain results and discusses 
their implications for the feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach. 
Section 4.5.1 briefly addresses the significance of the response-rate to the empirical 
research. Section 4.5.2 reviews the industrialists' ability to extend their normal practice 
to evaluate contract strategies quantitatively. Section 4.5.2 also highlights the data that 
indicated the capacity of the quantitative approach to aid contract strategy selection. 
Finally, section 4.5.3 focuses upon the insights gained from the empirical study that 
suggest how the research into the quantitative approach could develop. 
4.5.1 The participants of the empirical research 
Seventy five industrialists were asked to participate in the empirical research, of whom 
fourteen agreed to be interviewed. It was apparent from a relatively early stage that 
obtaining the views of a large sample of industrialists was not possible. However, it was 
considered that the sample of fourteen provided sufficient information to facilitate a 
meaningful investigation. 
Many of the industrialists who did not participate in the research expressed an interest in 
the subject of contract strategy selection. The industrialists' leading reason why they 
chose not to contribute to the research was unavailability of their time. The fourteen 
industrialists who participated in the research may have had more available time, but 
other reasons which may have incited their participation include: 
an enthusiasm for research in general; 
a belief that contract strategy selection is an important decision; 
a belief that their current approach to contract strategy selection needs to be 
improved; or 
a perception that their participation in the research would inforrn them about a new 
approach to contract strategy evaluation. 
4.5.2 The feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach 
The feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach is examined in relation to several 
issues. Section 4.5.2.1 discusses the industrialists' ability to differentiate between 
contract strategies in terms of their probable cost and time effects. Perceptions about the 
practical implications of the quantitative approach are presented in section 4.5.2.2. 
Section 4.5.2.3 reviews the reasoning used by the questionnaire respondents to justify 
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their quantitative estimates. Empirical research results that support the decision-aid 
capabilities of the quantitative approach are the subject of section 4.5.2.4. 
4.5.21 Differentiation bet)veen contract strategies ill terills of cost and tiftle 
All of the industrialists believed that different contract strategies could have different 
impacts upon the price and duration of a project. Some of the industrialists reported that 
they had experience of making quantitative estimates of contract strategies' potential 
impacts upon the overall project price and duration. During the interviews, the majority 
of the industrialists claimed that that they could estimate, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, the impact that a contract strategy's general division of risk and facility 
to fast-track was likely to have on a project's overall price and duration. However, it 
was evident that none had previously estimated, quantitatively, contract strategies' 
potential impacts upon a series of cost and time elements which cumulated to the project 
price and duration. 
It appeared that the industrialists' evaluation of contract strategies would typically 
comprise subjective assumptions which made express reference to contract strategies' 
probable cost and time effects. However, their evaluation processes also comprised 
assumptions which made reference to criteria other than cost and time. These other 
criteria related to project circumstance (e. g. project size, project complexity, client type, 
market conditions, availability of particular contractors, etc. ). Despite this wide variety 
of decision criteria, all of the industrialists recognised that the ultimate aim of contract 
strategy selection was to enable the achievement of the client's primary objectives (i. e. 
price, time and quality targets). 
Although the empirical study provided evidence to suggest that contract strategy 
evaluation can be undertaken in the context of cost and time effects, all of the 
industrialists expressed concerns about the uncertainty surrounding highly-intuitive 
qualitative and quantitative estimates of contract strategies' probable cost and time 
effects. There was a fairly common view that many of the issues addressed during 
contract strategy evaluation cannot be expressed in the qualitative context of cost and 
time effects. This view could suggest that subjective assumptions about contract 
strategies are not always rationalised in terms of the client's primary objectives (one of 
the deficiencies perceived to exist in the industry's typical approach to contract strategy 
selection - see section 2.3.2). 
During the course of the empirical study, several industrialists' concerns about 
uncertainty appeared to have been eased because they demonstrated that they were 
quite-readily prepared to make qualitative estimates about contract strategies' probable 
cost and time effects. Some of the industrialists stated outright that many of their 
subjective assumptions about contract strategies which make reference to decision 
criteria, other than cost and time, could be interpreted as having cost and time 
implications. Meanwhile, other industrialists provided example applications of this 
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theory. For example, a large number of the industrialists claimed that the 
appropriateness of a contract strategy, in the light of a particular client, can be referred 
to in terms of a positive or negative effect upon the project's price and duration. In 
addition, four of the six industrialists who completed questionnaires estimated cost and 
time values that accounted for the potential effect of appointing a contractor during the 
early stages of a project. 
Although, effectively, all fourteen industrialists expressed some reservations about the 
feasibility of the quantitative approach, a few appreciated that the approach aimed to 
impose order into their current evaluation process. None of the industrialists openly 
expressed concerns about their current approach to contract strategy evaluation. 
However, three industrialists who initially offered dissenting views eventually became 
more in favour of the quantitative approach as they became more familiar with its 
principles. These three industrialists, together with four others, provided some positive 
appraisal of the quantitative approach. The fact that six out of these seven industrialists 
completed questionnaires indicated that they had understood the quantitative approach 
and thus provided informed views about its feasibility and utility. 
The industrialists who completed questionnaires demonstrated that they could translate 
subjective assumptions about contract strategies into quantitative estimates of contract 
strategies' potential cost and time effects. It is important, however, to recognise that the 
questionnaires could only aim to provide a very basic simulation of an actual contract 
strategy selection process at the outset of a project. 
it has already been acknowledged that all fourteen industrialists interviewed indicated 
that they perceived different contract strategies could have different impacts on the price 
and duration of projects. The graphical presentations of the results calculated from the 
six industrialists' questionnaire estimates (section 4.4.3) illustrate that different contract 
strategies can be expected to have significantly different impacts upon the price and 
duration of projects. For example, the results calculated from the questionnaire 
estimates provided by PIO show that the project price under the Management Contract 
type contract strategy could be a maximum of 24% more than the price for the same 
project under the Design-Build type contract strategy (see Figure 4.6). 
The questionnaires required the industrialists to estimate contract strategies' impacts 
upon a set of cost and time elements which cumulate to the project price and duration 
(e. g. design cost and duration, tender process costs and duration, etc. ). Therefore the six 
industrialists who completed questionnaires demonstrated that they could discern which 
aspects of a project were likely to be affected by a contract strategy. The completed 
questionnaires also indicated that, in a given contract strategy decision problem, 
different contract strategies could be evaluated consistently against the same set of 
criteria (i. e. the effects that different contract strategies are likely to have on the same 
set of cost and time elements). 
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4.5.22 Practicality of the quantitative approach 
The industrialists indicated that their normal approach to contract strategy evaluation 
relies upon intuitive decision logic. They focus upon issues that are identified, 
intuitively, as the most important issues in the decision problem presented by each 
project. Some of the industrialists also appeared to attach little importance to contract 
strategy decisions made at the outset of projects. They claimed that these decisions, 
typically, did not have as much impact on a project as those decisions made at later 
project stages (e. g. allocation of particular risks, which organisations to appoint as 
construction contractors). These industrialists acknowledged that a contract strategy was 
a compilation of components. However, they apparently perceived the interrelationship 
between the components did not warrant consideration when the early contract strategy 
decisions were made. 
Many of the industrialists claimed that their current approach to contract strategy 
evaluation was more efficient than the quantitative approach. Some of the industrialists 
asserted that their evaluation processes had to be efficient owing to the time and money 
constraints, particularly prevalent at the outset of projects. In contrast, some 
industrialists recognised the need for improvement in the quality of decisions made at 
the project outset. They perceived this would ensure projects were managed more 
efficiently. 
The insights gained into the industrialists' current approach to contract strategy 
evaluation indicated that they reduced the potential intricacy of the process to a level 
which they considered was manageable and led to satisfactory decisions. However, the 
following section reports that the six questionnaire respondents provided evidence to 
support the perception that numerous deficiencies are inherent in the industry's typical 
approach to contract strategy selection (see section 2.3.2). 
4.5.2.3 Rationalisation of contract strategy evaluation 
The industrialists who completed questionnaires were asked to justify the cost and time 
values that they estimated. These estimate-justifications provided a further indication of 
the feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach. They also provided valuable 
insights into the industrialists' current approach to contract strategy evaluation. 
All six industrialists provided a reason to explain all instances where they had estimated 
different cost and time levels for different contract strategies. The reasons given 
explained Why they perceived each contract strategy was likely to have a particular type 
of effect on the cost and time elements (i. e. whether one contract strategy was likely to 
induce a saving or loss relative to another contract strategy). However, the industrialists 
did not explain why they perceived each contract strategy was likely to have a particular 
level of effect on the cost and time elements (i. e. what size of saving or loss was likely 
to be made). For example, P16 claimed that the design cost for the office building 
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project presented in Questionnaire IB would be less under a Design-Build type contract 
strategy than a Traditional type contract strategy because having the same party design 
and build the project reduces the amount of detailed design. He did not, however, 
explain why the estimated range of design cost values for the Design-Build type 
contract strategy were specifically ; E40k lower than the range estimated for the 
Traditional type contract strategy. 
The questionnaire responses from industrialist P15 included a claim that cost and time 
savings could be attained if a specific design organisation was appointed under a 
particular contract strategy. However, there were very few other estimate-justifications 
that accounted for a project's particular circumstances. Rather than addressing the 
specific details of each contract strategy and project's circumstances, it appeared that 
the estimate-justifications were dominated by general perceptions about broad types of 
contract strategies. In fact, P4 acknowledged that the justifications for his estimates 
applied to the same contract strategy types on most projects, not just the project 
considered for the questionnaire. 
There was a suspicion that the industrialists may associate the particular details of 
standard contract forms with their respective organisational structure labels, and vice 
versa. In other words, it appeared that the industrialists might have a tendency to 
categorise their knowledge about contract strategies under very broad headings such as 
Traditional, Design-Build and Management Contracting. 
This theory was supported by the virtually consistent ranking order between the mean 
project price and duration calculated for the contract strategies that classify under the 
categories of Traditional, Design-Build and Management Contracting. The general 
trends observed between the results calculated from five of the industrialists' 
questionnaire responses were: 
1. the contract strategies' mean project price in the following ascending order: 
Design-Build, Traditional and Management Contract; and 
2. the contract strategies' mean project duration in the following ascending order: 
Management Contract, Design-Build and Traditional. 
The consistency between the five sets of results was compounded by the relative 
agreement between the industrialists' estimate-justifications for each contract strategy 
type. For example, all five industrialists recognised that the project duration was 
primarily dependent upon whether the contract strategy facilitates fast-track 
construction. In addition, several of the industrialists made some reference to the 
potential cost and time savings which can ensue from the early involvement of a 
contractor. The industrialists also had similar views on the subject of risk allocation and 
contractors' mark-up levels for each contract strategy that classifies under the 
Traditional, Design-Build and Management Contract categories. It appeared that the 
industrialists interpreted a contract strategy's general division of risk between the client 
and main contracting party from the contract strategy's general organisational structure 
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label and, to a lesser extent, from the pricing mechanism type used to remunerate the 
principal contractor. 
Assuming that the industrialists have a tendency to relate to broadly-defined contract 
strategy types and thereby do not evaluate contract strategies at a particularly detailed 
level, it may be inferred that the industrialists select contract strategies from a very 
limited range of options. Section 2.3.2 reported that the industry's approach to contract 
strategy selection was defective in that a decision-maker, typically, has a limited 
appreciation of plausible decision options when selecting a contract strategy. 
It is important to remain aware that the primary purpose of the questionnaires was for 
industrialists to translate their subjective distinctions between contract strategies into 
cost and time estimates. It was appreciated that the questionnaires did not constitute an 
ideal test of whether quantitative estimates of contract strategies' potential cost and time 
impacts on a project would be rationalised as much as possible. For example, the two 
industrialists who completed Questionnaire IB displayed difficulties in relating to the 
hypothetical office building project. This was expected since the questionnaires could 
only provide a relatively small amount of information about the project. Questionnaire 2 
was designed to overcome this disadvantage of Questionnaire 113. However, because the 
respondents of Questionnaire 2 were permitted to consider a project which they had 
previously been involved with, it was probable that their estimates and reasoning were 
influenced by actual project events. 
The industrialists' reference to broad contract strategy types and failure to account for 
the case-specifics of each decision problem could be attributed to the limitations of the 
questionnaires. Alternatively, the estimate-justifi cations may be considered to represent 
the industrialists' typical approach to contract strategy selection. Imprecise and 
general ly-appl icable decision logic were reported in section 2.3.2 as deficiencies 
perceived to be inherent in the industry's typical approach to contract strategy selection. 
The industrialists' estimate-justifications also indicated the existence of another 
deficiency in the industry's typical approach to contract strategy selection - failure to 
rationalise decision uncertainty (see section 2.3.2). The six industrialists who completed 
questionnaires gave little explanation as to why they had estimated the specific range 
for each cost and time element. All six industrialists made some attempt to account for 
the possible range of values that each cost and time element may assume without 
acknowledging which specific events could bring about the values within the estimated 
range. For example, P16 did not explain why the design cost could be as low as E660k 
and as high as E810k if the Design-Build type contract strategy was used on the office 
building project. 
One may attribute this last observation again to the limitations of the questionnaires, but 
it may also be attributed to the industrialists' failure to understand, and appreciate the 
relevance of, probabilistic techniques. Four of the six industrialists (P4, PIO, P12 and 
P16) estimated minimum, most likely and maximum values for all of the cost and time 
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elements, but it was apparent that only two of these industrialists (P4 and P16) 
appreciated the relevance of this technique. Two of the six industrialists (P14 and P15) 
did not estimate the minimum, most likely and maximum values for all of the cost and 
time elements. Instead they focused upon the most likely value. When prompted to 
estimate the minimum and maximum values, both P14 and P15 estimated some of these 
values in terms of a percentage decrease and increase relative to the most likely value. 
4.5.24 Decision aidprovided by the quantitative approach 
Two of the interviewed industrialists stated that the quantitative approach served a 
useful purpose in breaking contract strategy selection down into a series of sub- 
decisions where each sub-decision was an appraisal of a contract strategy with respect 
to a project's specific cost and time element (e. g. design cost, tender process duration, 
etc. ). This appeared to suggest that their current approach to contract strategy selection 
was unstructured. 
Four industrialists commended the quantitative approach for its focus upon contract 
strategy decisions made at the outset of projects. These industrialists regarded good, 
early project decisions as prerequisites for a successful ly-managed project. 
Many of the industrialists showed particular interest in the set of results from an 
example application of the quantitative approach. They recognised the value in the 
explicitness of the results. Ten of the fourteen industrialists made favourable references 
about the overview of the likely differences between contract stmtegies which the 
results provided. 
It was suspected that some of the industrialists would have been disappointed by the fact 
that the results attained from an application of the quantitative approach do not express, 
outright, which contract strategy is the best option to select. Surprisingly, only one 
industrialist made reference to this point. However, seven industrialists revealed 
reservations about the value of the results. The industrialists were aware that the results 
were obtained by the accumulation of a contmct strategist's estimates. Hence these 
seven industrialists were perturbed that any results of the quantitative approach would 
simply reflect, and even magnify, the high level of uncertainty and subjectivity in the 
contract strategist's estimates. 
This last response suggests that some of the industrialists did not perceive that the 
process involved in arriving at the results would provide any benefit to the decision 
process. Seveml industrialists refuted the attempts of the quantitative approach to 
improve their understanding of the impacts that contract stmtegies have on projects. 
Some claimed that a high level of uncertainty and subjectivity would always surround 
contract stmtegy selection because every new project presents a different decision 
problem. However, two of the six industrialists who completed questionnaires 
166 
demonstrated some of the potential of the quantitative approach to aid the decision 
process. 
When the industrialists P15 and P16 were shown the results calculated from their own 
questionnaire estimates, their reactions revealed that they had not fully appreciated the 
implications that their estimates of individual project elements would have on the 
overall project price and duration results. P15 claimed that the maximum project 
duration value calculated for one of the evaluated contract strategies was too high (see 
Figure 4.10). The project under consideration was one that P15 had been involved in. 
Effectively, he acknowledged that the information about the contract strategy's most 
pessimistic impact on the project's duration, had it been explicitly evaluated at the time, 
may have influenced the actual contract strategy selection process (section 4.4.3.2.1.4). 
Meanwhile, P16 experienced a similar enlightenment when shown the results calculated 
from his own estimates (see Figure 4.8). P16 believed that the difference between the 
mean project price for two of the contract strategies evaluated should differ from that 
presented in the results (section 4.4.3.1.2.3). 
Therefore one may interpret these two industrialists' reactions to their results as an 
indication that an elemental breakdown of the evaluation process can provide different, 
and possibly more valuable, insights to assist the decision process than an 
all-encompassing intuitive evaluation. Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
industrialists' recognition of these discrepancies between their intuition, before and after 
reviewing their results, would not have been possible if the evaluation process had not 
been as explicit as that demanded by the quantitative approach. 
It may be concluded that the combined process of applying the quantitative approach 
and the subsequent review of the estimates can make the decision-maker more aware of 
the significance of their estimates. Therefore one would expect this in turn to motivate 
contract strategy selectors to rationalise their estimates as much as possible. 
4.5.3 Implications of the empirical research to the prototype model 
The empirical research confirmed that the quantitative approach is different from the 
industry's current approach to contract strategy evaluation. There were signs that this 
difference was perceived by the industrialists as too great to overcome. Although the 
questionnaire respondents demonstrated an ability to adapt their current approach to 
contract strategy evaluation to a quantitative evaluation, many of the deficiencies 
associated with contract strategy selection practice were not eliminated by the 
application of the quantitative approach (section 4.5.2.3). 
The questionnaires required the quantitative approach to be applied in the same fonnat 
as the prototype model (described in Chapter 3). As a result, it appeared necessary to 
review the design of the prototype model. 
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Section 4.5.2.3 reported that the questionnaire respondents estimated cost and time 
values that accounted for their generally-applicable perceptions about broadly-defined 
contract strategy types (e. g. Traditional, Design-Build). Virtually no express reference 
was made to the particular circumstances of the respective projects. Therefore the 
design of the prototype model had to be reviewed with respect to: 
" precision with which contract strategies were defined and simulated by the model; 
and 
" addressing the specific circumstances of each contract strategy decision problem. 
Sections 4.4.2.5.2 and 4.5.2.3 indicated that the majority of the industrialists did not 
fully understand the concept of probability distribution estimates. It was suspected that 
this quantification method was too abstract because in each triangular probability 
distribution estimate a decision-maker was required to account for the uncertainty 
inherent in the cost/time element as well as reflect the potential impact of the particular 
contract strategy under evaluation. Therefore it appeared appropriate to examine means 
of making the quantification process more intuitive to a contract strategy decision- 
maker. 
A number of design compromises were made when the prototype model was developed. 
Some of these design compromises coincided with the model limitations highlighted by 
the empirical research. Following an assessment of the prototype model, the results of 
the empirical research and the nature of the contract strategy decision problem, it was 
decided to design a new model. The refined model facilitates the application of a 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation in a different format to that 
facilitated by the prototype model. The next chapter describes the refinements made to 
the prototype model. 
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5. Model Rerinements 
Chapter 3 described the prototype model designed to facilitate the application of a 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. This model was evaluated both 
academically (for example, see section 3.3.3) and, through an empirical study, by 
industrialists (see section 4.4). There were indications that the quantitative approach 
embodied within the prototype model was valid and useful. 
Since it was perceived important to establish, demonstrate and test the principles of the 
quantitative approach, several design compromises were made during the development 
of the prototype model. The major limitations of the model included: 
0 inflexibility with respect to the contract strategies that can be simulated and thus 
evaluated; 
imprecision in the definition and simulation of contract strategy options; 
inflexibility owing to constraints on the number of activities which may be used to 
simulate a project; 
the uncertainty inherent in each cost and time element has to be implicitly accounted 
for in the triangular probability distribution estimates; 
in each model simulation there is no correlation between the calculated values of 
project price and project duration; and 
there is no facility to account for dependencies between the individual cost and time 
elements. 
The decision to refine the model was based upon the findings of the preceding research 
into the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. Reference to these 
research findings was again required in order to: 
1. identify which limitations of the prototype model were critical to the validity and 
usability of the model; and 
2. design the simulation techniques to enable the necessary refinements to be 
incorporated. 
The first of these steps in upgrading the model involved consideration of the general 
philosophy of a quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. The following 
types of questions were addressed: 
" Which general contract strategy features ought the model be able to recognise and/or 
simulate? 
" Which cost and time elements should be quantified? 
" is it possible to aid the decision-maker estimate more accurate inputs? 
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Should tile model's computations produce a more realistic output (e. g. correlation 
between cost and time)'? 
Are there model outputs, in addition to project price and duration, that are relevant 
to, and useful for, contract strategy selection'? 
The following sections of this chapter describe the simulation techniques which were 
incorporated into the refined model. These techniques were used to obtain the results 
from the example model applications featured in Chapter 6. Furthermore, the following 
descriptions also address the strategic questions posed above. 
Figure 5.1 provides a simplified breakdown of the model inputs required for each 
contract strategy evaluated in ail application of the refined model. A more detailed list 
of the model inputs is provided at the end of the chapter. It should also be noted that a 
copy of the refined model is provided in Appendix D. 
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Figure 5.1 Seven stclis of model inputs for each evaluated contract strategy 
5.1 Simulation of project performance 
As with the prototype model, the refined model simulates the cost and time perforrnance 
of projects. The refined model was designed to provide a flexible framework with which 
to attain a more sophisticated representation of a project than that attainable in the 
application of the prototype model. The type and format of model inputs have been 
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designed to assist the user and are also intended to produce additional model output to 
that of the prototype model. 
5.1.1 Elemental breakdown of projects 
In the prototype model a project was divided into the following activities: 
0 design activity; 
tender process activity; and 
up to a maximum of four construction activities. 
The model-user was required to estimate the cost and duration of each of the above 
project activities. The user was also required to estimate values for the following: 
" transaction costs; 
" project schedule (i. e. activity links); and 
" tender bid parameters. 
From these cost and time estimates the prototype model calculated the price and 
duration of the project under consideration. 
In contrast to the prototype model, the refined model provides a more flexible 
framework with which to represent a project. This is achieved through the definition of. 
" work packages; 
" activities; and 
" risks. 
This framework is described in the following sub-sections. 
I Work packages 
It is apparent from the activities listed at the beginning section 5.1.1 that the prototype 
model constrained the elemental breakdown of projects. The obligation to model the 
design activity as a single activity was considered to be a severe restriction. However, 
this restriction was justified because it was decided to provide a framework to simulate 
just three contract strategies within the prototype model (see section 3.3.2.2). Section 
5.2.1 indicates that in order to simulate a wider variety of contract strategy options, the 
model must provide a more flexible framework with which to specify and simulate the 
constituent elements of a project. 
The model was refined to enable each evaluated contract strategy to be represented as a 
series of work packages. Essentially, each work package includes a set of activities that 
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are to be assigned to a particular party. Section 5.2.1 reports the versatility of this 
facility. 
5.1.1.2 Project activities 
The model was designed to enable the user to specify any number and type of project 
activities within each work package. Therefore, for example, it is possible to model a 
project's design process as a series of activities, each of which may be undertaken by a 
different party. 
In contrast to the prototype model, it was decided not to include transaction costs as an 
explicit cost element in the refined model. This decision was governed by the perception 
that the new flexible framework, with which a project can be simulated, enables the user 
to specifically account for the issues which are expected to influence transaction costs in 
the relevant activities' cost estimates. 
5.1.1.3 project risks 
In the prototype model the user was required to estimate a triangular probability 
distribution of values (i. e. minimum, most likely and maximum values) for each cost 
and time element. Each distribution estimate was intended to account for the uncertainty 
generated by the risk(s) related to the cost/time element. 
Section 4.5.2.3 reported that the majority of industrialists who completed 
questionnaires, performed a generalised and imprecise evaluation of each contract 
strategy's risk allocation. They appeared to interpret a contract strategy's general 
division of risk between the client and main contracting party from the contract 
strategy's general organisational structure label and, to a lesser extent, from the pricing 
mechanism type used to remunerate the principal contractor. 
it was decided that a model that facilitated an explicit risk analysis was likely to aid the 
decision-maker on two levels: 
" more precise definition of each evaluated contract strategy; and 
"a greater account of each project's circumstances. 
The remainder of this section describes the risk identification stage while the subsequent 
section describes the method designed to model and analyse project risks. 
The preceding section reported that the model-user is able to specify any number and 
type of project activities in an application of the refined model. Once the activities are 
specified, the user is prompted to identify the risk, or risks, related to each activity. 
There is an option to either specify and analyse the general risk associated with an 
activity or specify and analyse more than one specific risk related to an activity. For 
example, consider the activity 'substructure construction', Table 5.1 presents two 
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alternative ways of representing the risk related to this activity. The user may opt to 
model the risk related to the activity as a whole (i. e. Option I in Table 5.1). 
Alternatively, the user may opt to model the risk related to the activity as two specific 
risks (i. e. Option 2 in Table 5.1). 
Risk specified for 'substructure construction' activity 
Option I General activity risk 
Option 2 Specific Risk 1: unforeseen ground conditions 
Specific Risk 2: unavailable plant 
Table 5.1 Alternative ways of specifying the risk related to the example activity 
'substructure construction' 
When identifying which risks to analyse it is important to separate risks that are 
allocable to different parties. This is to enable the model to analyse the effect of a 
contract strategy's risk allocation. Therefore in the above example, if the client is 
responsible for the risk of 'unforeseen ground conditions' and the contractor is 
responsible for the risk of 'unavailable plant', the user should model the specific risks, 
as opposed to the general risk. Section 5.2.2 provides further details about the model's 
capacity to simulate a contract strategy's risk allocation. 
5.1.2 Quantification of project activities and risks 
In the prototype model the majority of cost and time elements were activities. Therefore 
the model-user was required to estimate a triangular probability distribution of values 
(i. e. minimum, most likely and maximum values) for the cost and duration of a series of 
activities. 
Sections 4.4.2.5.2 and 4.5.2.3 indicated that the majority of the industrialists did not 
fully understand the concept of probability distribution estimates. The six questionnaire 
respondents were unable to explain precisely why each cost and time element could 
assume the values within the range they had estimated. 
it was inferred that the concept of triangular probability distribution estimates was too 
abstract to mitigate the industrialists' reluctance to appreciate the relevance of 
accounting for a project's cost and time uncertainty. Furthermore, the preceding section 
highlighted the fact that this quantification method inhibits an explicit risk analysis. As 
a result, it was concluded that the quantification process was likely to become more 
intuitive if it constituted a risk analysis. 
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A further limitation of the quantification method adopted by the prototype model (i. e. 
triangular probability distributions) was its failure to simulate the time-cost relationship 
of each activity. In an application of the prototype model it would be probable that the 
user's cost and time distribution estimates for each activity would reflect an implied 
time-cost relationship for the activity. For example, the occurrence of a risk event that 
causes a high estimated cost is likely to result in a correspondingly high value of the 
same activity's estimated duration. 
However, in the prototype model the activities' implied time-cost relationships were not 
accounted for in the calculation process. This is because the model was designed to 
randomly sample values from each cost and time distribution in each simulated run of a 
project. Consequently, in each simulation, the cost of an activity was independent of the 
activity's duration. It follows, therefore, that each simulated project price was 
independent of the simulated project duration. 
it was decided to design a quantification method that: 
assisted the user to model the time-cost relationship of each risk and thus each 
activity; and 
ensured that an activity's simulated cost realistically correlates with its simulated 
duration. 
The quantification process designed for the refined model requires the user to estimate a 
'base cost' and 'base duration' for each activity. These values are intended to reflect the 
cost and duration of the activity assuming the activity is not exposed to any risk. The 
model-user is then required to estimate a set of additional cost and delay values 
associated with each risk related to an activity. 
A risk's additional cost and delay values are normalised against the same risk scale. The 
risk scale is calibrated in units of 'percentage of maximum risk level occurrence 
Therefore the risk scale ranges from 0% of the maximum risk level occurrence to 100% 
of the maximum risk level occurrence. The scale is divided into four quartile levels and 
each level has been assigned a qualitative label that makes reference to a relative scale 
of consequence (see Table 5.2). The particular labels displayed in Table 5.2 may be 
considered to relate solely to major project risks. When quantifying risks, the user must 
interpret the quartile levels as appropriate. 
For each individual risk, the model-user is prompted to estimate an additional cost value 
and delay value at each quarterly risk level. The user is then required to estimate which 
of the five quarterly risk levels is the most likely level to be assumed by the risk in 
question. This single estimate defines a triangular probability distribution that dictates 
the likelihood that the risk will assume any level ranging from 0% to 100% of the 
maximum risk level occurrence. Figure 5.2a shows an example triangular probability 
distribution for the risk level. Figures 5.2b and 5.2c are example graphical 
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representations of a set of additional cost and delay values estimated for a particular 
risk. 
of max. risk level occurrence Degree of occurrence 
0% Negligible 
25% Marginal 
50% Serious 
75% Severe 
100% Critical 
Table 5.2 The quantitative and qualitative quarterly measures of risk level 
probability 
Figure 5.2a 
Probability 
distribution 
of risk 
Risk level 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% r1o ofmar. risk leveloccurrence) 
Additional cost 
Figure 5.2b 
Additional 
cost-Risk 
relationship 
Risklevcl 
0% 25% 50% 75% joO% (016 ofmax. risk level occurrence) 
Delay 
Figure 5.2c 
Delay-Risk 
relationship 
Risklevel 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% (016 ofmax. risk level occurrence) 
In a single simulation, the model generates a random number for each risk. The random 
number is used to sample a particular risk level from its distribution (Figure 5.2a). The 
sampled risk level is that which has the cumulative probability equal to the randomly 
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generated number (this is the sampling method commonly associated with Monte Carlo 
simulation (Vose, 1996)). Subsequently, the simulated additional cost and delay values 
for the respective risk are taken as those that correspond to the sampled risk level 
(Figures 5.2a and 5.2b). Linear interpolation between the additional cost and delay 
values estimated at the quarterly risk levels is used to obtain the simulated additional 
cost and delay values. 
In order to obtain the total simulated cost of an activity in a single simulation, the above 
process is repeated for each risk related to the activity. The total simulated cost of the 
activity is equal to the sum of the activity's base cost and each of its risks' simulated 
additional costs. Meanwhile, the total simulated duration of the activity is equal to the 
sum of the activity's base duration and the maximum delay value simulated from 
amongst the activity's risks. It is therefore assumed that the risk events run in parallel, 
rather than in series, but the cost of the risk events is cumulative. 
To summarise, the quantification process of the refined model requires the model-user 
to make the following estimates for each user-specified activity: 
" activity's base cost (i. e. cost assuming negligible risk levels for all of the activity's 
risks) 
" activity's base duration (i. e. duration assuming negligible risk levels for all of the 
activity's risks) 
" (for each risk specified for the activity) additional cost and delay if the risk occurs at 
0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of the maximum risk level occurrence. 
" (for each risk specified for the activity) most likely quarterly risk level 
An example of how the refined model's quantification process calculates the cost and 
ýMrra&D_ýZ_Wuqýyu 
Consider an activity named 'design'. 
Rather than analyse the general activity risk, the model-user chose to analyse two 
specific risks related to the activity: 
Risk 1: re-design owing to an inadequate site investigation 
Risk 2: low productivity rate of design team 
Figure 5.3 is a screen-shot from the refined model. It presents the model-user's 
estimates for the example activity. 
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Figure 5.4 shows a graphical representation of the estimates for Risk 1. 
in a single simulation the model performs the following process to obtain the simulated 
cost and duration of the design activity 
Risk I 
Random number generated 
hence, sampled risk level 
simulated additional cost 
simulated delay 
Risk 2 
Random number generated 
hence, sampled risk level 
simulated additional cost 
simulated delay 
0.84175 
60.2% of max. fisk level occurrence 
(see cumulative fwobability distribution in Figure 5.4) 
L80.4k (see Figure 5.4) 
4.2wk (see Figure 5.4) 
0.27109 
= 26.1 % of max. n sk level occurrence 
120.8k 
I. Owk 
Simulated design activitv base cost + (additional COSORisk I+ (additional COSORisk 2 
activity cost 
1300k + 180.4k + L20.8k 
1401.2k 
Simulated design activity base duration + (delav)Risk I [note: (delqv)pA, - (de4ORiA. ' I 
activity duration 
l5wk + 4.2wk 
19.2wk 
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Notc. All cost values are in units of ik 
All time values arc in units of wceks 
Figure 5.3 Estimates for the example design activity and its related risks (screen-shot 
from the refined model) 
probahihýi 
Risk level 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
cumulative probabili(v 
0.8417.51 
25% 50% 75% lo(M 
60.2% 
A dthli onal cost 
Risk level 
E80.4k 
Risk level 
0% 25% 50% ý 75% 100% 
4.2wk -o 
1 10 Risk leve/ 
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Risk level ('ý, u qfrnax. risk lowl (xvurreptce) 
Figure 5.4 Graphical representation of the estimates for Risk I 
The use of quarterly risk levels followed the principles of a simple scenario approach 
where a few discrete events relating to a risk are analysed. For example, Chapman and 
Ward (1997) described a method where a risk Is quantified for each of three scales of 
impact; low, medium and high impact. The decision to divide the risk scale, used by the 
refined model, into five discrete levels and assign a qualitative label to each level was 
based upon a technique reported by Godfrey (1996). 
This section has demonstrated that the refined model's quantification method ensures 
that the project price is correlated with the project duration in each simulation run of a 
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project. Furthermore, it is evident that the quantification process enables an explicit and 
fairly elementary risk analysis to be performed in each model application. 
The quantification method designed for the refined model has addressed the inability of 
the prototype model to correlate project price and duration. However, the prototype 
model was also unable to correlate the cost and time performance of individual risks and 
activities with the cost and time performance of other risks and activities. This 
limitation is addressed in the following section. 
5.1.3 Dependencies between activities and risks 
it is perceived that the outcome of a risk event can be influenced by the outcome of 
another risk event. For example, if a risk occurs at a fairly serious level it may induce 
another risk to occur at a similarly serious level. Table 5.3 provides three example pairs 
of risks which may have a dependency relationship. 
Dependency relationship Risk name Risk name 
I Inadcquate design Availability of labour and 
equipment 
2 Bad ground conditions Inclement weather 
3 Defective works Labour injuries and accidents 
Table 5.3 Example risk pairs that may have dependency relationships 
Chau (1995b) provided a brief review of empirical research that has concluded that 
dependence can exist between the cost of proJect elements. Touran and Wiser (1992), 
Raftery (1994), Chau (1995b) and Wall (1997) asserted that an elemental cost model 
that applies Monte Carlo simulation must model any significant dependencies that exist 
between variables. However, in risk analysis literature there are very few fully- 
documented techniques that can model dependencies between variables. 
Cooper and Chapman (1987) reported that dependencies could be modelled using 
conditional probabilities. However, even they conceded that this method requires a 
considerable amount of computation and specification effort. 
Cooper and Chapman (1987) reported a method that may be used to bench-mark and 
check estimated conditional probabilities. The result of the method is a single 
percentage value intended to give an approximate measure of the dependency between 
two variables. Cooper and Chapman insisted that percentage dependence is not suitable 
for specification purposes. However, owing to the considerable reduction in 
specification effort that this method offered, relative to the use of conditional 
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probabilities, it was decided to investigate whether the method could model 
dependencies. 
Since Cooper and Chapman applied the method to variables represented by histogram 
probability distributions, it was necessary to adjust the technique so that it may be 
applied to variables represented by triangular probability distributions (i. e. risks that 
may assume a continuous range of risk levels - see Figure 5.2a). The resultant technique 
is described in Figure 5.5 under the heading of Technique 1. 
Technique I inspired the development of similar techniques that relied upon the 
specification of a single dependence value. The techniques were variations upon fairly 
basic mathematical manipulations. Each technique equated to a slightly different 
interpretation of the single value specified to represent a dependency relationship. 
Technique 2 described in Figure 5.5 is an example derivative of Technique 1. 
The following techniques aim to model a dependency relationship between two risks (RI and R2). 
Each risk's level of occurrence is represented by a probability distribution. The degree of 
dependence between the risks is to be specified as a single percentage value. Assume 80% 
dependence (i. e. 20YO independence) has been specified for RI and R2. 
Technique I 
A random number (NO is generated. ]'he Icvel of RI is taken as that which has a cumulative 
probability value equal to the random number. Using the same random number and mcthod_ the 
corresponding level of R2 is derived (see Figure (i)). This level of R2 represents the level where 
R2 is I OW16 correlated with RI (i. e. R2(l W%)). 
A second random number (N2) is generated. A second level of R2 is taken as that which has a 
cumulative probability value equal to the random number(sec Figure (i)). This level of R2 
represents the levcl where R2 is 0% correlated (i. e. independent) with RI (i. e. R2(0%)). 
The two levels of R2 arc then combined to give a single level that reflects 80% dependence. The 
two levels of R2 are weighted in accordance with the specified percentage dependency level using 
the following equation: 
0.8 x R2 (100%) 1+ 10.2 x R2 (0%)l 
L Figure (i) 
cumulative 
probabilitN 
- RI 
- R2 
NI 
RI R2(0%) R2(100%) 
Risk level 
Figure 5.5 Example dependency modelling techniques that require a single 
specification value (continued oi, erleqfi 
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Techniquc 2 
A random 
. 
number (NI) is generated. The level of RI is taken as that which has a cumulative 
probabilitý value equal to the random number. Figure (ii) shows that NI dictates that the level of 
RI is equal to X in this simulation. 
The level of R2 is then restricted to a ncA range of values. The minimum value of this range 
equates to the value of R2 which has a cumulative probabilitv value equal to the initiall., I generated 
random number minus 0.1 (0.1 corresponds to half of the 20% independence specification). 
Similarly the maximum value of the range equates to the value of R2 which has a cumulative 
probability value equal to the initially generated random number plus 0.1. If the cumulative 
probability values calculated in the previous step lies outside the limits of zero or one. the relevant 
limiting, valuc is used. 
Figure (ii) shows that the level of R2 is now restricted to the range between A and B for this 
simulation. It is assumed that R2 has an equal probability of assuming any value within the new 
range (i. e. R2 is now represented by a uniform distribution. irrespective of R2's original 
distribution - see Figure (iii)). A second random number (N2) is generated The level of R2 is 
taken as the level within the uniform distribution which has a cumulative probability value equal to 
the random number (see Figure (iv)). Figure (iv) shows that N2 dictates that the level of R2 is 
equal to Y in this simulation. 
The simulated levels of RI and R2 are X and Y. respectively. It is intended that the values X and 
Y exhibit the specified 80'N. dependency between RI and R2. 
cumulativc 
probjbilitý 
NI - 
I 
Figure (iii) 
probabilitý 
R-2 
A Risk level 
RI 
R2 
Risk level 
Figure (ii) 
cumulative 
Figure (iv) 
probability 
N2 
--Oo- R2 A N, B Risk level 
Figure 5.5 (continueI) Example dependency modelling techniques that require a single 
specification value 
Tests were conducted on these proposed dependency modelling techniques. Each 
dependency technique was used to sample values from two variables' independent 
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probability distributions. The sampling process was repeated 2000 times. Each 
variable's 2000 sampled values were then arranged into a probability distribution (i. e. 
histogram). The test results showed that all of the techniques, including the two 
described in Figure 5.5, introduced some biases into the sampling process. The presence 
of biases in the sampling process was evident from the difference in shape between the 
dependent variable's originally estimated independent distribution and its sampled 
distribution. Figures 5.6a, 5.6b and 5.6c contrast the distributions of risk levels for R2 
sampled using Techniques I and 2 (described in Figure 5.5) with the original 
distribution estimated for R, 2. 
probabilifY 
I Risk level 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Figure 5.6a Independent triangular distribution estimated for R2 
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Figure 5.6b Distribution of R2 risk levels Figure 5.6c Distribution of R2 risk levels 
sampled using Technique I sampled using Technique 2 
Following a review of commercial risk analysis software it was discovered that Palisade 
Corporation had developed software that utilised Spearman's rank order correlation 
coefficient to model dependencies. The dependency between two variables is specified 
as a single value. The technique was described as 'distribution-free' because any types 
of distributions may be correlated and the technique did not bias the sampling process 
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(Palisade Corporation, 1996). Furthermore, the technique can model a scenario where a 
variable is dependent upon more than one other variable (Palisade Corporation, 1996). 
The actual mechanics of the technique based upon Spearman's rank order correlation 
coefficient are not widely disclosed, but may be found in Iman and Conover (1982). 
Owing to the length and complexity of the technique, a description of its mathematical 
process is not provided. 
Correlation techniques measure the degree of linear relationship between two variables 
(Caswell, 1989). Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (r) is a measure of correlation 
between the order in which each variable's values are ranked as opposed to the 
variable's actual values. The value of' the coefficient Is calculated using the following 
formula: 
6(XI )2 (Equation 5.1) 
11 IF, IT where 
r= Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
Xi = the rank order of the ith value assumed by variable X 
Yi = the rank order of the i"' value assumed by variable Y 
n= number ofvalues assumed by each variable 
The value of Spearman's rank correlation coefficient lies within the range -1 to 1. A 
coefficient value of I means the variables are perfectly positively correlated (i. e. each 
pair of values assumed by the two variables have the same rank order). A coefficient 
value of -1 means the variables are perfectly negatively correlated (Le. each pair of 
values assumed by the two variables have rank orders that are symmetrical about the 
median rank order). A coefficient value of zero means the two variables are independent 
of each other. 
In order to model the dependency between two variables, a value of Spearman's rank 
order correlation coefficient has to be specified. Assistance to the estimator may be 
provided by a graphical presentation of the relationship for specific coefficient values. 
Figures 5.7a and 5.7b are scatter plots that indicate the general trend of paired values of 
variables X and Y for two different coefficient values. The Spearrnan's rank order 
correlation coefficient value that gives the sampled values of X and Y in Figures 5.7a 
and 5.7b are 0.2 and 0.9, respectively. 
The refined model incorporates the dependency modelling technique based upon the 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient. The model-user is required to specify the 
coefficient value between any risks considered to be correlated. 
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Figure 5.7b 
A scatter plot of paired values of variables 
X and Y that have a Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficient equal to 0.9 
The model presents an empty matrix where all of the user-specified risks are listed as 
both its row and column headings. In order to specify a dependency relationship 
between a pair of risks the user has to insert the appropriate coefficient value into the 
corresponding matrix position. Figure 5.8 shows an example matrix. In this example, 
the dependency between Risk I and Risk 2 is reflected in the coefficient estimate 0.3. 
The dependency between Risk 2 and Risk 3 is reflected in the coefficient estimate of 
0.5. Meanwhile Risk I and Risk 3 are assumed to be independent. 
Risk I Risk 2 Risk 3 
Risk 1 1 0.3 
Risk 2 0.3 1 0.5 
Risk 3 0.5 1 
Figure 5.7a 
A scatter plot of paired values of variables 
X and Y that have a Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficient equal to 0.2 
Figure 5.8 An example matrix of Spearman's rank correlation coefficients that denote 
the degree of dependency between the three risks 
It should be noted that the dependency modelling technique based upon Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient imposes certain limitations. These include: 
the technique presumes that the correlation between two variables is linear, 
the technique presumes that both variables are dependent on the other, as opposed to 
one variable being dependent upon an independent variable. 
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A particular variation of the technique was implemented into the model in order reduce 
the amount of programming. This version introduced the following limitations: 
* it was designed to only permit positive coefficient values to be modelled; 
9 the model was constrained to perform either 100,500 or 1000 simulations. 
5.2 Simulation of contract strategies 
In contrast to the prototype model, the refined version provides a more flexible 
framework with which to represent a project using work packages, activities and risks. 
As a result, it is possible to provide a more sophisticated representation of each contract 
strategy under consideration. The following sub-sections report that the model 
facilitates simulation of contract strategies' assignment of work and risk, pricing 
mechanisms, tender processes, consultant fees and timing of the client's payments to 
each contracted party. 
5.2.1 Organisational structure 
Three contract strategies were modelled in the prototype model. In each definition of 
these three contract strategies reference was made to one of the following general 
organisational structure labels: 
9 Traditional 
o Design-Build 
Management Contract 
It is appreciated that these organisational structure labels are not definitive. There are 
many variations of organisational structures which may be referred to using each of 
these labels. In other words each label is open to considerable interpretation, but there is 
a common understanding as to the general type of organisational structure associated 
with each of these labels. Table 2.1 in section 2.1.1 defined each of the above listed 
organisational structure types as follows: 
0 Traditional: design completed by consultants before construction is awarded to a 
contractor 
0 Design-Build: both detailed design and construction performed by a contractor 
Management Contract: design by consultants; management contractor appointed 
early and work packages let progressively by the management contractor. 
It is apparent that these widely accepted definitions of organisational structure types 
primarily define the division of design, construction and management responsibilities. 
The three contract strategies featured in the prototype model were modelled in such a 
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way that they allocated design, construction and, in one case, management 
responsibilities in a specific configuration. The configuration imposed by each of the 
three contract strategies is reported in Table 5.4. 
Each of the three contract strategies either dictated that total design was an independent 
work package (Traditional and Management Contract) or grouped total design and 
construction together as a single work package (Design-Build). Therefore it was 
possible to construct the prototype model so that, in any application, the design activity 
was always a complete activity. Table 5.4 also indicates that the prototype model was 
designed to group construction as a single work package that is allocated to a single 
contractor. Again, this compromise was justified because the model was designed only 
to simulate the three previously-cited contract strategies. 
Organisational structure type Division of project work 
Traditional 0 Entire design allocated to one party 
0 Entire construction allocated to one party 
Design-Build 0 Entire design and construction allocated to one party 
Management Contract 0 Total design allocated to one party 
0 Management services provided by one party 
0 Construction work completed by several works contractors 
(the prototype model treated the works contractors as a 
single party) 
Table 5.4 Division of project work dictated by the three contract strategies featured in 
the prototype model 
In order for the refined model to simulate a wider variety of contract strategies it was 
necessary to increase the flexibility with which a contract strategy's division of work 
could be modelled and subsequently evaluated. Therefore a framework was designed 
that enabled a contract strategy's division of work to be modelled in terms of the 
appropriate number of work packages. 
Since the model is intended, primarily, to be used by the client organisation, the work 
packages should equate to the prime contracts held by the client with contracting 
parties. Therefore, in the case of the Traditional contract strategy featured in the 
prototype model, two work packages could be modelled. One work package would 
represent the client's contract with the designer while the other work package 
represented the client's contract with the general contractor. 
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it is possible to model subcontracts in addition to prime contracts. However, a modelled 
prime contract must not incorporate the details of a subcontract if the subcontract is to 
be modelled separately. The Management Contract featured in the prototype model 
could be modelled as: 
" one work package for the design work, 
" one work package for just the management services provided by the management 
contractor, and 
" as many work packages as number of works contractors appointed under the 
management contractor. 
In order to distinguish which aspects of work are assigned by a contract strategy to 
different contracting parties, the refined model prompts the user to specify names for 
each party assigned responsibility for a work package. It should be noted that the model 
is programmed to recognise the name "client" as a reference to the client organisation. 
Meanwhile, the user can specify any name for the contracting parties, although the 
names must be consistent throughout an application of the model. Section 5.2.2 reports 
that the parties' names are used to define a contract strategy's risk allocation. 
For each specified work package the model-user has the option to analyse the affect of 
a: 
" pricing mechanism (see section 5.2.3), 
" tender process (see section 5.2.4)1 and 
" management/consultant's fee (see section 5.2.5). 
Figure 5.9 displays a screen-shot where a contract strategy's work packages have been 
specified. In this example the first work package is to be undertaken by the client whilst 
the second is to be undertaken by a party named by the model-user as "Contractor". The 
model-user has opted to evaluate the affect of a type of pricing mechanism, tender 
process and consultant's fee on the second work package. A party named "Manager" is 
to receive the consultant's fee. 
Figure 5.9 An example set of inputs that defines the division of work and which work 
packages the user has opted to analyse the effect of a pricing mechanism, tender process 
and management/consultant fee 
it has been acknowledged that the framework designed to define a contract strategy's 
division of work permits prime contracts and subcontracts to be modelled. It is also 
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possible to model a contract in which different aspects of work, within that contract, are 
to be paid using different pricing mechanism types. This can be achieved by separating 
the different aspects of work that are to be paid using different pricing mechanism types 
into individual work packages, whilst accrediting each work package to the same 
contracting party. 
In contrast to the prototype model, the refined version provides a more flexible 
framework to simulate the organisational structure of contract strategies. However, it 
does not provide a comprehensive representation. As with the prototype model, an 
application of the refined model requires the user to interpret and reflect the specific 
details about each contract strategy's organisational structure in his/her cost and time 
estimates that are inputted into the model. 
Although the refined model is not programmed to recognise descriptive labels such as 
Traditional and Design-Build, the model prompts the user to specify any label for the 
organisational structure associated with each contract strategy evaluated. This is purely 
a reference label. 
5.2.2 Risk allocation 
The preceding section reported that a contract strategy's division of work is simulated 
by defining a series of work packages. This process is the first step in an application of 
the refined model. The next step is to divide each work package into a series of 
activities and risks. 
Section 5.1.1 reported that the refined model enabled the user to specify any number 
and type of activities. It also reported that the model-user has the option to either specify 
and analyse the general risk associated with each activity or specify and analyse more 
than one specific risk related to each activity. 
The refined model was designed to simulate the particular risk allocation of each 
evaluated contract strategy. Each identified and quantified risk is to be allocated to a 
party. The risk owner names must be consistent with the party names assigned when the 
contract strategy's division of work was specified. 
During the empirical research the industrialists who completed questionnaires indicated 
that they interpreted a contract strategy's general division of risk between the client and 
main contractor from the contract strategy's general organisational structure label and, 
to a lesser extent, from the pricing mechanism type. The design of the refined model 
aims to make the particular risk allocation of each evaluated contract strategy explicit 
and thus aid contract strategy selection and risk management. 
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5.2.3 Pricing mechanism 
The prototype model simulated a single pricing mechanism type for each of the three 
contract strategy options (see section 3.3.2.2). For each option the model simulated the 
pricing mechanism implemented within the contract between the client and the 
contractor that is assigned responsibility for the construction (i. e. the principal 
contractor). Table 5.5 displays the common reference label of the principal contractor 
and pricing mechanism type that governed the principal contractor's reimbursement 
within each of the three contract strategies. 
Contract strategy Common title of principal 
contractor 
Pricing mechanism type 
Traditional General contractor Guaranteed maximum price 
Design-Build Design-Build contractor Fixed lump sum 
Management Contract Works contractors Cost plus percentage fee 
Table 5.5 The principal contractor and pricing mechanism types associated with each 
of the three contract strategies featured in the prototype model 
In contrast, the refined model permits the user to analyse the effect of a pricing 
mechanism type for each specified work package within a given contract strategy. 
Therefore it is possible to simulate a contract strategy where the client lets a series of 
contracts, amongst which different pricing mechanism types are implemented. In 
addition, section 5.2.1 acknowledged that the model could be used to model a single 
contract in which different aspects of work within that contract are to be paid for using 
different pricing mechanism types, providing each is specified as an individual work 
package. 
The main purpose of modelling pricing mechanisms is to conduct a more rigorous 
calculation of the client's price for particular work packages and to assess the possible 
effect that a pricing mechanism type may have on the price. However, since modelling 
pricing mechanisms requires the user to distinguish between the contractor's costs and 
the contractor's tender bid, it is possible to calculate the contractor's financial outcome 
in addition to the client's price for the work package. 
The prototype model did not perform this calculation. It is perceived to be a very 
valuable addition to the model because it assists the user to assess whether the estimated 
tender bids are realistic. It can also provide insights into whether a contract strategy's 
risk allocation is equitable as well as efficient from the client's perspective. It is in the 
client's interests to give the contractor sufficient incentive to execute and complete 
work to the required standards and also to avoid insolvency of the contractor. 
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The refined model imposes a restriction on the pricing mechanism types that can be 
simulated. Nonetheless, the range of options are considered the most common. The 
options include: 
40 lump sum; 
" target cost (with Guaranteed Maximum Price); 
" target cost; 
" cost plus fixed fee; and 
" cost plus percentage fee. 
The first, second and fifth options in the above list are the same pricing mechanism 
types as those incorporated in the three contract strategy options featured in the 
prototype model. Table 5.6 reports the tender bid parameters and mathematical 
formulae used to calculate the client's price for a work package as well as the 
contractor's financial outcome if any of the above-listed pricing mechanism types are 
specified for a work package. 
5.2.4 Tender process 
The three contract strategy options within the prototype model included reference to a 
tender process type used to appoint the principal contractor (and management contractor 
for the Management Contract option). In contrast, the refined model gives the user the 
option to account for the tender process associated with each specified work package. 
For each tender process chosen to be modelled, the user is prompted to specify whether 
the tender process includes one or two stages. The user's response governs whether the 
relevant work package contains one or two tender activities. The user is also prompted 
to assign a reference label to each modelled tender process. 
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5.2.5 Management/Consultant fee 
Section 5.2.1 reported that for each specified work package the model-user can opt to 
take account of a management/consultant's fee. This modelling option may be 
considered applicable where a party is appointed to provide a service that does not 
involve execution of a particular project production activity. For example, it may be 
used to model the fee paid to a party that provides purely construction management 
services. 
If the model-user opts to take account of a management/consultant's fee for a particular 
work package the user is prompted to specify the mechanism used to calculate the fee 
amount. The refined model permits the fee to be modelled using one of the following 
options: 
0 lump sum; 
4, percentage of work package costs (costs to the client); and 
0 target fee. 
Table 5.7 presents the parameter(s) and the fee calculation formula for each of the 
above options. Each of the parameters listed in Table 5.7 are to be estimated as 
triangular probability distributions. This is with the exception of the sharing rate (see 
Table 5.7 notes). 
Management/Consultant Parameters Fee Formula 
Feetype 
Lump sum fee lump sum (U) Fee =U 
Percentage fee percentage fee level (g) Fee = g(B* + Y*) 
Target cost fee 0 percentage fee (h) 
Fee 
0 target cost (T) 
h(B* + Y*) + r(T - (B* + Y*)) 
0 sharing rate (r) 
hl2= 
B* = sum of each activity's base cost within the work package 
Y* = sum of the client's risk costs within the work package 
The sharing rate (r) is treated as a deterministic variable because it is assumed that this value is dictated 
by the client. In the context of the above formulae, the sharing rate is interpreted to mean the proportion 
of savings/losscs of the client's actual price of the work package, relative to the target cost, that the 
client pays/receives tolfrom the consultant. 
Table 5.7 Management/consultant fee types that may be simulated by the refined 
model, their parameters and calculation formulae 
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5.2.6 Timing of client's payments 
The value of money varies with time (Briscoe, 1988; Pilcher, 1992; Parkin et A, 1997; 
for example). Therefore the real value of money expended by a client is dependent upon 
the times at which a client pays the contracting parties as well as the overall time period 
during which a client's monies are expended. Given that construction projects generally 
cover a considerable time period, cash flow analysis is a useful application. However, in 
addition, it appeared wholly appropriate to incorporate cash flow analysis as a feature of 
the contract strategy selection-aid model because: 
" the timing of a client's payments is a contract-related decision; 
" the model is designed to simulate a project duration that reflects the expected impact 
of each prospective contract strategy for a given project; and 
" cash flow analysis is an elementary add-on to the model because the other model 
analysis involves calculation of a project's cost and time performance. 
As with the prototype model, the output of the refined model includes a distribution of 
simulated price and duration values that reflect a contract strategy's appropriateness for 
the project under consideration. The refined model also provides an option to simulate a 
client's interim payments and thereby use the previously-simulated cost and time values 
to calculate a distribution of net present values of project price and project revenue. 
The net present value calculation of a project's revenue requires the user to input a 
single estimate of the client's net income from the project once it is in operation along 
with a single estimate of the number of years over which this income is to be received. 
it should be noted that tile model's net present value calculation assumes that the client 
receives the annual net income at the beginning of each operational year. In each 
simulation, the project duration value is taken as the timing of the client's first receipt of 
net income. 
In order to calculate the net present value of a project's price it is necessary to establish 
a time schedule of the client's payments throughout the project. Therefore the user is 
prompted to specify the timing of the client's payments for each work package within 
the contract strategy under evaluation. The model is designed to allow the client's 
interim payments for each work package to regularly occur either: 
" after a specified time interval; or 
" at the completion of each activity. 
The model-user also has the option to specify an amount for each work package which 
equates to a lump sum amount paid to the contracting party at the outset of the work 
package. The model-user is required to estimate a single value for the discount rate. 
The refined model is designed to perforin a cash flow analysis for each simulated run of 
the project. The method used to calculate the client's payments at each payment stage is 
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dependent upon which of the two previously-cited interim payment systems is selected 
for a work package. 
If the interim payments for a work package are to take place after a specified time 
interval, the client's payments at each payment stage are calculated using the following 
method: 
the price of the work package per unit time is calculated using the following 
equation: 
work package price rate 
(P L) 
(Equation 5.2) 
D 
where, 
P= price of work package 
L= up-front lump sum 
duration of work package 
at each payment stage for a work package, the model calculates, from the simulated 
project schedule, the length of time that the work package was in progress since the 
preceding payment stage 
at each work package's payment stage, the calculated 'in-progress' time is 
multiplied by the work package's price rate to give the client's Payment at the 
corresponding payment stage 
the first payment stage of a work package must add any up-front lump sum amount 
to the client's payment. 
Alternatively, if the interim payments for a work package are to take place at the 
completion of each activity within the work package, the client's payments at each 
payment stage are calculated using the following method: 
the work package's mark-up per unit time is calculated using the following 
equation: 
work package mark-up rate, rn 
P (B* + Y*) (Equation 5.3) 
D 
where, 
P= price of work package 
B* = sum of each activity's base cost within the work package 
Y* = sum of the client's risk costs within the work package 
D= duration of work package 
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the cost of each activity, which equates to the client's payment at each payment 
stage, is calculated using the following equation: 
activity cost to client =B+ Y* + md (Equation 5.4) 
where, 
B= base cost of the activity 
Y* = sum of the client's risk costs within the work package 
m= work package mark-up rate 
d= simulated duration of the activity 
(i. e. includes the activity's base duration and its maximum risk delay) 
the first payment stage of a work package must add any up-front lump sum amount 
to the client's payment. 
Once the model has calculated the client's payment at all of the payment stages for all 
of the work packages, the model calculates the net present value of the project price for 
each simulated run of the project. It was previously reported that, in each simulation, the 
project duration value is taken as the timing of the client's first receipt of net income. 
The model subsequently calculates the net present value of the project revenue. This 
value is added to the net present value of project price calculated for the corresponding 
simulation run to give a net present value of the project. 
5.3 A summary of model inputs 
Figure 5.10 shows the seven steps which the user must follow to obtain a complete set 
of inputs for a single contract strategy (Step 7 is optional). Demonstrations of these 
model input steps are provided by the applications of the refined model to two example 
projects in Chapter 6. 
Figure 5.10 indicates that an application of the refined model presents a demanding 
task. Although a fairly crude definition of a project might only require, say, ten 
activities, the minimal number of cost and time estimates for each activity is twelve. 
This number almost duplicates for each activity-related risk the user chooses to identify 
and analyse. Further inputs are required to simulate a project schedule, risk 
dependencies, pricing mechanisms, etc. The total number of inputs is dependent upon 
the particular contract strategy that is under evaluation and the level of detail at which a 
user prefers to define and simulate a project and contract strategy. However, it should 
also be acknowledged that the aim is to compare contract strategies that are regarded as 
the most plausible for a given project. Therefore the data-demand escalates further 
because it is urged that all of the input data steps featured in Figure 5.10 are repeated for 
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each contract strategy that is regarded as an appropriate option and where its analysis is 
expected to provide insights. 
Establish the nunibcr ot work packagcs 
Assign a name to the contractor responsible for each work package 
Specify pricing mechanism type if option selected for any work package 
Specify tender process type if option selected for any work package STEP I Specify managcnicrit/consultant's fee type if option selected for any 
work package 
. -- 
VI 
Spccily activitics within cach work packagc 
For each activity, specify more than one specific risk or opt to assess the 
STE P2 general activity-risk 
Spccifv the owncr (it cach risk 
I.. "Hinatc the hasc cost and basc cILIN01011 101 CiiCII ilCtiý 11ý 
" (for each risk specified for the activity) estimate the additional cost and 
delay ifthe risk occurs at 0%, 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of the 
STEP 3 maximum risk level occurrence 
" (for each risk specified for the activity) estimate the most likely 
quarterly risk level 
STEP 4 F-slimalc 
Spcarman's rank ordcr corrclation cociticients to rcprcscnt any risk I 
dmcridencics 
STEP 51 Fstiniatc the proicct sclic(luic (i. c. activity links) 
v 
Fstiniatc rc1cvant tcnder bid parametcrs it'pricing mcchallism option 
STEP 6 scicctcd for any work packagc 
Fstimatc rclcvint managemcnt/consultant's fec parametcrs if option 
. sclcctcd 
for anv ýNork package 
Spccity the timing ot the client", paynicrits for each work package 
STEP 7. Specify the client's net annual income trom the completed project and 
(Optional) 
the time period over which this income is received 
0 Estimate discount ratc 
Figure 5.10 Seven steps of model inputs for each evaluated contract strategy 
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it is evident that the application of the refined model is not a trivial task. In fact the cost, 
time and effort involved in its application may be regarded as comparable with that 
involved in the preparation of a tender bid or in a project appraisal before sanction. 
The high data requirement raises concerns about the practicality of the model. These 
concerns are heightened in light of the fact that a client typically faces considerable 
financial and time-related pressures at the outset of a project which is when the 
quantitative approach is to be applied. 
The timing at which the quantitative approach is to be applied also raises concerns about 
the feasibility of the quantitative approach. This is because there may be insufficient 
information available about a project at its outset to enable a model-user to ascertain 
cost and time values that reflect the potential impact of a contract strategy. The limited 
amount of information adds to the uncertainty and subjectivity in the decision-maker's 
imperfect knowledge upon which input estimates are based. 
The reliability of the analysis will always be subject to criticism, especially the output to 
the refined model because it is the accumulated product of a large number of estimates, 
all of which are highly subjective. However, it is intended that the rigorous, structured 
and explicit nature of the quantitative approach enables the criticism and debate to be 
directed to the theories and assumptions that underlie the model inputs and outputs. It is 
believed that this may lead to less subjective contract strategy decisions. 
5.4 Model output 
The prototype model's output, for each evaluated contract strategy, includes a 
distribution of project price and duration values. This chapter has described and justified 
the model refinements which generate additional model output. 
Once all of the values are inputted for a given contract strategy, the refined model 
performs either 100,500 or 1000 simulated runs of the project. The subsequent model 
output includes simulated values of- 
" project price; 
" project duration; 
" net present value of project price and revenue; 
" any managemcnt/consultant's fee; 
price for each work package; and 
financial outcome of a work package contractor if a pricing mechanism was 
simulated for the work package. 
Section 3.3.3 presented a series of statistical techniques which may be used to interpret 
the output (see Table 3.12). It is crucial, however, to appreciate that the model output is 
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far from objective. The output represents the estimator's accumulated assumptions 
about each contract strategy's appropriateness for the project in question. 
Many of the industrialists who participated in the empirical study expressed their 
reservations about the quantitative approach by making reference to the subjectivity of 
the output. In defence, the quantitative approach is, foremost, a methodology. As such, 
the purpose of the model inputs is not solely to arrive at the model output. 
The process of applying the quantitative approach is intended to improve upon the 
industry's conventional approach to contract strategy selection. This is because 
application of the quantitative approach: 
" imposes a structure to contract strategy evaluation; 
" requires the decision-maker to evaluate contract strategies in terms of cost and time 
and thus contract strategy alternatives may be compared on a consistent basis and in 
direct relation to the client's primary objectives (i. e. price and time targets); 
" makes the decision-maker's assumptions about the relative appropriateness of 
contract strategies explicit and therefore open to debate and challenge; and 
" enables any relevant casc-specific details to be incorporated into the evaluation 
process. 
The results of an application of the quantitative approach provide an indication of the 
relative appropriateness of each evaluated contract strategy. For example, it is possible 
to obtain a measure of the likelihood that the client's price and time objectives will be 
met and whether a particular contract strategy is likely to provide the contractor with an 
acceptable balance between profit incentive and protection against financial loss. 
In addition, the output permits the decision-maker to review the consistency between 
his/her discrete assumptions and the accumulation of these assumptions. In effect, the 
quantitative approach tests the decision-maker's assumptions and theories. Furthermore, 
the quantitative approach facilitates iterative analyses. It is possible to investigate 'what- 
if, type questions. For example, one could examine the effect that different risk 
allocations, different cost and time estimates, different project schedules, etc. have on 
the output. 
Chapter 6 presents two example applications of the refined model. Guidance is provided 
on how to apply the model and how its output may be interpreted. The examples 
reiterate the fact that the inputs are intended to provide the decision-maker with as much 
insight as the output. 
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Example applications of the refined model 
Chapter 5 described the refined version of the model that facilitates application of a 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. In this chapter the refined model is 
applied to two example projects. The first is a tunnel project and the second involves a 
factory building with offices. 
The two example projects are fictional. They have been fashioned to demonstrate how 
to apply the model and suggest how its application could aid contract strategy selection. 
it is impossible to create very specific project circumstances. Consequently, details of 
each project focus upon the most relevant issues. In addition, it is necessary to describe 
the model application from the perspective of a fictional contract strategy selector 
and/or client. 
The first example project has been specifically chosen to demonstrate the capacity of 
the model to analyse project risks. The model is used to evaluate two contract strategies 
of converse risk allocations. 
In the second example project, prospective contract strategies are evaluated on a more 
subjective basis. The perceptions of the hypothetical decision-maker are reflected in 
his/her estimates of each contract strategy's set of cost and time elements for the factory 
building project. 
6.1 Example Project 1: The Tunnel Project 
An experienced client has sanctioned a tunnel project. The client's feasibility study 
identified several key risks and provided sufficient information to analyse these risks. 
The project is expected to cost the client approximately E14million and the completion 
date is expected approximately 20 weeks after commencement of the design. 
6.1.1 Initial overview of contract strategy selection 
For the purposes of this example it was assumed that the client expressed a preference 
to use its own in-house team to assume an overall project management role. The 
principal functions of this role include the development of the client's brief, contract 
strategy selection and project supervision. 
It was also assumed that the design would be relatively straightforward once the client's 
in-house team had prescribed the essential design specifications in the project brief As 
a consequence, a Design-Build type arrangement appeared appropriate. The simple 
design requirements were also assumed to favour a competitive tender process. 
Decisions pertaining to risk allocation appeared to warrant particular attention. 
Therefore, to begin with, it was decided to compare two contract strategies with 
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converse risk allocations. 
These two contract strategies both comprise a Design-Build type arrangement which is 
let on a competitive basis. The differences between the two contract strategies are 
summarised as follows. 
" Contracl Sfrafeýý I (FP): all design and construction risks are allocated to the 
appointed contractor and the contractor is paid on a fixed price basis. 
" Contracl Strale*, 2 ((7-): all design and construction risks are allocated to the client 
and the appointed contractor is paid on a cost plus fixed fee basis. 
The first contract strategy is to be referred to, hereafter, as FP (i. e. a reference to its 
fixed price type pricing mechanism). Meanwhile the second contract strategy is to be 
referred to, hereafter, as CP (i. e. a reference to its cost plus fixed fee type pricing 
mechanism). 
6.1.2 The model inputs for the contract strategy FP 
Figure 5.10 presented the series of steps involved in the specification of a contract 
strategy's model inputs. The titles of the following sub-sections correspond to the steps 
featured in Figure 5.10. 
1 Step 1: Specification of general details regarding the contract strategy's work 
packages 
FP comprises two work packages. One work package constitutes the client's role as the 
overall project manager. The other work package involves the design and construction 
of the tunnel. This second work package is to be carried out by the 'yet to be appointed' 
contractor which has been assigned the label of "Contractor". These details were input 
into the model using the format shown in Figure 6.1. 
The tick marks under the headings 'tender process' and 'pricing mechanism' for work 
package 2 indicate that the type of tender process and pricing mechanism for this work 
package is to be accounted for in the analysis. The model subsequently prompted the 
specification of the type of tender process and pricing mechanism for work package 2. 
The tender process was specified as 'Competitive'. The pricing mechanism was 
specified as 'Fixed Price'. 
Figure 6.1 The general work package details inputted into the model 
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6. LZ2Step2:, Speciftcati(., n qf the activities, risks and ipisk ("Vners within each w(jrk 
package 
The activities listed in Table 6.1 were considered an appropriate breakdown of each 
work package. The option was taken to analyse the general risks associated with the 
majority of the activities. Specific risks were identified for two activities (i. e. Boring 
and Lining). Table 6.1 also shows that all of the risks related to production activities are 
owned by the contractor under FP. 
1.2 3Step 3: Quantification (f activities andrisks 
Section 5.1.2 described the technique used to quantify the specified activities and risks. 
The estimates for all of the identified activities and risks for FP are displayed in Table 
6.2. The base cost and base duration of each activity are shown as a proportion of the 
overall base cost and duration respectively. 
6 1. Z 4Step 4: Specification of correlation between risks 
For the tunnel project, it was assumed that none of the risks were strongly correlated to 
each other. Owing to the potential size of the 'hard ground, risk, it was decided to 
account for its correlation with two other risks, the risk of 'machine failure during the 
boring activity' and the general risk of 'cost and time increases related to the client's 
project management activity'. The correlation between the risk of 'water ingress during 
the tunnel boring activity' and the general risk of 'cost and time increases related to the 
client's project management activity' was also accounted for. 
The correlation coefficient values inputted Into the matrix to account for these risk 
dependencies are shown in Figure 6.2. If a cell is left blank the model assumes a 
correlation coefficient of zero (i. e. the two corresponding risks are independent). 
Figure6.2 The correlation coefficient matrix inputted for FP 
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6.1.2.5 Step 5: Specification ofproject schedide 
The project schedule inputted into the model for FP is shown in Figure 6.3. 
Projcct managcrricrit 
Tcnder 
4 
Finish - Finish Finish - Finish lag-0 L , iao -0 
Dcsign 
Enabling works Staxt-stan tag - 0.5 months 
Boring 
Finish - Start 
lag-0 Finish-FiniSh 
lag-0 
Lining Finish - Finish 
Finishcs 
lag - 3moný* 
F77 
Most likely project duration estimate 20 months 
Figure 6.3 The project schedule for FP 
6.1. Z6 Step 6. - Specification of ten der hids 
The option to analyse the effect of using a pricing mechanism for work package 2 was 
selected at the outset. As a result, the model performed Monte Carlo simulation to 
calculate probability distributions of: 
The contractor Is costs. This included the base cost of all the activities in work 
package 2 (E7.9million) and the cost of the risks which are owned by the contractor 
(see Figure 6.4). 
The client's costs (for ivorkpack-age 2). Owing to the inputs made for FP, the client 
costs for work package 2 included just the costs associated with the tender process 
activity. 
The purpose of calculating and displaying these two distributions is to assist the model- 
user in the estimation of the tender bids which may be submitted for work package 2. It 
was specified at the outset that FP utilises a fixed price type pricing mechanism for 
work package 2. Consequently, whilst displaying the distributions described above, the 
model prompted the user for inputs of a minimum, most likely and maximum fixed 
price tender bid for work package 2. These estimated values constitute a triangular 
probability distribution of fixed price tender bids. 
As with all of the other inputs, the model-user must make an assessment which 
addresses the particular circumstances of the project. However, at a general level, the 
estimated fixed price levels must aim to: 
205 
1. reimburse the contractor for the base cost of all the activities (i. e. cost assuming no 
risks occur), 
2. cover the cost of the risk which the contractor is responsible for; 
3. offer the contractor the opportunity to make an adequate level of profit; and 
4. be low enough to win the contract against competing contractors. 
The calculated distribution of the cost of the work involved in work package 2 is shown 
in Figure 6.4. The bidding strategy based upon this distribution is outlined below. This 
bidding strategy is simply a demonstration of the type of reasoning that may be 
employed in making these inputs. The model allows the user's discretion to be applied. 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
Figure 6.4 The contractor's cost distribution for work package 2 
Example fixed price bidding strategv used for FP 
Base cost for work package 2 (i. e. costs reimbursed by client) = J7. qM 
Most likely cost of the work (derived from the results shown in Figure 6.4) =112. IM 
The distribution of tender bids is estimated as different levels of mark-up added to the 
most likely cost of the work. nese levels of mark-up are specified as percentages of the 
cost of the work. The mark-up is intended to include an adequate risk premium and a 
margin of profit. 
Minimum fixed price bid = 1.12 x 12.1 =fI3.6M (i. e. 12% mark-up) 
Most likely fixed price bid =l. 20xl2. l=1l4.5M (i. e. 20% mark-up) 
Maximum fixed price bid = 1.22 x 12.1 =I 14.8M (i. e. 22% mark-up) 
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6.1.3 Model output for contract strategy FP 
Once all of the inputs referred to in the preceding sections were made, the model 
performed Monte Carlo simulation to calculate a set of results for the contract strategy 
FP. These results represent the price and duration outcomes having simulated the 
project 1000 times. Figure 6.5 provides a graphical presentation of the model output for 
FR These results suggest that if FP was used to procure the tunnel project: 
* the price of the project will be between f]4.5M and L15.6M; 
* the most likely project price will be 115AM; 
the duration of the project will be between l8months and 25months; 
the most likely project duration will be 21 months. 
26 
25 
T 
24 
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Is 14.4 14.6 14.8 Is 15.2 ISA 15.6 
PROJECT PRICE (Emillion) 
Figure 6.5 Contour plot ofthe project price and duration results calculated for FP 
6.1.4 Model inputs for contract strategy CP 
The objective differences between FP and CP are: 
FP allocates the work-related risks to the contractor while CP allocates these risks to 
the client, and 
2. FP uses a fixed price type pricing mechanism while CP uses a cOst Plus fixed fee 
type pricing mechanism, 
As a consequence, the model inputs with regards to work breakdown and cost and time 
estimates for CP were the same, on the whole, as those made for FP. However, for CP, 
the client was specified as responsible for all the risks in work package 2. In addition, it 
was necessary to estimate a distribution of fixed fee bids (as opposed to fixed price 
bids) which competing contractors were likely to submit for work package 2. 
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6.1.4.1 Step 6: Specification of tender bidv 
CP allocates the work-related risks to the client. Therefore the contractor is simply 
reimbursed the base cost of all the activities in work package 2 (i. e. the cost assuming 
no risks occur). Since the base cost estimates are single value estimates the contractor's 
cost of work in work package 2 is a single value (see Figure 6.6a). Figure 6.6b is the 
distribution of the costs which the client is likely to incur for work package 2. 
1000 
800 
600 
400 
200 
0 
7.75 - 7,85 - 7.95 - 
7.85 7.95 &05 
Cordractor's costs (Emillion) 
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50 
OL. -k 
0.5 - 15 -25-3.5 - 4.5 - 5.5 - 6.5 - 7.5 - 
1.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 
cost of cherd-owned risks (imillion) 
Figure 6.6a The costs of work package 2 Figure 6.6b The client's costs which arise from the 
which the contractor will incur and risks related to work package 2 which the client 
subsequently be reimbursed for under CP retains under CP 
Since CP employs a different type of pricing mechanism than FP the user is required to 
estimate a different set of tender bid parameters for the two contract strategies. In the 
case of FP, it was necessary to estimate a fixed price to cover the cost of all the work- 
related activities and risks in work package 2 as well as provide a margin of profit for 
the contractor. In contrast, for CP, it was necessary to estimate a fixed fee which simply 
provides an acceptable profit margin for the contractor because the client assumes 
responsibility for all of the risks. Therefore a different bidding strategy must be used to 
estimate the tender bid values for CP. An example bidding strategy for CP is outlined 
below. 
Example cost glus fixed fee bidding, strategy used for CP 
The cost of the work with which the contractor will be fully reimbursed = 17,9M 
The distribution of tender bids are estimated as profit margins. These profit margins are 
specified as percentages of the cost of the work. 
Minimum fixed fee bid =0.04xf7.9M=fO. 32M (i. e. 4%profit margin) 
Most likely fixed fee bid =0.08xf7.9M=fO. 65M (i. e. 8% profit margin) 
Maximum fixed fee bid = 0.12 xf7.9M =f0.95M (i. e. 12% profit margin) 
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6.1.5 The model output for contract strategy CP 
Figure 6.7 provides a graphical presentation of the model output calculated for CP. 
These results suggest that if CP was used to procure the tunnel project- 
" the price of the project will be between 110.2M and L16.2M, 
" the most likely project price will be 113.2M. 
" the duration of the project will be between 17 months and 25 months-, 
" the most likely project duration will be 21 months. 
The results in Figure 6.7 indicate a strong correlation between project price and project 
duration. This correlation derives from the technique used to quantify the cost and 
duration of each activity and risk. Each activity's cost and duration are both normalised 
against the same risk scale (see section 5.1.2). 
26 
25 
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23 
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I: 
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17 
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Figure 6.7 Contour plot of the project price and duration results calculated for CP 
This correlation is observed in the results calculated for CP, but not in those calculated 
for FP because of the different types of pricing mechanisms that each contract strategy 
employs. Since CP uses a cost reimbursable type pricing mechanism, the price paid for 
work package 2 consists of the actual cost of the work plus a fee. Owing to the 
technique used to quantify each activity and risk (see section 5.1.2), the actual cost of 
work package 2 will be incurred within a correlated period of time. Meanwhile, the 
price fixed for work package 2 under FP is assumed to be independent of the actual cost 
of the work and consequently independent of the project duration. 
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6.1.6 Comparison of the results calculated for FP and CP 
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 display both sets of results calculated for FP and CP. The results 
may be interpreted as follows: 
1. FP covers-a much smaller l2rice range than CP. 
The project price range calculated for CP effectively comprises the range of cost 
values inputted for all the project activities and the fixed fee bids distribution. In 
contrast, the project price range calculated for FP comprises the range of cost values 
inputted for the project management activity and the tender process activity plus the 
distribution of fixed price bids for work package 2. Therefore, in the case of FP, the 
range of values estimated for the work-related activities in work package 2 are made 
redundant by the distribution of fixed price bids estimated for this contract strategy. 
As a consequence, the range of project price outcomes for FP is largely dependent 
upon the estimated range of fixed price bids. The results in Figure 6.8 suggest that 
the uncertainty inherent in a fixed price to cover work package 2 is less than the 
uncertainty inherent in the cost of the activities and risks involved in work package 
2. 
2. FP and CP produce the same-distribution of 12rWect duration outcomes, 
In the preliminary analysis the objective differences between FP and CP were not 
perceived as having any effect on the duration of the project activities nor upon the 
schedule in which the activities were to be undertaken. 
3. y to induce a higher project price. 
The results indicate: 
" the mean project price for FP and CP are fI5.03M and EI2.94M, respectively; 
" the maximum project price for FP and CP are E15.57M and E16.08M, 
respectively; 
" the minimum project price for FP and CP are E14.32M and E10.44M, 
respectively; 
" there is a probability of 0.88 that CP will induce a lower project price than the 
minimum possible price for FP; 
" there is a probability of 0.95 that the contractor's profit for CP will lie between 
E0.39M and EO. 89M (see Figure 6.9); 
" FP presents the contractor with a 0.005 probability of making a loss (the 
maximum loss was calculated at E0.04M); 
" FP presents the contractor with a 0.93 probability of making a profit which 
exceeds LIM. 
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Figure 6.8 Comparison of the price and duration results calculated for FP and CP 
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Figure 6.9 Comparison of the contractor's outcome calculated for FP and CP 
The only differences between FP and CP that were accounted for in the analysis were 
their different risk allocation and type of pricing mechanism (i. e. only objective 
differences). The allocation of risks to the client under CP means that the client would 
pay the actual cost of the risks. The spread of the results calculated for CP (Figure 6.8) 
illustrates that considerable uncertainty surrounds the actual cost of the risks. If FP was 
used the client effectively pays the contractor a premium, established at the tender stage 
(i. e. before the risks occur), so that the contractor assumes responsibility for the fisks 
and pays their actual costs. Therefore the client avoids not only paying the actual cost of 
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the risks, but also the uncertainty surrounding their cost. However, Figure 6.8 indicates 
that the premium that the client must pay to transfer the risks to the contractor is likely 
to cost the client more than the actual cost of the risks. 
This result has ensued because the fixed price tender bids estimated for FP were 
intended to minimise the likelihood that the contractor will make a financial loss. it is 
evident from Figure 6.9 that this has been achieved. However, in those instances where 
the actual cost of the risks is less than its maximum possible level, the risk premium 
supplements the contractor's profit. As a result the contractor's profit under FP is likely 
to be substantially greater than that if CP was used. 
6.1.7 Re-assessing the inputs for FP and CP 
it is evident that the model is able to produce meaningful results that could aid the 
decision process. However, when interpreting the results, it is crucial for the decision- 
maker to appreciate their origin. The results are a product of the input estimates and the 
subjective assumptions that underlie these estimates. 
If particular inputs are recognised as having considerable impact upon the model output 
or if some inputs were especially speculative it may be worthwhile to investigate the 
sensitivity of the model output to these inputs. However, one must bear in mind that the 
inputs are expected to be intuitive because the analysis is being carried out at the project 
outset and contract strategies are evaluated on a subjective basis. 
Since the model output cannot offer any guarantees with regards to contract strategies' 
actual impacts upon a project's price and duration one must aim to use the model 
efficiently. Therefore, rather than assessing the implications of all the subjective 
assumptions in the analysis, the decision-maker may need to focus upon the 
assumptions that are most relevant to the particular contract strategy decision problem 
that is under assessment. 
For the inputs in the preliminary analysis it was assumed that the two contract strategies 
would not have any distinguishing cost and time effects on the project activities and 
risks. However, the quantitative approach is designed to enable a decision-maker to 
account for subjective assumptions about contract strategies' anticipated cost and time 
effects. 
Subjective distinctions between FP and CP that could be incorporated into the analysis 
include: 
e The base cost of the project management activity could be increased for CP relative 
to that for FP. This is to reflect the possibility that the client will expend more 
resources on cost monitoring for CP than FP because CP uses a cost reimbursable 
type pricing mechanism and allocates the project risks to the client. 
212 
The base cost of the project management activity could be increased for FP relative 
to that for CP. This is to reflect the possibility that the client may expend more 
resources to supervise the contractor's work if FP is used. This is because FP places 
the contractor under a great deal of financial risk and the client does not want this to 
lead to a deterioration in quality standards. 
The base duration of all the activities in work package 2 could be decreased for FP 
relative to CP. The justification for this relative reduction derives from the 
assumption that, compared to CP, FP provides the contractor with a greater 
incentive to sustain a higher productivity rate. 
It was perceived, however, that a more significant subjective distinction between FP and 
CP warranted quantification: impact of risk control measures. The following section 
addresses this issue. 
6.1.7.1 Modelling the impact of risk control measures 
The objective differences between FP and CP are: 
FP allocates the work-related risks of work package 2 to the contractor while CP 
allocates these risks to the client; and 
2. FP requires the contractor to fix the price of work package 2 before the work has 
commenced. In contrast, if CP is used, the client fully reimburses the contractor's 
actual costs incurred for work package 2 and the contractor receives an additional 
fee. The fee must be fixed before the work is commenced. 
One could perceive that, owing to these differences, FP is likely to induce more 
effective management of the risks in work package 2. This subjective assumption could 
be justified as follows: 
1. FP allocates the risks in work package 2 to the party which can best control them 
(i. e. the contractor); and 
2. FP provides the contractor with more incentive to minimise the cost of the risks. 
This is because the fixed price type pricing mechanism governs that the contractor's 
profit increases if the cost of the risks is minimised. 
These subjective assumptions suggest that the inputs for CP should remain the same as 
those estimated in the preliminary analysis, while the inputs for FP should be modified 
to reflect the anticipated reduction in risks if FP was used. 
To begin with, it was necessary to identify which risks may be reduced by the 
contractor's implementation of effective control measures. Table 6.3 lists the identified 
risks and indicates the measures that may reduce the cost and delay associated with 
these risks. 
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Project Risk Ri sk reduction strategy 
Hard ground (risk rio. 2.4-1 1. Standby blasting 
(related to tunnel boring activity) 2. Advance probing 
3. Altemative cutters 
Water ingress (risk no. 2.4.2) 1. Install advance de-watering 
(related to tunnel boring actk ity) 2. Grouting systerns on standby 
3. Potential for compressed air 
4. Drive uphill 
5. Pumps on standby 
Machine failure (risk no. 2.4.3) 1. Additional fitters 
(related to tunnel boring activity) 2. Standby components 
Grout required (risk no. 2.5.2) 1. Grout kit on-site 
(related to tunnel lining activity) 2. Personnel and equipment on standby 
Table 6.3 The risk reduction measures which may induce cost and time savings under 
FP 
it was expected that the implementation of risk-reducing measures would increase the 
base cost and base duration of the respective activities. Figure 6.10 presents the 
adjustments made to the inputs t1or the risk of 'grout required during tunnel lining'. The 
modified inputs flor the other risks are displayed in Table 6.4. 
Work package number: 2 
A clivity n umber: 2.5 
Activityname: Lining 
Risk number: 2.5.2 
Risk name: Grout required 
Partll responsiblefor the risk: contractor 
Aclivijýv's base cost., LO. 75NI Activin, 's base cost: LO. 80M 
Activity's base duration: 6months Activitys base duration: 6 months 
Quarterly risk level Most likely risk level 
(tick appropriate riýk le%el) 
Additional cost (LM) 
(to the acti ity's base cost) 
Delay (months) (to the 
acti% itv's base duration) 
Negligible (O%o) 0 0 0 0 
Marginal (25%) 0.20 0.13 0.40 0.25 
Serious (50%) 0.35 0.25 0.75 0.50 
1 -; evere (75%) 0.60 0.38 1.10 0.75 
rCritical (100%) 0.70 . 50 1.50 1.00 
Kev: D Original estimates El Revised estimates 
Figure6.10 Revised quantification of the 'Grout required' risk for FP 
214 
1 
ei 
<0 
»j 0-4 
001 
os 
00 ý 
02 
00 k 
os 
, 001 
i 
09 
w ý- gz P ,t sz M 
ihm dw"p 
wi ý- e sz e sz ? .i 
Me 
F- l= u 
(0) 
F-I 
ýo as 
215 
Once the new estimates were inputted for FP the model calculated, and subsequently 
displayed, probability distributions of 
0 Me contr(ic-for's costs. This includes the base cost of all the activities in work 
package 2 and the cost of the risks which are owned by the contractor. Since FP 
allocates all the risks in work package 2 to the contractor this distribution is 
effectively a distribution of the cost of the work involved in work package 2. 
0 Me clieta's cosis (for w, ork 1xickage 2). Owing to the inputs made for FP, the client 
costs for work package 2 includes just the costs associated with the tender process 
activity. 
Figure 6.11 shows the distributions of the contractor's costs calculated from the original 
and revised inputs for FP. The revised inputs reduce the mean value of the contractor's 
costs from 11 1.6M to fI OW. The revised inputs also reduce the standard deviation of 
the contractor's costs distribution from 1.09 to 0.50. Therefore it is evident that the 
additional cost and time expended in implementing the risk-reducing measures is 
justified by the potential reduction in the cost of the work. 
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Contractor's costs (Emilon) 
Figure6.11 The contractor's costs under FP for both the original and revised inputs 
Given the results in Figure 6.11 it appears that the contractor does not require a risk 
premium that is as large as that included in the fixed price bids estimated for FP in the 
preliminary analysis. Furthermore, since the risk-reducing measures decrease the 
uncertainty surrounding the cost of the work the estimated distribution of tender bids 
may cover a smaller range of values. However, it was decided to employ the same 
bidding strategy as that used in the preliminary analysis of FP (i. e. the same levels of 
mark-up which are specified as percentages of the most likely cost of the work were 
used). 
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8.75 925 9,75 10.25 10.75 11.25 11.75 12.25 12.75 1325 13.75 14.25 
925 9.75 10.25 10.75 11.25 11.75 12.25 12.75 U25 13.75 1425 14.75 
Fixed price bidding strategy used for F (based upon the revised inputs for FP) 
Most likely cost of the work (derived from the results shown in Figure 6.11) = flO. 9M 
The distribution of tender bids are estimated as different levels of mark-up added to the 
most likely cost of the work. These levels of mark-up are specified as percentages of the 
cost of the work. The mark-up is intended to include an adequate risk premium and a 
margin of profit. 
Minimum fixed price bid = 1.12 x 10,9 =I 12.2M (i. e. 12% mark-up) 
Most likely fixed price bid = 1.20 x 10.9 = f 13.1 M (i. e. 20% mark-up) 
Most likely fixed price bid = 1.22 x 10.9 = iI3.3M (i. e. 22% mark-up) 
Figure 6.12 shows the project price and duration results calculated from both the revised 
and the original inputs for FP. Figure 6.13 displays the contractor's financial outcome 
under FP calculated from the original inputs and fi-om the revised inputs. 
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Figure 6.12 Comparison of the price and duration results for FP calculated from both 
the original and revised inputs 
it appears that effective management of the risks will be to the advantage of the 
contractor as well as the client. Figure 6.13 illustrates that implementing the risk- 
reducing measures is likely to provide a more secure profit margin for the contractor. 
The mean financial outcome of the contractor calculated from the original and revised 
inputs for FP are L2.68M and 11.98M, respectively. The original inputs for FP 
presented the contractor with a 0.01 probability of making a financial loss, but a 0,93 
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probability of making a profit which exceeds 1IM. The revised inputs for FP have 
eliminated the possibility of the contractor making a loss (the minimum outcome was 
calculated at LO. 19M). In addition the probability that the contractor will make a profit 
that exceeds fIM has increased slightly to 0.96. 
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Figure 6.13 Comparison of the contractor's financial outcome for FP calculated from 
both the original and revised inputs 
The revision of inputted values for FP was based upon a subjective distinction made 
between FP and CP. It was perceived that, relative to CP, FP was expected to induce a 
reduction in the potential size of the major project risks. Figures 6.14 and 6.15 compare 
the results calculated from the revised inputs for FP and the results calculated for CP in 
the preliminary analysis. 
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Figure 6.14 Comparison of the project price and duration results calculated for 
FP(revised) and CP 
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Figure 6.15 Comparison of the contractor's outcome calculated for FP(revised) and CP 
The results may be interpreted as follows: 
0 the mean project price for FP and CP are f]3.6M and 112.9M, respectively; 
there is a probability of 0.45 that CP will induce a lower project price than the 
minimum possible price for FPI 
there is a probability of 0.14 that CP will induce a higher project price than the 
maximum possible price for FP, 
there is a probability of 0.95 that the contractor's profit for CP will lie between 
IOAM and DWI 
" the minimum, mean and maximum profit levels for the contractor under FP are 
IOAM, 12. OM and 0.7MI 
" FP presents the contractor with a 0.96 probability of making a profit which 
exceeds IIM. 
Based upon the assumption that the client aims to minimise project price and duration, 
the results of the preliminary analysis strongly suggested that CP was a better option 
than FP. In contrast, the results of the modified analysis suggest FP is a plausible 
option. Therefore one may conclude that the model output, in this particular analysis, is 
notably sensitive to the variables whose inputted values were modified. Although this 
sensitivity could be investigated further, it may be considered more beneficial and 
efficient to use and interpret the analysis in other ways. 
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6.1.8 Implications of the analysis to contract strategy selection 
The results in Figure 6.14 suggest that FP offers an advantage with respect to the project 
duration. The advantage is reflected in the fact that the mean duration calculated for FP 
is I month less than that calculated for CP. However, the probabilistic nature of the 
analysis enables a more sophisticated comparison of the two strategies to be made. For 
example it is possible to ascertain that FP provides more certainty with respect to the 
duration outcome (i. e. there is a smaller difference between the minimum and maximum 
duration for FP than CP). In addition, if it is assumed that the client ideally wishes to 
complete the project within a target duration, say for example 20.5months, one can 
interpret from the results that the probabilities that FP and CP will enable this target to 
be achieved are 0.80 and 0.45, respectively. 
Figure 6.14 clearly illustrates that FP is expected to restrain the maximum project price 
to a lower level than CP. However, one could infer that this advantage is not too 
significant given the information that the probability that CP will induce a higher price 
than the maximum price calculated for FP is only 0.14. Furthermore, the appeal of CP 
with respect to project price is increased in light of the 0.45 probability that CP will 
induce a lower project price than the minimum price calculated for FP. The project price 
appeal of CP is even further reinforced if one reflects upon the assumptions behind the 
modified analysis. This is because the subjective distinction made between FP and CP 
effectively maximised the positive aspects of FP. 
owing to the evident price appeal of CP, one may claim that the fixed price tender bids 
estimated for FP were too high. A review of the contractor's financial outcome under 
FP (Figure 6.15) provides some justification for this claim. Figure 6.15 shows that the 
contractor's profit is expected to be substantially higher for FP than CP. Therefore one 
might conclude that the analysis should be modified in order to asses the impact of an 
alternative fixed price tender bidding strategy for FP. 
The flexible structure of the model lends itself to iterative analyses. However, in some 
instances it can be more efficient and logical to manipulate previously calculated results 
using alternative analytical techniques. For example, Figure 6.16 illustrates a very basic 
probability tree which was used to approximate the project price distribution assuming: 
1. there is a 0.6 probability that the major project risks will be managed to the extent 
represented in the modified analysis; and 
2. there is a 0.4 probability that the major project risks will be managed to the extent 
represented in the preliminary analysis. 
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The major project risks are managed 
0.6 _, 
ý 
successftilly (i. e. the refined analvsis) 
FP is used to 
procure the project 
0.4 
The project risks are not managed 
(i. e. the preliminary analysis) 
Figure 6.16 Probability tree indicating the likelihood that the major project risks will, 
and will not, be successfully managed if FP was used 
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Figure 6.17 Comparison of the project price results calculated for CP with those 
calculated for FP (in both the preliminary and refined analysis) 
Figure 6.17 shows the project price distribution for FP that results form the application 
of the probability tree in Figure 6.16. Figure 6.17 compares this distribution with the 
project price distribution for CP. This figure reiterates the greater opportunity offered by 
Cp to minimise project price. It also provides a more accurate reflection of the price 
uncertainty which surrounds FP. However, it is very important to the decision process to 
recognise that this is the price uncertainty at the timing of the analysis (i. e. at the outset 
of the project). 
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The uncertainty surrounding the project price for both FP and CP is expected to 
decrease as the project progresses. This is because the quality and availability of project 
information will improve. However, the price uncertainty is also dependent upon the 
contract strategy, and in particular upon the contract strategy's type of pricing 
mechanism. The type of contract strategy is likely to influence the speed of flow of 
project information and also the timing of the tender process. At the tender process, the 
parameters of the contract strategy's pricing mechanism are established. Therefore the 
price uncertainty at the tender process stage is largely governed by the pricing 
mechanism parameters and the pricing mechanism formula for price calculation (see 
Table 5.6). 
In this case, FP employs a fixed price type pricing mechanism and this fixed price is 
required to cover the cost of all of the work including its related risks. Therefore, from 
the client's perspective, the price uncertainty surrounding work package 2 will be 
eliminated at the tender stage. The price uncertainty for FP will simply reflect the cost 
uncertainty surrounding the client's project management activity. In contrast, CP 
allocates all of the project risks to the client and the contractor is paid using a cost plus 
fixed fee type pricing mechanism. Therefore at the tender stage the contractor's fee will 
be known, but the client will still face all of the uncertainty surrounding the cost of the 
work. 
This important distinction between FP and CP was not exhibited in the model results. 
This is because the model has been applied, hypothetically, at the project outset rather 
than at the tender stage. However, at the project outset, it is vital to consider how the 
analysis may change as the project progresses. 
Although the capacity of FP to minimise price uncertainty has been brought to the fore, 
it is evident that FP is unlikely to be the most economical option for this example 
project. It has been demonstrated that, because the client retains the project risks, CP 
provides a greater opportunity than FP to achieve a lower project price. Nonetheless, the 
modified analysis highlighted that both the mean and spread of the project price and 
duration could be significantly reduced if the major risks were successfully managed. 
This is independent of who owns the risks. It is suspected that CP is unable to induce 
the maximum possible reduction in the project risks because: 
1. CP does not allocate the risks to the contractor which is assumed to be the party 
most able to control the risks; and 
2. CP provides virtually no incentive to the contractor to minimise the project price 
which includes the cost of the risks. 
in order to balance the advantages of FP with those of CP it would appear that the 
evaluation process may benefit from an analysis of contract strategies which share the 
project risks between the client and contractor. It could be decided that the most 
appropriate contract strategies to evaluate are those which are similar to FP and CP but 
which use a target cost type pricing mechanism. This pricing mechanism type 
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essentially allocates the project risks to the client because the work is paid on a 
cost-reimbursable basis. However, a target cost is agreed at the tender stage and the 
overrun or underrun of the actual cost relative to the target cost is shared (not 
necessarily equally) between the client and contractor. Therefore, although the client 
retains the project risks, the contractor has an incentive to minimise costs. 
Since this type of contract strategy places some responsibility onto the contractor, the 
target cost will include a premium to cover the contractor's share of the responsibility. 
As a consequence, if a target cost type pricing mechanism was used it is possible that 
the project price may cost the client more than if CP was used. Although this argument 
could continue discursively, it is suspected that application of the model will help to 
resolve it. 
The preceding sections have presented one example way in which the model could be 
applied to the tunnel project. It has been demonstrated that the model-user/decision- 
maker has the flexibility to use the analysis (both inputs and outputs) in whatever way 
he/she considers appropriate. 
In particular, this first example project has provided a clear demonstration of how to 
apply the model. It reports the model input steps for a single contract strategy (i. e. FP) 
in detail. 
The model application to the tunnel project was relatively straightforward. In the 
preliminary analysis, the estimates of cost and time values for the two contract strategy 
options were the same. The model was simply used to investigate the effect of the 
objective differences between the two options. These differences existed in the contract 
strategies' risk allocations and pricing mechanism types. 
However, each construction project is subject to its own set of circumstances. These 
circumstances may be inherent of the project or imposed by project participants. 
Therefore, following the preliminary analysis, the inputs for FP and CP were re- 
assessed in order to ascertain whether it was appropriate to account for any case-specific 
factors. 
owing to the objective differences between FP and CP, it was decided to modify the 
preliminary analysis of the two contract strategies. The two modified inputs reflected 
the assumption that more effective risk control measures were likely to be implemented 
under FP compared to CP. 
Section 2.2.4 reported that contract strategy selection is typically based upon subjective 
assumptions that make reference to relative advantages and disadvantages of contract 
strategy types. The second example model application in this chapter focuses more upon 
the model's capacity to enable subjective assumptions about contract strategies to be 
incorporated into the analysis. 
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6.2 Example project 2: factory and office building 
In this example it is assumed that a medium-sized computer manufacturing company 
wishes to expand and provide premises at a second location. A three-storey building is 
required (7000m 
2) 
. The ground 
floor is planned to house machinery while the first and 
second floors are to provide office space. The green-field site is located on the outskirts 
of a town. Several surrounding sites have been developed in recent years. 
The company's only construction experience was gained when its current premises were 
constructed 6 years earlier. The previous project was similar to the current project. The 
client used a contract strategy based upon the Traditional type organisational structure. 
Although the client considers the project was executed fairly successfully, the client has 
expressed a preference to complete the current project within a shorter period of time. 
The client perceives that tile sooner the building is in operation the better. However, the 
client is prepared to implement a contract strategy that may compromise the project's 
time performance providing it provides a sufficient guarantee that the price budget will 
not be exceeded. In other words, the client organisation has assigned priority to its price 
budget of E53M. Although project duration is of secondary importance, the client 
stipulated 120 weeks as the maximum permissible project duration. 
The following sections show how the model might be applied to aid contract strategy 
selection for this project. Section 6.2.1 describes the starting point for this process. 
6.2.1 Initial overview of contract strategy selection 
The client organisation had been the client of a previous, similar project that was 
adjudged to have been executed fairly successfully. Therefore it appeared that the same 
contract strategy option used to procure the previous project ought to be considered for 
the current project. This option is referred to, hereafter, 'as the Trad option because it 
utilises a Traditional type organisational structure. 
Although the client does not have any major objections to using the Trad option again, 
the client has expressed a preference to complete the project within a shorter time than 
the previous project. Therefore it was decided to evaluate a contract strategy option that 
utilises a Design-Build type organisational structure because this general type of 
arrangement facilitates fast-track construction. Other attributes which led to this choice 
of option to evaluate are reported in section 6.2.2.3. 
The Design-Build type option is referred to, hereafter, as the D-B option. Outline 
descriptions of both the Trad and D-B contract strategy options are provided in Figure 
6.18. 
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Trad option: 
The client's principal adviser, appointed at the project sanction stage, undertakes the 
contract administration on behalf of the client throughout the project. 
The client appoints an engineering consultants organisation to undertake the design work, 
including the conceptual design. The majority of risk relating to the conceptual design is 
borne by the client. 
At completion of the design, selected contractors arc invited to submit fixed price tender 
bids for the entire construction work, using a full bill of quantities. The successful tenderer 
is allocated the bulk of the risk related to the work covered by the contract, with the 
exception of risk related to ground work. The client retains this risk. 
D-B option: 
The client employs an organisation to act as tile employer's agent throughout the project. 
The agent is also assigned principal responsibility to undertake the conceptual design, 
although the client assumes all of the risks until a dcsign-build contractor is appointed after 
a two-stage tender process. 
Once the client has established a project brief, selected contractors are invited to submit 
tender bids that include drawings and approximate cost estimates. A contractor is then 
singled out to work with the employer's agent and develop the conceptual design and 
negotiate a fixed price for the remaining design and entire construction work. Essentially, 
the design-build contractor is allocated all of the risk related to the work covered by the 
contract. 
Figure 6.18 The contract strategy options initially evaluated 
6.2.2 Model inputs for the Trad and D-B options 
Figure 5.10 presented the steps involved in the specification of model inputs for a 
contract strategy. 
6.2.2.1 Step 1: Specification of the general details regarding the contract strategy's 
workpackages 
Figure 6.19 shows tile inputs used to represent the division of work imposed by the Trad 
contract strategy option. The first work package involves the design work which is to be 
undertaken by a party referred to as "Designee'. The second work package equates to 
the contract for the construction work which is to be awarded to a party referred to as 
"Contractor". Figure 6.19 also shows that the model-user has opted to model the tender 
process and pricing mechanism type associated with the second work package. When 
prompted, the user specified a single stage tender process activity and described the 
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activity as "competitive". When prompted with regards to the pricing mechanism type 
for work package 2, the user specified "fixed price". 
Figure 6.19 The general work package inputs for the Trad option 
Figure 6.20 shows the inputs used to represent the division of work imposed by the D-B 
contract strategy option. The first work package involves the conceptual design which is 
to be undertaken by the employer's agent (named "Agent" in the model application). 
The second work package equates to the contract covering completion of design and 
construction. "Contractor" is the name given to the party to which this contract is 
awarded in the model application. 
owing to the fact that the design-build contractor is appointed using a two-stage tender 
process whilst the conceptual design is in progress, the design-build contractor will 
receive a fee for its conceptual design contribution. The inputs under the column headed 
, Mgmt/Consultants fee' for work package I in Figure 6.20 indicates that the user has 
chosen to account for this fee explicitly in the analysis of the D-B option. When 
subsequently prompted, the user specified that the fee is to be a "lump sum". 
Figure 6.20 also shows that the user has opted to model the tender process and pricing 
mechanism type associated with work package 2. When prompted, the user specified a 
two-stage tender process activity and described the activity as 'Iwo-stage". When 
prompted with regards to the pricing mechanism type for work package 2, the user 
specified "fixed price". 
Figure 6.20 The general work package inputs for the D-B option 
6.2.22Step 2: Specification of the activities, risks and risk owners within each work 
package 
Figures 6.21a and 6.21b list the activities chosen to be analysed within the first and 
second work package, respectively, for the Trad contract strategy option. The figures 
show that the user has opted to analyse the general risk related to each activity, as 
opposed to specific activity-risks. The owners of each risk, as designated by the Trad 
option, are also reported in the figures. 
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Figure6.21a The activities, risks and owners of each risk specified for the Trad 
option's work package I 
Figures 6.22a and 6.22b list the activities chosen to be analysed within the first and 
second work package, respectively, for the D-B contract strategy option. The design and 
construction activities are the same as those specified for the Trad option. The second 
work package for the D-B option includes an additional tender activity to that of the 
Trad option because the D-B option uses a two-stage tender process. 
Like the inputs for the Trad option, the user has opted to analyse the general risk related 
to each activity. However, the D-B inputs differ with respect to the owner of the 
foundation-risk The D-B option allocates the foundation-risk to the design-build 
contractor while the Trad option allocates this risk to the client. 
Figure 6.22a The activities, risks and owners ofeach risk specified for the D-B 
option's work package I 
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Figure6.21b The activities, risks and owners of each risk specified for the Trad 
option's work package 2 
Work package 2 
WIM0. 
21 1, rolt-i G ''Ient 
2.2 tender G chent 
2.3 detailed design IS Contractor 
2.4 foUndabon_ G Contractor 
2.5 frame G Contractor 
2.6 services & finishe,, j G Contractor 
Figure 6.22b The activities, risks and owners of each risk specified for the D-B 
option's work package 2 
6.223Step 3: Qu an tification of activities and risks 
The model prompts the user to input cost and time estimates for the previously-specified 
activities and risks. A set of estimates is required for each contract strategy option. 
Therefore it is possible for the user to reflect the advantages and disadvantages which 
the user associates with each of the options in the appropfiate estimates. 
Table 6.5 presents a series of subjective assumptions that differentiate between the two 
contract strategies under evaluation in this model application. The blue subjective 
assumptions in Table 6.5 are perceived advantages of the D-B option relative to the 
Trad option. Meanwhile, the red subjective assumptions in Table 6.5 are perceived 
disadvantages of the D-B option relative to the Trad option. The first column in Table 
6.5 reports which user-specified activity is expected to be affected by each subjective 
assumption. 
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The subjective distinctions made between the two contract strategy options were 
incorporated into the estimates of each option's cost and time elements. Each option's 
set of estimates are presented in Table 6.6. Beforehand, however, Figure 6.23 provides 
an example of how the cost and time estimates for an individual activity (in this case the 
foundation activity) may be progressively refined to incorporate a variety of contrasting 
subjective assumptions about the contract strategy options' potential impacts upon the 
activity. 
Figure 6.23 shows the refinement of the estimates in five stages. The assumptions that 
are reflected in the estimates at each of the five stages are outlined below. 
Stau 
The building's foundations are expected to present some difficulties (e. g. piling may be required 
because of reports of subsidence in the area local to the site). Consequently, it is perceived that an 
application of practical construction experience during the design stage is likely to improve the 
management and execution of the foundation activity, including any risk events should they arise. 
Unlike the arrangement under the Trad option, the contractor at least manages the design and may 
also undertake the design under the D-B option. Therefore the values of the cost and time elements 
associated with the foundation activity are expected to be less if the D-B option, rather than the 
Trad option, is used to procure the project. 
In addition, it is perceived that the design-build contractor has more incentive to apply its practical 
experience, particularly in the event of risk occurrence, because the D-B option allocates the 
foundation-risk to the contractor whereas the Trad option allocates this risk to the client. The D-B 
option is also likely to generate less disruption in the event of risk occurrence because this option 
assigns overall, single-point responsibility to the design-build contractor. Therefore the lines of 
communication between the decision-makers and the parties responsible for implementing the 
decisions are simpler and more direct. 
The initial estimates of all the foundation activity's cost and time elements for the Trad and D-B 
options that reflect these assumptions are shown in the column headed 'Stage P in Figure 6.23. 
Stage 2 
The D-B option enables an earlier start on site than the Trad option (see schedule estimates in 
section 6.2.2.5). As a result, under the Trad option, the foundation activity is expected to extend 
into winter whilst tile D-B option is most likely to enable the activity to be completed before 
winter commences. Therefore the initial estimates of all the foundation activity's cost and time 
elements for the Trad option were modified to account for this probable event (see Stage 2 in 
Figure 6.23). 
The base cost and duration estimates were increased by E50k and 3 weeks, respectively, to reflect 
the likelihood of a lower productivity rate when the weather is expected to become more 
inclement. The same rcasonjustifics the increase in values estimated for the delays that may result 
in the event of foundation-risk occurrence. Meanwhile, only the additional cost values at the 
higher end of the risk level scale were increased to account for the perception that the more serious 
consequences of the foundation-risk would particularly escalate if they coincided with 
exceptionally adverse weather conditions. 
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Since the client organisation has very limited construction experience it is suited to an inactive role 
in the project once its requirements have been specified. Although the client has experience of the 
Trad option on a previous project, it is perceived that the D-B option is more appropriate given the 
type of client. 
This is because, firstly, the D-B option is expected to assist the client to provide a clearer and more 
comprehensive specification of requirements at a very early project stage, and secondly, the client 
is negated of significant responsibility once the contract is awarded, providing a competent 
employer's agent is appointed. Furthermore, the client's oversight is not as essential under the D-B 
option because this option allocates the foundation-risk to the contractor, not the client as imposed 
by the Trad option. 
The assumption that the client is more suited to the role under the D-B option was accounted for in 
the estimates by simply reducing the activity's base cost estimate by OR (see Stage 3 in Figure 
6.23). This was intended to simulate a reduction in administrative procedures across contractual 
interfaces. 
Stall 
Unlike the Trad option, the D-B option facilitates fast-track construction (i. e. overlap between 
design and construction). It is perceived that fast-track construction is likely to induce errors that 
would not occur if the design was completed before construction commenced. Furthermore, it is 
perceived that a more intense working schedule would be demanded by fast-track construction 
because it increases the importance of activities' start and finish times. As a result, the base cost 
and base duration estimates for the D-B option were increased by E80k and 2 weeks, respectively. 
Since fast-track construction puts considerable pressure onto the contractor and relies upon 
effective communication, any disruption is expected to be more substantial under the D-B option. 
Therefore this assumption led to an increase in the additional cost and delay values estimated for 
the D-B option (see Stage 4 in Figure 6.23). 
191=1 
The D-B option allocates the foundation-risk to the design-build contractor whereas the Trad 
option allocates the foundation-risk to the client. As a consequence, it is perceived that the design- 
build contractor will have a more pessimistic view of this risk's potential cost (i. e. estimate a 
higher level of additional cost values). The cost of the foundation-risk is also expected to be 
inflated under the D-B option owing to the fact that this option requires the potential cost of the 
risk to be covered by a fixed price tender bid established at a much earlier project stage, and thus 
subject to more uncertainty, than the fixed price tender bid established at design completion under 
the Trad option. In addition, the risk may be further over-priced because the market is fairly 
buoyant. The foundation-risk's additional cost values, estimated for the D-B option, were 
increased to reflect these assumptions (see Stage 5 in Figure 6.23). These assumptions also led to a 
further distinction between the two options' estimates. The most likely quarterly risk level was 
estimated at 25% for the Trad option, but 50% for the D-B option (see Table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 presents input data for the foundation activity as well as for the other 
activities. 
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6.2 2 4Step 4: Specification of correlation between iisks 
Figure 6.24 presents the correlation coefficients specified to model the dependencies 
between the risks in the model applications for both the Trad and D-B options. 
options 
The specified coeflicient value of 0.6 between the 'frame-general risk' and 4services 
and finishes-general risk' was based upon the perception that the cost and time 
performance of the frame activity was quite likely to be mirrored by the cost and time 
performance of the services and finishes activity. This is owing to the importance of 
integration between these two activities. The 0.5 correlation coefficient value specified 
for the relationship between the foundation and detailed design activities was intended 
to reflect the likelihood that substructure difficulties could require re-design work. In 
addition, it was anticipated that substructure performance could have some 
consequential effect upon the frame activity. Therefore a 0.4 coefficient value was 
specified to model this dependency relationship. 
6.2 2 5Step 5: Specification of prt4ect schedule 
Figures 6.25 and 6.26 show the estimated project schedules for the Trad and D-B 
contract strategy option, respectively. The options' schedules differ with respect to the 
fact that the D-B option facilitates overlap of the design and construction stages as well 
as more overlap between the construction activities 
Conceptual design rn-h Start 
1 m1h Fmmh 
I)dailed design Iv Sýk Most likely project duration 
estimate I 10 wk. 
Tender process 
Foundations start 
iv P. 911-1 
Frame 
St. 11 
services & Finishes 
lag P 
Figure 6.25 The project schedule inputted for the Trad option 
235 
Figure 6.24 The correlation coefficient matrix inputted for both the Trad and D-B 
Conceptual design Fumh Fmb 
la 0 
In , S 
-0-0 lag 0 
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lar, Tender process stage 2 F1, W, Start 
lag 0 
M st eh pr( 
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lag P 40-. 
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ei 
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ý 
Services and Finishes 
Figure 6.26 The project schedule inputted for the D-B option 
6.226, Vtep &Specification of tender bidy 
The user opted to analyse the effect of a fixed price pricing mechanism type on the price 
of work package 2 for both the Trad and D-B contract strategy options. Therefore, for 
each option, the model calculates, and subsequently displays, the distribution of costs to 
be incurred by the party assigned responsibility for work package 2. 
Figures 6.27 and 6.28 show the distributions calculated for the Trad and D-B options, 
respectively. These distributions were used to estimate a rational triangular probability 
distribution of fixed price tender bids for both contract strategy options. 
minimum = E4.074M 
mostlikely = f4636M 
ma)dmum = F4.301 M 
350 
300 
250 
c 200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
Figure 6.27 The contractor's cost distribution for work package 2 under the Trad 
option 
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Figure 6.28 The contractor's cost distribution for work package 2 under the D-B option 
Table 6.7 reports the formulae used to derive the minimum, most likely and maximum 
values of each option's triangular distribution of fixed price tender bids. It was decided 
to base the Trad option's most likely value on a higher cumulative percentile level 
because the distribution of' contractor's costs, under the Trad option, covered a much 
smaller range of values than the distribution of the design-build contractor's costs. 
Trad D-B 
minimum cost value at 80t'ý cumulative cost value at 80d'cumulative 
percentile level percentile level 
most likely cost value at I(X)tl' cumulative cost value at 95h cumulative 
percentile level percentile level 
maximum mean cost mean cost 
+0 1% of mean cost) + (I I% of mean cost) 
Table 6.7 Formulae used to derive values of the two options' tender bid parameters 
from their corresponding contractor's cost distribution for work package 2 
The values of the minimum, most likely and maximum fixed price bids inputted into the 
model for the Trad and D-13 options are presented in Table 6.8. It is important to note 
that the fixed price bids for the D-B option are intended to cover the contractor's cost of 
the detailed design and the construction whilst the fixed price bids for the Trad option 
are intended to coverjust the construction costs 
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fixed price bid Trad D-B 
minimum E4.400M E4.800M 
most likely E4.600M E4.950M 
maximum E4.750M E5.150 
Table 6.8 Each option's distribution of fixed price tender bids for work package 2 
At step I of the model inputs, the user also opted to model the design-build contractor's 
Jump sum fee for its contribution during conceptual design (i. e. work package 1). 
Therefore, during the D-B option's model application, the user is prompted to estimate a 
minimum, most likely and maximum value of the lump sum fee amount. The estimated 
values are shown in Table 6.9. 
Design-build contractor's lump sum fee for conceptual 
design contribution 
minimum E0.050M 
most likely E0.060M 
maximum E0.075M 
Table 6.9 The distribution estimate of the design-build contractor's lump sum fee for 
its conceptual design contribution 
6.2. Z 7 Step 7. - Specification of the timing of the client's payments and the project 
revenue 
Figures 6.25 and 6.26 indicate that the D-B option is likely to induce a significantly 
shorter project duration than that which would result if the Trad option was used. 
Consequently, a cash flow analysis for the project under the two contract strategy 
options was expected to provide informative results. 
Figure 6.29 shows the inputs specified to model the timing of the client's payments 
under the Trad option. Interim payments are to be paid every four weeks for both work 
package I and 2. 
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up-front TIME-RELATED ACTIVITY-RELATED 
payment interval 
Work packagel 2 F_ F1 
Work package2 
1-0- f4- 
F-1 
Figure6.29 Specification ofthe client's timing of payments under the Trad option 
Figure 6.30 shows the inputs specified to model the timing of the client's payments 
under the D-B option. During both work package I and 2, the client is to pay for each 
activity on completion. 
Figure6.30 Specification ofthe client's timing of payments under the D-B option 
With regards to project revenue, the user estimated that the client will receive an annual 
net income off2M during its first five operational years. Although these estimates did 
not provide a precise or long-term representation of the project's operational 
performance, they provided a suitably accurate basis for comparison of the contract 
strategies' impacts upon the net present value of the project. Therefore these project 
revenue estimates were inputted for both the Trad and D-B option. 
The discount rate was estimated at 8%. 
6.2.3 Model output for the Trad and D-B options 
The model performed 1000 S1111111ated runs ofthe project using each of the two contract 
strategy options' set of inputs. Each option's project pr c Ie and duration results are 
presented as contour plots in Figure 6.31. Table 6.10 provides a statistical comparison 
of each option's price and duration results. 
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Figure 6.31 Comparison of the 1000 project price and duration values simulated for the 
Trad and D-B options 
Price Duration 
StatiStiCal FnCaSUrC TR, %i) D-B TRAD D-B 
Minimum L4.943M L5.085M 104. Owk 81. lwk 
Maximum L5.70 IM L5.510M 138.5wk 102.8wk 
Mean L5.218M L5.286M 116.9wk 90.9wk 
2.5 d'Cumulati%'C L5.014M L5.138M 107.1wk 84.6wk 
perccntile 
97.5"' cumulativc L5.5(X)M L5.440M 129,2wk 98.7wk 
pcrccntilc 
P(X > BudgCO 1 
0.23 
1 
0.42 0.29 
1 
0 
Table6.10 Comparison of statistical measures between the Trad and D-B contract 
strategy options 
A significantly wider price range has been calculated for the Trad option and its 
maximum price value is nearly L200k more than the maximum price value calculated 
for the D-B option. However, the price values at the 2.5h and 97.5, h cumulative 
percentile levels indicate that the majority of the 1000 simulated price values calculated 
for the Trad option cover the lower portion of its pnce range. This is reinforced by the 
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fact that the mean price calculated for the D-B option is VOk more than that calculated 
for the Trad option. Furthermore, in accordance with these results, there is a 0.23 and 
0.42 probability that the price will exceed the client's price budget (i. e. 15.3M) if the 
Trad and D-B options, respectively, are used to procure the project, 
In contrast, the D-B option is clearly the better option with respect to the project's time 
performance. The mean duration calculated for the D-B option is 26 weeks less than 
that calculated for the Trad option. 
The client regards the project completion date as less important than the project price 
(see section 6.2). Nonetheless the client expressed a preference to ensure the project is 
completed within 120 weeks. Although the mean project duration calculated for the 
Trad option is inside the 120 week target, there is, according to these results, a 0.29 
probability that the duration will exceed 120 weeks. Meanwhile, the maximum duration 
calculated for the D-B option is 17 weeks less than this deadline. 
Figure 6.32 shows each option's distribution of net present values (NPV) of the project 
which includes the client's price for the project and project revenue (estimated at 12M 
net annual income over a five year period). Since the project price is expected to be 
generally higher under the D-B option, it is apparent that the overall time saving 
induced by the D-13 option, relative to the Trad option, can make a significant difference 
to the value of the project The mean NPV for the D-B option is L60k more than that 
calculated for the Trad option. 
2A 25 26 272.8 29 10 
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Figure 6.32 Comparison of the Trad and D-B options' distributions of net present 
values of project price and revenue 
Given these results, the D-B option is preferred to the Trad option. However, since the 
client organisation is very keen not to exceed the price budget, the D-B option's 0.42 
probability that the price will exceed the budget is regarded as unacceptable. It was 
therefore decided to investigate whether a variation of the D-B option could induce a 
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lower price whilst retaining the advantages of the original D-B option. The contract 
strategy subsequently chosen to be evaluated is referred to as the 'D-B Target' option. 
The revised D-B option is the same as the original D-B option with the exception that 
the client is required to remunerate the design-build contractor for the foundation 
activity using a target cost type pricing mechanism. In the original D-B option, the 
general risk related to the foundation activity was allocated to the contractor and both 
the activity's base cost and risk cost were to be included in a fixed price intended to 
cover all of the design-build contractor's costs. In contrast, the use of the target cost 
type pricing mechanism, in the revised D-B option, effectively shares the actual cost of 
the foundation-risk between the client and the design-build contractor. 
In the D-B Target option, the other construction activities (frame, services and finishes) 
and detailed design activity are still grouped together as a fixed price package. The 
decision to isolate just the foundation activity and use a cost-based pricing mechanism 
was based upon the assumptions that this activity presented the greatest risk and 
because elements ofthis risk were uncontrollable. Therefore sharing the risk between 
the client and contractor was considered a more equitable arrangement and it reduced a 
contractor's probable inclination to include a conservative risk premium in a fixed price 
tender bid. 
6.2.4 Model inputs for the D-B Target option 
The following sub-sections report the model inputs for the D-B Target option which 
differ from the original D-B option's inputs. Input steps 4,5 and 7 for the D-B Target 
option are not presented because thev are the same as those reported for the original 
D-B option 
6.2.4.1 , Vtep 1: Specification of general details regarding the contract strategy's work 
packages 
The D-B Target option utilises two pricing mechanism types within the same prime 
contract awarded to the design-build contractor. As a result, the model-user specified 
the division of work for this contract strategy option in the format shown in Figure 6.33. 
When prompted, the user specified a fixed price type pricing mechanism for work 
package 2 and a "Target cost (without GMP)- type pricing mechanism for work 
package 3. 
Figure 6.33 The general work package inputs for the D-B Target option 
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6.2 4.2Step 2: Specification of the activities, risks and risk mvners within each lv(,, rk 
package 
The same activities and risks specified for the original D-B option were inputted again 
for the D-B Target option. However, the foundation activity is specified under the new 
option's third work package rather than the second work package. As with the original 
model, the user opted to analyse the general risk related to the foundation activity and 
also specified the design-build contractor as the owner of the risk. Nonetheless, the risk 
is effectively shared between the client and contractor, This is because the target cost 
pricing mechanism type requires the client to reimburse the contractor for all his costs, 
but then the difference between the contractor's costs and the predetermined target cost, 
whether it be a saving or loss, is divided between the client and contractor in 
proportions dictated by the predetermined sharing ratio (see Table 5.6). 
fication tf activities and risks 6 2.4. -? 
Step 3: Qu an ti 
The D-13 Target option's estimates of each activity's base cost, base duration and each 
risk's additional cost and delay values were the same as those inputted for the original 
D-B option with the exception of the foundation activity estimates. 
Section 6.2.2.3 presented the series of subjective assumptions used to reflect the 
potential Impact of the D-B and Trad options upon the foundation activity's cost and 
time estimates, Following a review of these subjective assumptions it was decided that 
Stage 5 (Figure 6.23) of the estimates' refinement did not entirely apply to the revised 
D-B option. 
Stage 5 made reference to the fact that the D-B option allocated the entire foundation- 
risk to the design-build contractor. Therefore it was perceived that the risk's additional 
cost values ought to be increased by a margin that reflected the contractor's probable 
inclination to overestimate the potential cost of the foundation-risk. Figure 6.34 shows 
the additional cost values used in the analysis for both the original and revised D-B 
options. It should be noted that all of the other estimates for the foundation activity 
remained unchanged. 
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Figure 6.34 Comparison of the foundation-risk's additional cost values estimated for 
the original and revised D-B options 
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6.2.4.4, Vtep 6: Specification qf tender bidv 
Two sets of tender bids had to be estimated. The first set was the triangular distribution 
of fixed price bids for work package 2 while the second set included distribution 
estimates of the target cost, target fee and a single estimate of the sharing ratio for work 
package 3. 
Figures 6.35 and 6.36 show the design-build contractor's costs for work package 2 and 
work package 3, respectively. With regards to work package 2, the formulae used to 
derive the minimum, most likely and maximum fixed price bid values were the same as 
those used to obtain the fixed price bid values for the original D-B option (see Table 
6.7). Table 6.11 shows the distribution of fixed price bid values inputted for the D-B 
Target option's work package 2. 
minimum = E3.613M 
most likely = E4.282M 
ma)dmum = E3.913M 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
Contractor's costs (Emillion) 
Figure6.35 The contractor's cost distribution for work package 2 under the D-B 
Target option 
Fixed price tender bids for work package 2 
minimum L4.025M 
most likch, L4.150M 
- um T L4.325M 
Table6.11 The distribution estimate of the fixed price tender bid for work package 2 
under the D-B Target option 
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wI LQ 
minimu-m--- EO. 5-08-M-- 
most likely EO. 892M 
ma)omum EO. 664M 
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Figure 6.36 The contractor's cost distribution for work package 3 under the D-B 
Target option 
Tender bid parameter minimum most likeh, maximum 
Target cost (T) LO. 640M LO. 650M LO. 665M 
Target fec (F) LO. 015M LO. 025M LO. 040M 
Table 6.12 The distribution estimates of the tender bid parameters for work package 3 
under the D-B Target option 
Table 6.12 reports the values of the tender bid parameters that were inputted for the D-B 
Target option's work package 3. The minimum, most likely and maximum target cost 
values correspond to the design-build contractor's cost for work package 3 at the 45 Ih 
5& and 55b cumulative percentile levels. The minimum, most likely and maximum 
target fee values are equal to 2%, 4% and 6% of the design-build contractor's mean cost 
value for work package 3. The sharing ratio is fixed at 0.5 (i. e. any cost savings or 
losses relative to the target cost are shared equally between the client and contractor). 
the sharing rate (b) is li\Ld at a single %', ilLw tvcausc it is assumed that this %, alw is dictated by the client 245 
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6.2.5 Model output for D-B Target option 
Figure 6.37 presents a contour plot of price and duration results simulated for the D-B 
Target option. Figure 6.37 compares it to the contour plots previously calculated for the 
original D-13 and Trad options. Table 6.13 provides a statistical comparison of the three 
options' price results. 
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Figure 6.3 7 Comparison of the 1000 project price and duration values simulated for the 
Trad, the original D-B and the D-B Target contract strategy options 
Statistical measure TRAD D-B D-B TARGET 
Minimum L4.943M L5.085M L4.842M 
Maximum L5.70 IM L5.510M L5.640M 
Mean L5.2 I 8M L5.286M L5.175M 
2.5"' cumulative 
pcrcentile 
L5.014M L5.138M L4.930M 
97.5"' cumulativc 
perccntile 
L5.5(X)M L5.440M L5.460M 
P(X > Budgct) 1 0.23 0.42 1 0,17 
Table 6.13 Comparison of statistical measures on the project price results calculated 
for the Trad, the onginal D-B and the D-B Target options 
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According to the results, the revised D-B option is expected to make significant cost 
savings relative to the original D-B option. The mean price value calculated for the D-B 
Target option is V l0k less than that calculated for the original D-B option and L40k 
less than that calculated for the Trad option. Although the maximum price calculated for 
the D-B Target option is fI 30k more than that calculated for the original D-B option, 
according to the results, there is only a 0.17 probability that the project price will exceed 
the client's budget (i. e. 15.3M) if the D-B Target option is used. This is in contrast to 
the original D-B option's 0.42 probability for this event to occur. 
The reduction in project price has also had a significant impact on the net present value 
of the project. The mean NPV for the D-B Target option is 1190k more than that 
calculated for the original D-B option and 1250k more than that calculated for the Trad 
option. 
Despite the fact that generally a lower price value was calculated for the D-B Target 
option, the financial outcome of the design-build contractor has not been compromised 
significantly. Figure 6.38 compares the distribution of contractor's financial outcome 
calculated for the original and revised D-B option. Table 6.14 provides a statistical 
comparison, including the contractor's financial outcome calculated for the Trad option. 
The mean and maximum values of the contractor's financial outcome that were 
calculated for the D-B Target option are L50k and f130k, respectively, less than those 
calculated for the original D-B option. Nonetheless the revised D-B option induced the 
lowest calculated loss (-1141K), its lower 95% confidence limit is approximately zero 
(i. e. break-even), in contrast to -137K calculated for the original D-B option, and the 
probability that the contractor will incur a financial loss is slightly less than that 
calculated for the original D-B option. 
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Figure 6.38 Comparison of the contractor's financial outcome under the original and 
revised D-B options 
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-0.3- -02- -01 - 00- 01 - 02- 03- 0,4- 05- 0,6- 0.7- 0.8- 
-02 -01 00 01 02 03 04 U5 06 0,7 0.8 0.9 
Statistical measure TRAD D-B D-B TARGET 
Minimum 40.172M -EO. 283M 40.14 1M 
Maximum LO. 632M E0.791M ; EO. 662M 
Mean EO. 280M EO. 346M EO. 293M 
95% confidence limits 
E0.016M 
EO. 545M 
-EO. 037M 
LO. 729M 
E0.007M 
EO. 579M 
Prob. of financial loss 0.02 0.04 0.03 
Table 6.14 Comparison of statistical measures on the contractor's financial outcome 
results calculated for the Trad, the original D-B and the D-B Target options 
6.2.6 implications of the analysis to contract strategy selection 
Given the details presented in the preceding sections, one could simply conclude that 
the D-B Target option is the best, from the three options evaluated, for the example 
project. This conclusion is largely based upon the model output and the client's 
objectives which were expressed simply in terms of single figure price and time 
budgets. However, it is important to appreciate that the model output has derived from 
subjective judgement and therefore any decision should not be based purely upon the 
output. instead it is intended for the decision-maker to interpret and use the model 
output together with the model inputs to direct the decision process. 
The way in which the decision-maker interprets and uses the insights gained from the 
model application is very much dependent upon personal judgement and the particular 
circumstances of tile decision. For example, following the model application the client 
organisation may be prompted to review its price and time budgets or even its priority 
rating between the price and time objectives. The decision to evaluate the D-B Target 
option was a calculated judgement based upon the analysis of the Trad and original D-B 
options. However, it may have been equally valid to have evaluated alternatives such as 
a D-13 option where the entire foundation-risk is allocated to the client or a D-B option 
where all of the risk related to detailed design and construction work is shared using a 
target cost mechanism. 
The process of applying the quantitative approach is intended to provide insights which 
are as valuable as the those provided by the model output itself. Table 6.5 presented a 
series of subjective distinctions between the Trad and D-B options which were reflected 
in each option's model inputs. Figure 6.23 also demonstrated how the foundation 
activity's estimates were refined for the Trad and D-B options to incorporate several of 
the subjective assumptions cited in Table 6.5. It should be noted that each model input, 
even each estimate refinement as featured in Figure 6.23, may be derived from an 
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application of quantitative or qualitative analytical techniques. Therefore the model 
inputs, in addition to the model output, equate to results from an application of the 
quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. 
It is inefficient to perform analysis to ascertain the sensitivity of the output to each input 
owing to the large number of inputs. Sensitivity analysis for certain inputs may be 
necessary and useful. However, the decision-maker's time and effort may be expended 
more wisely by reviewing the subjective assumptions accounted for in the model inputs. 
A major aim of the quantitative approach is to encourage the contract strategy selectors 
to rationalise their intuitive, qualitative assumptions about contract strategy options. 
it is expected that, before any analysis was undertaken, the decision-maker would be 
confident that the Trad option would induce a significantly longer project duration that 
the D-B option. However, it is probable that the decision-maker would be less assured 
about the two options' relative, potential impacts upon the project price before any 
analysis was undertaken. One may hypothesise that the decision-maker's uncertainty 
could stem from the following two contrasting, general, intuitive assumptions: 
I. the Trad option requires the client to bear the cost of any risk related to the 
foundation activity while these costs are bome by the contractor under the D-B 
option; 
2. Design-Build type contract strategies generally induce a higher price for a project 
than Traditional type contract strategies. 
owing to the explicit and quantitative nature of the model inputs, the decision-maker 
was compelled to rationalise the two previously-cited assumptions as well as other 
subjective distinctions between the Trad and D-B options. As a result, it was possible to 
accumulate a series of contrasting, qualitative assumptions and obtain an explicit 
overview of what all the assumptions amount to, in very tangible and appropriate terms; 
units of cost and time. Consequently, the analysis of the Trad and D-B options is likely 
to reduce the decision-maker's uncertainty about the two options' relative, potential 
impacts upon the project price. 
It is has been demonstrated that a considerable amount of useful information can be 
gained from evaluating contract strategy options in units of cost and time. In addition to 
project price and duration, it is possible to calculate the values of a variety of other 
variables such as a contractor's financial outcome and the net present value of the 
project. A contract strategy's potential ability to induce a project performance that 
satisfies the client's price and duration objectives can be measured directly. It is also 
possible to compare, explicitly, several contract strategies' potential impacts upon a 
project's performance. 
The use of probabilistic techniques certainly leads to valuable measurements. The 
advantage of estimating a distribution of values, rather than a single value (e. g. mean), 
for each cost/time element was illustrated by the Trad option's expected effect upon the 
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project duration. The mean project duration value calculated for the Trad option was 
less than the client's prescribed target of 120 weeks, yet the distribution of duration 
values indicated that there was a 0.3 probability that the target would be exceeded. 
Another aim of the quantitative approach is to make the assumptions explicit so that 
they are open to criticism, particularly from the decision-maker. As the actual project 
events unfold the decision-maker may be able to attain a more objective perception 
about the validity of his/her assumptions. Therefore contract strategy decisions on 
subsequent projects may be less subjective. 
This section has provided a brief overview of how the model application for the 
example factory building may assist the contract strategy selector. It has emphasised the 
view that the quantitative approach is not intended to produce answers, but to provide 
guidance to the decision-maker's inevitable subjective judgement. 
It is possible to develop the model so that it ascertains the optimum contract strategy 
from those to which the model has been applied for a particular project. This is possible 
because the model could measure the model output, for each contract strategy evaluated, 
with respect to certain criteria prescribed by the user. These criteria could relate to, for 
example, acceptable probabilities of exceeding budget levels and the minimum 
permissible financial outcome for a contractor. Although the introduction of automation 
of this type offers definite advantages, it may impair, firstly, a decision-maker's 
appreciation of the assumptions underlying an analysis and, secondly, a decision- 
maker's impetus to perform iterative analyses. As a result, decision-making automation 
may disable the learning potential of the quantitative approach. 
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Conclusions 
Numerous sources have identified deficiencies that exist in the industry's typical 
approach to contract strategy selection (see section 2.3.2). The use of inappropriate 
contract strategies results in inefficient construction, with the associated time delays and 
financial penalties. 
In this thesis a quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation has been developed 
to eliminate the deficiencies in current practice and induce better contract strategy 
decisions. The key observations and insights gained from the research are presented in 
section 7.1. Section 7.2 is a discussion about how the research might be further 
developed in the future. A major item within the discussion concerns the underlying 
research aim which is to improve contract strategy selection in the long-term. 
7.1 A review of the research observations and insights 
The initial research objective was to gain an understanding of both the nature of contract 
strategy selection and the industry's typical approach to this decision problem. This 
understanding was gained from literature and interviews with fourteen industrialists. 
It appeared that both the construction industry and academia can be accused of over- 
simplifying the decision problem. The desire to establish a set of generally-applicable 
decision rules is considered to be a major contributory factor to the over-simplification. 
Several deficiencies appeared to exist in the industry's typical approach to contract 
strategy selection. The existence of these deficiencies was supported by the survey of 
industrialists. The deficiencies include: 
" limited appreciation of the decision options; 
" failure to set clear, realistic and balanced price, duration and quality targets; 
failure to wholly rationalise decisions in terms of the client's primary objectives; 
unstructured and imprecise decision mechanisms; 
lack of explicitness and transparency in the decision mechanism; and 
failure to account for the uncertainty inherent in contract strategy selection. 
The research set out to develop a new improved methodology to contract strategy 
selection and implement it in a model. The general requirements of a new methodology 
were reflected in the research objectives. It was aimed to devise an approach that: 
" was attuned to the nature of the decision problem; 
" can and will be applied by the industry (i. e. is feasible and practical); 
" aids a decision-maker to make rational contract strategy decisions; and 
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has the potential to improve the industry's knowledge about contract strategy 
selection. 
The research provided many insights into the extent to which these four objectives were 
met. The key insights are presented below under headings that refer to each objective. 
Attuned to the nature O-f-c-offilrla-ct-sitrlat-99Y -selection 
The existing contract strategy decision-aids were not attuned to the nature of the 
decision problem. They did not address, in sufficient depth, the interrelationship 
between a contract strategy, a project's circumstances and a client's objectives. 
Essentially, they all comprised fairly generalised decision rules which often 
differentiated between contract strategies using criteria that did not equate to 
rationalisation in terms of the client's primary objectives (i. e. project price, duration 
and quality targets). For example, many existing contract strategy decision-aids 
ascertain the appropriateness of a contract strategy from, amongst other criteria, a 
client's preference to retain or transfer the bulk of project risk. Other than imposing 
a structure on the decision process, the majority of the existing decision-aids appear 
to incorporate the same set of deficiencies that exist in the industry's typical 
approach to contract strategy selection. 
The quantitative approach was developed to address the nature of contract strategy 
selection and thereby to eliminate the deficiencies in current practice. The 
quantitative approach aims to discipline a decision-maker to address the 
interrelationship between a contract strategy, a project's circumstances and a client's 
objectives. The quantitative approach requires a decision-maker to reflect his/her 
perceptions about a contract strategy's likely impact upon a project in probabilistic 
estimates of the project's constituent cost and time elements. The estimates are then 
combined to give probabilistic cost and time measures of project performance that 
reflect the potential impact of the particular contract strategy that was evaluated. 
Therefore the appropriateness of a contract strategy, including its risk allocation, is 
rationalised in terms of the client's primary objectives rather than in terms of criteria 
such as the client's preference to retain or transfer the bulk of project risk. 
In addition to simulating a project's cost and time performance, the quantitative 
approach involves simulating particular features of each contract strategy that is 
evaluated (e. g. work packaging, risk allocation, pricing mechanism). Although, in 
theory, the quantitative approach may be used to evaluate any contract strategy, for 
practical reasons, not all contract strategy features can be simulated by a model that 
provides a framework with which to apply the quantitative approach. For example, it 
is impossible to simulate the precise organisational structure imposed by a contract 
strategy. It is also difficult to establish a generic model framework that is capable of 
simulating all possible variations of risk allocations and pricing mechanisms. 
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-Feasible and practical 
The feasibility of the quantitative approach was supported by a number of literature- 
reported cases where prospective contract strategies for a project had been 
differentiated in terms of their expected impacts upon the cost and time performance 
of the project (Chisnall, 1991; Pedwell et al., 1996). 
The interviewed industrialists expressed both positive and negative views about the 
feasibility of the approach. As expected, the majority of the industrialists were 
initially very sceptical. However, the new approach was received more positively by 
some as they became familiar with its principles. The six who completed 
questionnaires indicated that, in their view, the quantitative approach was workable. 
There is a need to recognise that the quantitative approach has a limitation that may 
prevent its use in practice. This limitation relates to the large amount of data that a 
user is required to acquire and input when applying the quantitative approach, 
particularly in the format adopted in the refined model. Furthermore, some of this 
input data may be difficult to obtain because: 
the data is unavailable at the outset of a project; or 
it involves estimation of variables that have little intuitive appeal. 
The majority of the interviewed industrialists expressed reservations about the 
practicality of the quantitative approach. Some industrialists claimed that there 
would be insufficient time and other resources available at a project's outset to 
apply the quantitative approach. Other industrialists perceived that its application 
would be a waste of valuable resources because the approach relies upon very 
speculative information. 
Useful decision-aid 
The theoretical applications of the quantitative approach (reported in chapters 3 and 
6), together with the applications performed by the six industrialists (reported in 
chapter 4), demonstrated that an application of the quantitative approach leads to a 
series of outputs that may aid contract strategy selection. For example, the output of 
the refined model includes a distribution of project price, project duration and the 
financial outcome of parties contracted by the client. Several of the interviewed 
industrialists indicated that the price and duration results of the quantitative 
approach provided a useful overview of the likely differences between contract 
strategies. 
The decision-maker can analyse and test his/her theories and assumptions relevant 
in each contract strategy decision problem by varying either the nature of the input 
variables or the values estimated for the input variables. Therefore the process 
involved in arriving at the inputs may prove to be very insightful. In fact it would 
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not be surprising to find that the process involved in applying the quantitative 
approach provides more decision-making insights than its final outputs. 
Some of the interviewed industrialists stated that the quantitative approach served a 
useful purpose in breaking contract strategy selection down into a series of sub- 
decisions where each sub-decision was an appraisal of a contract strategy with 
respect to a project's specific cost and time clement (e. g. design cost, tender process 
duration, etc. ). Other industrialists commended the quantitative approach for its 
focus upon contract strategy decisions made at the outset of projects. These 
industrialists regarded good, early project decisions as prerequisites for a 
successfully-managed project. 
Poten ction 
Two industrialists who completed questionnaires recognised the need to question 
their intuitive judgement once shown the price and duration results calculated from 
their estimates of cost and time elements that reflected the likely impact of the 
contract strategies they had evaluated. This result is an indication of the potential to 
improve an individual's knowledge about contract strategy selection by making their 
decision process structured and transparent. 
The reliability of the analysis will always be subject to criticism, especially the 
output to the refined model because it is the accumulated product of a large number 
of subjective estimates. Many of the interviewed industrialists expressed 
reservations of this type. However, it is intended that the rigorous, structured and 
explicit nature of the quantitative approach enables the criticism and debate to be 
directed to the theories and assumptions that underlie the model inputs and outputs. 
it is believed that this may lead to less subjective and, subsequently, better contract 
strategy decisions. 
7.2 Scope for further development of the research 
The research described in this thesis has led to the development of a probabilistic model 
which assists in the decision-making associated with contract strategy selection. The 
model represents a quantitative approach, which is sufficiently developed to have been 
applied to realistic examples in its present form. Discussion on scope for further 
development will focus on the following aspects: 
practical considerations for model application; 
extensions to the scope of the model in terms of flexibility in range of inputs; and 
* extensions to the model which would enable it to be used as a record of experience. 
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7.2.1 Practical considerations for model application 
The questionnaires employed in the empirical research are considered to have provided 
industrialists with a very useful introduction to the quantitative approach. Some of the 
industrialists who completed questionnaires may be sufficiently familiar with the 
underlying principles to apply the quantitative approach to an actual project. This is 
clearly the next step in the research. 
Initially, it is advisable to use the model in the fairly simple manner demonstrated with 
the hypothetical tunnel project in Chapter 6. In this example the objective differences 
between the contract strategies (i. e. each option's risk allocation and pricing mechanism 
type) were focused upon. In contrast, application of the model to the second example 
project in Chapter 6 (i. e. factory building) took a greater account of the subjective 
assumptions used to distinguish between contract strategies. This application also 
indicated that technical methods may be used to decide upon the values to be used for 
model inputs. It is arguable that some of the subjective assumptions accounted for in the 
analysis for the factory building project are too speculative and uncertain to quantify. 
However, this speculation and uncertainty could reduce as a decision-maker 
accumulates more experience in the application of the quantitative approach. 
There is a vast amount of literature that present abstract theories about the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of broadly-defined contract strategy types (e. g. 
comparing 'Traditional' with 'Design-Build' - see section 2.2.4) and about the 
allocation of project risk (see section 2.5.1.1.1). The research has demonstrated that the 
application of quantitative techniques to contract strategy decisions enables these 
theories to be put into context and tested. The tests are not definitive, but they make the 
decision processes transparent and thereby encourage rigorous and rational decision- 
making. It should be noted that the quantitative techniques, and the principles justifying 
their use, apply to any decision problem, not just contract strategy selection for 
construction projects. 
At this stage in the research, priority has to be assigned to instilling the fundamental 
principles of the quantitative approach into a decision-maker's conventional approach to 
contract strategy selection. The fundamental principles refer to the process of translating 
subjective assumptions into cost and time estimates and being able to justify the 
resultant estimates. Consequently, suggestions for work in the immediate future include: 
review the user-comprehension of the model and possibly write a manual to 
accompany the model; 
work alongside a contract strategist during an application of the model to an actual 
project; and 
report and analyse the results of the case study. 
it has already been acknowledged that it is impossible to obtain a conclusive measure of 
the feasibility and utility of the quantitative approach, nor can it guarantee selection of 
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appropriate contract strategies on future projects. Nonetheless, it is presumed that a 
meaningful measure could be gained if the approach was applied by practising contract 
strategists to a series of projects over a long period of time. 
7.2.2 Extensions to model flexibility/complexity 
Chapter 5 described the latest model designed and constructed to facilitate application 
of a quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. Chapter 5 reported that many 
of the refinements made to the prototype model (e. g. correlation between cost and time, 
simulation of a contract strategy's risk allocation) were warranted given the 
compromises made during the development of the prototype model and the insights 
gained from the empirical research. Meanwhile other refinements (i. e. calculation of a 
project's NPV and the financial outcome of contractors) were regarded as particularly 
valuable and relevant model-additions. 
However, the refined model could be developed further. For example, it may be 
extended in the following ways: 
The decision-maker may gain valuable insights if the model incorporated a 
framework that enables each contract strategy's organisational structure to be 
modelled in more detail. Obviously, the aspects of a contract strategy's 
organisational structure that are outside the control of the client or not imposed by a 
contract strategy may not be modelled. However, it may be possible to obtain an 
accurate model of the structure within the client's organisation, including the 
client's advisors, for each contract strategy option. It may also be possible to model 
the contractual interfaces between contracted parties and the client's team. 
The flexibility of the model may be increased to allow more pricing mechanism 
types to be modelled. For example, the current model simulates only one variation 
of a target cost type pricing mechanism. Furthermore, there is no facility to simulate 
a target time mechanism or simulate a mechanism that utilises both target cost and 
time levels. The model similarly constrains the mechanism options for 
management/consultant fees. 
It would be advantageous to introduce a time dimension into the analysis. The 
quantitative approach is intended to be applied at the outset of projects before any 
critical contract strategy-related decision is made. Therefore the results reflect the 
level of certainty prevalent at the project outset. However, it is possible to use the 
same analysis to survey how each evaluated contract strategy will affect the level of 
price certainty throughout the project. This output is governed by a contract 
strategy's pricing mechanism type(s) and the timing of a contract strategy's tender 
process(es) because the values of a pricing mechanism's parameters are generally 
fixed at the corresponding tender process. Since price certainty is a commonly-cited 
selection criterion, the calculation is expected to be a valuable addition. 
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The above list is not a definitive set of possible model-extensions. There is scope to add 
a variety of features to the refined model. However, Ward (1989) highlighted that a 
model's clarity, flexibility and convenience (i. e. constructive simplicity) tends to be in 
conflict with the model's completeness. Ward (1989) and Chapman and Ward (1997) 
suggest that constructively simple models are more likely to be developed into complete 
and valid models. 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that application of the refined model can produce meaningful 
results and is capable of providing aid to contract strategy selection. It is acknowledged 
that further features could be added to the refined model. However, in light of the 
comments by Chapman and Ward, it is reasonable to assume that the refined model is 
sufficiently complex. Therefore it is believed that that any potential developments to the 
refined model should not be addressed until the current model has been tested 
thoroughly. 
7.2.3 The model as a record of experience 
ICE (1996) claimed that improved efficiency in the construction industry may be 
achieved by, amongst other things, "adoption of continuous improvement culture and 
more systematic learning from project successes and failures". Simon et A (1997) 
acknowledged that experience can be captured effectively and efficiently by making 
objectives, decisions and estimates explicit so that they can be reviewed once the 
relevant events have transpired. The quantitative approach and the model designed to 
facilitate application of the approach adhere to these principles. However, with regards 
to explicitness and the learning process, the model could be improved in time by the 
development of a database. For each project the database could store: 
" quantitative input and output for each contract strategy option to which the approach 
is applied; 
" details of each contract strategy evaluated; 
" the subjective assumptions underlying the inputs that make reference to the 
perceived distinctions between contract strategies and to particular project details; 
and 
" information resulting from a review of each completed project. 
A database used in this way could lead to the identification of generalities on a personal 
level or individual organisation level. The author has serious doubts about developing a 
knowlcdge-based contract strategy decision-aid that will be valid and perceived as 
insightful throughout the industry. Nevertheless it is perceived that the likelihood of 
such a model being developed is improved if individual decision-makers learn to select 
contract strategies on a less subjective and more case-specific basis. 
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Before a database can be built it is necessary to establish the type of data that will be 
useful and how best the data can be stored for effective retrieval (Chapman and Ward, 
1997). This information will become apparent once the quantitative approach is put into 
practice. 
it is anticipated that it will take time before a decision-maker is comfortable with, and 
competent at, application of the quantitative approach to contract strategy evaluation. 
However, owing to the importance and complexity of the decision problem, as a long- 
term solution it is considered to represent a valid proposal. 
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